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Problems of Communism

SEPTEMBER – OCTOBER 1971



CHINA REVISITED
Tillman Durdin

The Tupamaros
Robert Moss

Socialist Law
Harold J. Berman

Soviet Agriculture
Roy D. Laird

Marxist-Christian Encounter
Edmund Demaitre

Book Section

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Problems of Communism

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SEPT-OCT 1971 VOL XX

Problems of Communism is a bimonthly publication. Its purpose is to provide analyses and significant background information on various aspects of world communism today. Opinions expressed by contributors do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the United States Government. Editorial office: U.S. Information Agency, 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20547.

HOW TO SUBSCRIBE: Outside the United States, *Problems of Communism* may be obtained by writing to the nearest office of the U.S. Information Service. Residents of the United States may purchase annual subscriptions or single copies by writing to the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Price per copy: $.50. Subscription price: $3.00.

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Cover: A huge statue of Mao Tse-tung at the Shanghai No. 1 Machine-Tool Plant. Photo by Tillman Durdin.

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The New Face of Maoist China

By Tillman Durdin

Providentially for the student of Chinese communism, there have been periodic partings of the curtain of secrecy and xenophobia that most of the time has veiled developments in the People's Republic of China. First, there was the upsurge of free speech and travel during the "hundred flowers" interlude of 1957, which revealed the existence of a startling degree of general opposition to the Peking regime and especially of bitterness among the intellectuals. Then, after the launching of Mao's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in the mid-1960's brought a new loosening of controls, there were the extraordinary exposés of the Red Guard tabloids in 1967–68, which disclosed the depth of the chasm—long in existence but almost unsuspected in the outside world—between the party bureaucrats led by Liu Shao-ch'i and the Mao-oriented idealist-radicals in the Chinese Communist leadership.

By contrast, the latest unveiling—signaled by the admission into the People's Republic for the first time of numerous Americans along with an increased influx of other foreign visitors—has brought no entirely unexpected or dramatic disclosures. The researcher in Hong Kong, in Tokyo, in London, or in Berkeley who has been assiduous at his task can take satisfaction from the fact that, despite his long disbarment from Communist China, he has been able to obtain enough data to make possible a reasonably accurate general assessment of the state of affairs in the PRC. Yet, for the writer at least—a longtime China-watcher from Hong Kong and other outside vantage points—the renewed personal contact made possible by a three-week visit to the People's Republic in April and May of this year has produced amplifications, some discoveries, and some corrections—nothing spectacularly new or completely unanticipated, but nevertheless impressions and fresh information that fill in important gaps in the dossier of Communist China as previously assessed.

Mr. Durdin is the Hong Kong correspondent of the New York Times. *A veteran of many years of reporting from China prior to 1949, he was among those US journalists granted a visa to visit the People's Republic of China this spring. He is the author of* Southeast Asia, *New York, Atheneum, 1966.*

The New Equilibrium

The aspects of the present China scene that is perhaps most striking is the effective functioning and relative stability of society. This comes as something of a surprise to the visitor still influenced by the disruptions that occurred during the Cultural Revolution, by the stories of continuing popular discontent brought into Hong Kong by refugees from the mainland, and by the outpourings of the Chinese Communist press and radio about factionalism, ideological deviations, organizational inadequacies, and slackness in labor performance. No doubt the troubles and deficiencies noted from outside the country do in fact exist to some degree. Even though the short-time visitor does not see much evidence of these aspects, there must be considerable dissatisfaction among some sections of the population,

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cleavages and infighting within the leadership, disillusionment in some segments of the youth, and tension among the intellectuals. Nevertheless, it is quite apparent to the visitor both from his own observations and from the findings he gleans from other foreign observers who either live or have traveled widely in the People's Republic, that social equilibrium predominates, that the vast majority of the people have adjusted to and accept Maoist communism as it operates today.

The proletarian masses streaming to work every morning on foot or—in the big cities—on millions of bicycles, or bending to their group tasks in the fields and workshops of the countryside, are obviously relaxed and visibly cheerful. One is particularly struck by the youthful energy and earnestness of the people. They look well fed; their drab, often patched, but usually clean blue and gray trousers and high-necked tunics for both men and women are adequate dress in an egalitarian society that frowns on any nonconformist ostentation. The marching groups one sees in city and countryside waving banners and singing as they go to perform special tasks are no doubt being prompted and supervised by cadres, but their faces wear a look of genuine satisfaction. And along Shanghai's famous Nanking Road, the main shopping street, the throngs that spill during the day and into the night over the sidewalks and through the No. 1 People's Department Store (in pre-Communist times the Wing On Department Store, the city's largest) appear at ease. Factory workers performing their tasks amidst wall slogans calling for maximum output seem intent on their work but free of tension.

A people traditionally as industrious as the Chinese—now 800 million strong—is bound to make economic gains when working without dislocations, in disciplined fashion, and along rational lines. Thus, it is not surprising that the generally more settled state of Chinese society over the last two years has brought a marked improvement in economic conditions, which in turn has contributed to increasing stability. Against this background, Premier Chou En-Lai's claimed figure of 240 million tons for grain production in 1970 is a believable one, and there are similarly credible reports of sizable increases in industrial output as well as visible evidence of sophisticated new products. The year 1971 appears certain to witness the achievement of new production peaks in both industry and agriculture, making the People's Republic a major if not top-rank economic power.

The recent economic advances appear to have been translated into some improvement of popular living standards. City shops and department stores display an adequate range and supply of utilitarian consumer goods. For what are considered to be nonessential or luxury items, such as a TV set, a multiwave radio receiver, an electric as distinct from a foot-pedal sewing machine, and better-quality clothing, the prices are high—usually above Hong Kong or world levels—and seemingly designed to curb consumption. On the other hand, the prices of essential goods as well as services are conspicuously low, the regime evidently preferring to improve living standards by lowering prices in these areas rather than by raising personal incomes, which it sternly opposes in principle on the ground that the satisfaction of serving society should be the citizen's prime incentive for harder work. There is, however, one notable exception to this: in rural areas where there have been marked increases in production, the peasants' cash allotments have been augmented in the year-end distribution of collective farm earnings.

Rebuilding the Power Structure

The new stability that impresses the visitor to the People's Republic today is a product of the reconsolidation that has been carried out after the end of the radical changes wrought by the Cultural Revolution. It is also a measure of the extent to which the old bureaucracy, bolstered by the military, has gradually managed to regain much of its former authority after being demeaned and demoralized by radical-left attacks during the GPCR.

Many of the party functionaries and managerial cadres in industry who were assailed and often deposed by Maoist radicals and their Red Guard followers have been rehabilitated and reinstated. A case in point is Chou Kwan-wu, a tall, muscular, 55-year-old self-trained engineer, with whom the writer talked during a visit to the big Shihchingshan steel plant west of Peking. Chou was manager of the plant when the Cultural Revolution began. He described at length how he subsequently suffered through intensive and protracted criticism and self-criticism but survived to resume his duties in charge of plant production—a position equivalent to that of manager—and to serve as a "leading responsible" member of the plant's present revolutionary committee. He maintains that he is now a reformed man and no longer holds himself aloof from the workers as he

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once did, emphasizing technique, rules and regulations rather than the creativity and industriousness of labor. He says that he now "goes down among the masses," takes part regularly in physical labor, eats in the workers' mess halls, dresses like the workers, and places Mao Tse-tung thought in command.

Besides Chou, nine other veteran cadres are on the plant's revolutionary committee of 50 members and remain in key directing positions. Linked with Mr. Chou in authority is a chunky, emphatic-looking army man, Shao Hsing-hsiang, the top military representative among ten on the committee. The 30 other members are workers' representatives, many of them party stalwarts and therefore establishment-oriented. Clearly the controlling force on the committee and in the plant consists of party cadres and military men in alliance.

The visitor finds the situation at Shihchingshan repeated from the smallest organizations up to the highest. At the top levels—*i.e.,* in the central party and government organs and in the provincial and municipal party and revolutionary committees—the predominance of the cadre and military elements is evidenced by the fact that they hold a large majority of the key positions, with the military men usually in more decisive roles than the cadres. The present power structure thus reflects a clear triumph of cadre-military pragmatists over the radicals—with the tacit, if possibly not always happy, concurrence of Communist Party Chairman Mao himself—in the maneuvering and factional infighting of the Cultural Revolution. Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Chiao Kuan-hua repeated to this visitor a statement that is now often heard in the People's Republic, namely, that not more than one percent of party members would end up permanently purged as a result of the Cultural Revolution.

Premier Chou En-lai has definitely emerged as the chief operative civilian leader within the reshuffled ruling hierarchy. During the writer's visit to Peking, Chou conducted himself at receptions and on public ceremonial occasions such as May Day with the manner of a man confident of his position. Defense Minister and Deputy Party Chairman Lin Piao heads the power structure on the military side, but with what control and assurance it is hard to say. In ill health and unimpressive as a personality, he appears and is mentioned only rarely in public. He and Chairman Mao, who is visibly weak from age, appeared on the reviewing stand in front of the Tien An Men for the May Day evening celebrations, but only briefly. The regime was represented more prominently by Premier Chou and People's Liberation Army Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng, both of whom moved about on the platform chatting with prominent guests and members of the diplomatic corps. Huang's activity reinforced the impression that he is the operative front man in military affairs much as Premier Chou is in the civilian administration.

Administrative Problems

The new stability is all the more remarkable in that the new revolutionary committee structure is revealed to the visitor as still experimenting with responsibilities that encompass the functions formerly exercised by managements and government organs with established procedures and much larger staffs. Members of revolutionary committees admitted that their organizations were still making operating shifts and changes and trying to simplify procedures so that they could handle their duties with the smaller number of personnel that the regime has decreed should be assigned to administrative jobs. Their problem is accentuated by the fact that committee members—and of course all other administrative personnel, except at highest levels—must put in a certain number of days each week (the number varies) performing manual labor with the masses. All this is in addition to the fundamental retraining the cadres have gone through or will have to go through at one time or another at the special cadre-school work farms.

Even diplomatic officials apparently are not exempt from performing periodic manual labor. At a dinner he gave for the writer in Peking, Huang Hua, the new Chinese Ambassador to Canada, and his wife proudly stated that they now knew all about spreading manure and transplanting rice as a result of months of duty, concluded only in April, on a cadre-school farm in Hunan. All this is in accordance with Chairman Mao's directives aimed at keeping the size of the bureaucracy at a minimum (we must have "fewer troops and simpler administration," he said during the Cultural Revolution) and at preventing officials from becoming an entrenched and privileged class divorced from the masses.

Despite completion of the revamping of the top-level party structure where the Central Committee and Politburo function, many lower-level party committees have not yet been re-formed, and their absence, combined with the factional jockeying that

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goes on in and around the revolutionary committees for membership in the party committees, appears to be hampering to some extent the effective and settled functioning of the new power structure. Many activities are still being carried out on an *ad hoc* basis; chains of command are still fluid; and many operational procedures are still transitional. When the revolutionary committees were first decided upon in 1967 as an impromptu administrative device to take the place of organs shattered during the Cultural Revolution, they were described as a temporary expedient. It now looks, however, as if they will be around for a long time, and it remains to be seen how efficient and effective they will prove in the long run.

Discipline and Control

In any case, the existing stability is the product of more than just the authority of the revolutionary committees on the one hand and voluntary popular acceptance on the other. Discipline is induced through the regime's massive propaganda effort—Mao slogans on every building and wall and virtually round-the-clock exhortations in the press and on radio broadcasts—and through the more important social groupings for mutual self-exposure and criticism—the process officially labeled the "struggle-criticism-transformation" phase of the Cultural Revolution.

Evidence of this process in operation is everywhere. At the Peace Hotel in Shanghai, service at six o'clock in the morning is apt to be a little tardy because the staff personnel on each floor are gathered in a service pantry, armed with their little red Mao books, going through mutual criticism sessions. At the core of this system at all levels is a group leader—a military regular or militiaman or the group's ranking party member—who represents the authority and potential sanctions of the regime. The system is an effective one, embodying as it does a self-enforcing instrumentality in the group sessions. Behavior that deviates from prescribed rectitude and group consensus is quickly spotted and corrected, and the group leader is always present to interpret official policy and symbolize the power of enforcement. It is a system which requires little display or use of force.

To be sure, the visitor sees police and regular soldiers or militiamen everywhere, but the latter are unarmed and usually engaged in activities more civilian in character than military. All through the new power structure, the military personnel are highly politicized and operate more as commissars than as agents of control by force. Except in the military operational organs, they directly command no troops and carry no guns. Thus, although the military are omnipresent, and although at this stage their institutional framework of control is probably stronger than that of the still not fully reconstituted party, the People's Republic is not under military rule in the traditional sense.

One of the many roles of the PLA in recent years has been to provide a model of proper work-style, dedication, and leadership for the entire nation to follow. As the top military member of the revolutionary committee of the Shihchingshan steel plant, Shao Hsing-hsiang, defined it, "Our fundamental task remains to study and apply Mao Tse-tung Thought in a living way together with workers and staff, to raise their political consciousness, and to keep active the struggle against the reactionary bourgeois line." But while official propaganda continues to exalt the military more than party men as models in these areas, increasing prominence is apparently being given once more to party men and units—clearly suggesting an effort to reassert the role of the party after the decline and disintegration it suffered during the Cultural Revolution. Although the visitor gets only sporadic indications of it, the evidence provided by resident observers and the Communist news media points to the emergence of a quiet rivalry between military men and party men for leadership.

Toward the New "Maoist Man"

The group system of control and the living implementation of the regime's Maoist philosophy denigrating selfish desires and exalting service to society, state, and revolution have given the Chinese in the People's Republic a self-effacing, communal quality that makes a striking impression on the visitor. The extent to which this quality is forced cannot, of course, be learned in a short encounter. But the system visibly engenders a sense of participation and of mutual responsibility among the people. Today's Chinese, though he doubtless falls far short of being the ideal Maoist man—egalitarian, austere and industrious—envisioned by the Party Chairman, is at least a conspicuously changed man —and in the direction that Maoism has tried to

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steer him. An indication of this is the standard reply the visitor receives when he questions a cadre about his aspirations in life. "I am ready to go wherever the party sends me and do whatever the party wants me to do." One has the impression that it is often more than just lip service.

Another thing that strikes the visitor familiar with the assertive, often raucous competitiveness of the Chinese in Hong Kong and Taiwan is the subdued, undemonstrative demeanor of the people of the mainland in their ordinary daily life. Perhaps it is the need to compensate for this everyday restraint that accounts for the vociferous enthusiasm with which the masses of citizens respond to organized demonstrations, marching and singing in the hundreds of thousands and working up a seemingly genuine sense of hate as they shout the prescribed slogans—"Down with US imperialism!" "Down with revisionism!," "Down with Japanese militarism!," and "Wipe out imperialist aggressors!"

Strangely enough, these frequent exercises in mass denunciation of the US and other enemies—carried out for years against a constant backdrop of propaganda outpourings in the press, wall posters and slogans, and over the radio—seem to represent mainly manipulated emotions. True, the foreigner is still viewed with suspicion and often with gauche curiosity—in a Tientsin department store the writer was so besieged by a mass of gawking shoppers that he had to be rescued by Intourist guides and spirited up a stairway. And "surveillance by the masses," a hangover from the xenophobia whipped up in the first two years of the Cultural Revolution, can still afflict the outsider who wanders into security-sensitive sectors of the big cities: this means being hemmed in by an unfriendly press of people until some policeman or military man comes to extricate the hapless visitor from his entrapment. But hostility toward the visiting American or any other foreigner is absent unless officially prompted, and friendliness is the general attitude.

The regime's effort to stamp out the influence of the old and the traditional, which is a key part of the operation to create a new Maoist man, is conspicuously evident, particularly to the visitor who has known China in pre-Communist times. The old, colorful practices of the traditional religions and festivals are no longer to be seen. Temples, mosques and churches are closed. The old art and literature are barred to the general public, with even the museums containing the treasures of China's great art heritage no longer open. The old imperial quarter in Peking with its magnificent halls and palaces may soon be reopened to the Chinese public, the visitor is told, but at present it is still only to be seen by visiting foreign groups.

Everywhere Maoist slogans have replaced the old traditional maxims carved into stone and woodwork, and white plaster statues of Mao have appeared in the place of the gilded Kuan Yins, the Kuan Tis, the eight fairies and other Buddhist, Taoist and Confucian images that once decorated religious and ceremonial places. Family altars are no more; the kitchen god is no longer burned in a send-off to heaven on New Year's eve with sugar smeared on his lips to ensure a good report of family behavior for the preceding 12 months. The colorful traditional weddings and funerals are gone; Confucian filial piety, paternal dominance, and the old extended family system are things of the past. Only the old even remember; a new generation and a new, rationalized but more drab society with a new outlook on life has come into being.

The Problem of Youth

The new generation of youth has been a problem for the regime, but by all present appearances it is being successfully channeled into the service of the system. The sending down (*hsiafang*) of millions of young people who had served as rampaging instruments of the purges of the Cultural Revolution to live and work in the countryside risked making these no longer wanted Red Guards a bitterly discontented and troublesome element in society. Evidence in the regime's own press and radio broadcasts indicates that many have, in fact, become angry and disillusioned. Further proof is provided by the scores of *hsiafang*-ed youth who escape every month into Hong Kong. But political pressures and indoctrination nevertheless seem to have persuaded the majority to accept the hardships of the new life, if not happily at least resignedly. By dint of adjusting to their lot and showing the proper political attitudes, many have worked their way into more congenial roles than that of an ordinary farm laborer and have become "barefoot" doctors, collective-farm accountants, and machine-shop technicians. Many have newly joined or been readmitted into party organizations. The visitor even meets some who are now back in the cities as students selected for higher education at a university or as junior specialists in a factory.

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

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

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1—Members of a visiting Australian table tennis team, accompanied by press representatives, strolling through the "Forbidden City," the old Imperial quarter of Peking, now closed to the general public and opened only on special occasions. Even here, Mao slogans now decorate the walls.
2—A view of Peking's vast Red Square as preparations were about to begin for the 1971 May Day celebrations. Five years ago the Square was the scene of massive Red Guard demonstrations during the Cultural Revolution.
3—A couple of the standard motor car sedans now being produced in the People's Republic. The models shown here are called "the Shanghai" and are made in this largest Chinese city.
4—View of a downtown Shanghai street. The scant pedestrian and vehicular traffic stands in sharp contrast to the bustling crowds and congestion of pre-Communist times and reflects the present shortage of transport facilities. One old feature of the Chinese urban scene—the "pedicab" (a cyclist-propelled rickshaw)—has been outlawed as a symbol of past exploitation.
5—Apartment buildings in a workers' housing development at Pengpu, outside Shanghai.
(All photos taken and made available by the author.)

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At the same time, a new layer of youth has grown up unaffected by the disillusionment of the banished Red Guards, and the regime is providing its members with active socio-political roles that, for the present at least, seem to be satisfying a majority. Typical was the part this new generation of youth played both in the preparations for and in the actual celebrations of this year's May Day all over the country. In Peking, parading, singing, giving amateur theatrical performances in the city parks, controlling holiday traffic, cleaning the streets, and taking part in the spectacular night-time May Day show of plays, operas, choruses, and gymnastics gave the youngsters a heady sense of importance and participation in national affairs. And elsewhere youth activities were roughly the same. It is by such devices, as well as through the new system of education with its combination of physical work and classroom study, that today's youth is kept preoccupied, propagandized and controlled.

The Reform of Education

The new school system, the visitor finds, has been almost universally established for primary education but is still in an incomplete stage at the middle-school and university levels. The system embodies practices that many educators around the world —leaving the question of political content aside— would consider good educational policy: classroom study with books, lectures and demonstrations, combined with manual work either in school workshops and farm plots or in outside factories and farms. While providing the basics of general culture, courses emphasize the vocational and practical, and students of worker, peasant and soldier background receive preference in admission. The content of study materials has been or is being revised to eliminate all so-called bourgeois influences and to conform to proletarian Maoist views and policies. Teachers must accept student surveillance and criticism and must also enlist the students' ideas for revising teaching materials to meet the new criteria.

The system envisages shortening the total period of primary, secondary and university schooling from the previous 16–17 years to 12–13. While attempting to provide universal primary education, it is designed to effect a sharp reduction of the numbers who go on to middle school and university. The scheme calls for middle-school students, upon graduating, to drop schooling to go through a couple of years of manual labor and examination of political attitudes, after which only a qualifying proportion will go on to university. Again, after two to three years of university studies interspersed with manual labor and emphasizing the vocational, graduates will return to factories and farms for a further period of physical work, after which only a select few will go on to higher studies.

The university phase of the new system, this visitor found, was just beginning, with only a scattering of universities starting with freshman classes. At Peking's Tsinghua University, which formerly was the country's premier engineering school and now is being publicized as a pioneer and model of the new university system for other institutions to follow, professors and members of the university revolutionary committee admitted to many difficulties in revising and compressing study materials into shortened, politically-proper courses, in dealing with new worker-peasant-soldier students of widely varying levels of learning, in fitting manual work into the curriculum and incorporating the orthodoxies of Maoism into every aspect of labor and study.

Veteran professors and administrators, many of them once scholars abroad like Dr. Chen Wei-chang, former aerodynamics specialist at the California Institute of Technology, professed to have become politically transformed in the course of more than two years of grueling reindoctrination at the hands of students and workers during the Cultural Revolution. But it was evident that there was still tension and uncertainty among the teaching and directing personnel at Tsinghua, as indeed there seemed to be among many of the faculty members of other academic institutions. The stories of many of them were too automatic and well-rehearsed, too profuse in their protestations of rapport with the Maoist way, to be all from the heart.

At the Peking No. 2 Middle School, things seemed to be more settled and organized for the student body of 1,500 and a teaching staff of 120. How studies are based on Mao's precepts was demonstrated in French classes that were using sayings from Mao's red book for language lessons, a physics class where natural phenomena were explained in terms of the Maoist theory of contradictions, and work programs in which both teachers and students were engaged in making classroom tables and stools and tiny diodes for electronic equipment. Military training is a regular part of the curriculum, and vacations are given over partly to agricultural work. Yet the amount of conventional teaching still being

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done at this school was surprising and left one with the thought that as the new educational system works itself out, it may prove—from the sheer necessity of creating citizens with enough general education to cope with a technological society—less revolutionary than Chairman Mao and his innovators, even at present, intend.

The No. 2 Middle School in Peking appeared to be one of only a few reformed schools at that level even in the capital. Shanghai authorities said that most of that city's middle schools were still operating, as of mid-1971, within the old organizational patterns. Thus organizationally, if not in terms of study content, education at the middle-school level all over the country is still in a stage of transition. At the university level, too, only a minority of the country's higher institutions had resumed classes under the new system by the middle of this year. Teachers subjected to attacks and humiliation during the Cultural Revolution are still hesitant, and many have dropped out of teaching; revised textbooks and teaching materials remain in short supply. Thus, education clearly continues at the top of the unfinished business of the Cultural Revolution. Incorporating the rigid political orthodoxies of Maoism into the rational organizational and procedural patterns that are contemplated is not proving to be easy.

Economic Progress

In the nation's economic life, however, progress goes on. Most striking to the visitor is the visible evidence of well-being in the countryside resulting from the regime's new policy of building up the rural economy and reducing the gap between the lower standard of living on the farms and the higher standard in the cities. There have been greater inputs of fertilizer and machinery, as well as of labor in the form of millions of persons transferred from the cities. There are improved farm techniques and seed strains, more medical services, more education, more development of rural small industries, more rural electrification, more rural roads, and more dams, wells and other water conservation projects. These added facilities, plus nine years of favorable weather, have resulted in steadily increasing farm yields. In fields that obviously are tended like gardens, the crops look good; rural villages, still largely made up of traditional-style tile-roofed houses, are attractively neat and clean; there is more machinery about than before; the people look well fed and adequately dressed, and larger numbers of personally-owned bicycles, radios, sewing machines and watches attest to better times.

There is no proof that collectivization works any better in China than elsewhere in the Communist world (without it, production might be even much larger than it is today). But the fact that the Chinese collective farm—now an autonomous part of the bigger, administrative commune—is still based on the traditional village of a few score families and permits five to seven percent of the land to be cultivated as private plots appears to have made collective farming at least acceptable to the Chinese peasant. There are constant efforts by the peasants, however, to enlarge the private plots and evade state controls on the marketing of privately-grown farm products. On the August First Commune near Mukden, San Kwang-ta, "chief responsible" person on the revolutionary committee, reported in May that he had just led a stern crackdown on peasants who had surreptitiously tried to expand their private plots and to sell more of their produce on the free market than they were entitled to. Special forms of pressure —such as military propaganda teams leading collective farm work-groups out to their daily tasks in the fields and constant campaigning calling on the peasants to root out "capitalist tendencies"—are commonly used to obtain maximum production effort.

New additions to the ancient landscape of China, seen from train or airplane, are the rural industrial establishments that have sprung up in recent years as commune enterprises. At the China-Korea Friendship Commune 15 miles outside Peking, the industrial layout consisted of plants making rice-transplanting machines, several kinds of plows and motorized cultivators; a workshop for repairing farm tools; brick kilns, a rice mill, a flour mill, a cotton gin, a canning plant for fruits and vegetables, a milk pasteurization plant, a mill making paper from rice husks, a powdered milk plant, and an oil-pressing plant. The commune, with its 240,000 acres and 14,000 households (75,000 people in all), had 30,000 pigs, 2,400 trucks, 3,000 beef and dairy cattle, an extensive system of irrigation canals and dams, a hydroelectric power plant supplying much of the commune's electricity needs, fruit trees, fisheries and many handicraft workshops. With its diversified crops—rice, wheat, sorghum, vegetables, cotton and other items—the commune compared well with a big diversified farm in the United States.

The China-Korea Friendship Commune is a showplace, but this and other foreign observers have

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seen scores like it in places ranging from Manchuria to the outskirts of Shanghai and Canton, to the rugged terrain of Shansi and Shensi and the rolling hill country of northern Hupeh and central Hunan. Other communes feature different and varying kinds of industry. Many make trucks and chemical fertilizer. Most generate their own electricity by means of elementary-up-to-sophisticated installations. Commune industrial operations are naturally less efficient than big mass-production establishments, but they make maximum use of rural manpower, diversify the rural economy, educate the rural populace in modern industrial practices, give rural youth satisfying opportunities to move from monotonous farm tasks into more challenging industrial-type work, facilitate distribution in a country short of most means of transport, and promote the self-reliance and the decentralization of the economy and of economic authority that are major present-day objectives of the regime. All this is unquestionably improving the lot of the rural population. As a Chinese-speaking member of one of the foreign embassies in Peking observed at the conclusion of an extensive diplomatic corps tour of China,

Undoubtedly life in the countryside, heretofore so poor and bleak, is becoming more attractive. With prices for goods uniform throughout the country and commune stores better stocked now, there is less of an urge to feel that a better life is to be had in the cities. And the fact that tens of millions of city people, including officials either on rotation or in permanent residence, now are living and working in the countryside at peasant tasks gives the rural population an added feeling of parity with city people.

Self-reliance and dispersal of production and control are, of course, key elements in present official policy for the cities as well. The regime's aim is to create economically autonomous regions that not only could subsist on their own in case of war but also—irrespective of this possibility—can develop autonomously in today's conditions of inadequate rail, road and other transport, which limit the capacity to distribute manufactures and raw materials. In the major east coast cities, the visitor is struck at finding each city attempting to develop a wide variety of industries. Each builds motor cars, buses and trucks; each has steel plants; each makes electronics equipment. The idea of big, centralized industrial complexes, which was initially borrowed from the Russians and translated during the 1950's into large installations in Wuhan, Paotow, Taiyuan, Shenyang and elsewhere, has now been dropped. The present system of dispersed industrial production and control may be less efficient in the long run, but it has a suitability to present conditions that applies to urban areas as well as to the countryside.

China's plants and factories are turning out an impressive range of products. At Shanghai's permanent exhibition of industrial items, one finds on display everything from computers, complicated machine tools, 12,000-ton hydraulic presses, massive electric generators and turbines, 30-ton dump trucks and automatic guidance systems for military aircraft to a vast array of the most modern pharmaceutical items. Although the Chinese Communists are at this stage making a point of working out their own technological advances and production techniques, many of their innovations turn out to be merely adaptations of what has already been developed elsewhere; however, they do indicate close attention, through technical journals and foreign models, to world standards.

Progress in Birth Control

Hope that the new economic productivity will some day make possible greatly improved living standards for China's huge population is provided the visitor by one of the most unexpected developments the visitor encounters in the People's Republic. This is the high degree of effectiveness of the regime's birth control program. One might expect to find the program working in the cities, but the extent to which it is also influencing the rural population comes as a surprise because the government's own publicity has said little about the program's progress anywhere. This success is no doubt due to the fact that the conditions of the new way of life under communism are such as to impress the desirability of birth control. In both city and country, living quarters are cramped. As a rule, both wife and husband work away from the home, and despite the availability of day nurseries for children this makes caring for children the rest of the time a problem. Also, the nationwide pension system makes it no longer necessary for parents to have children as an assurance of support in old age, and the traditional Confucian concept that there must be sons to perpetuate the family and venerate parents and ancestors is disappearing. Finally, since the state virtually takes over

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the molding as well as the activities of children from primary school age onward, parents now find less emotional satisfaction in having offspring.

Given these deterrents to large families, the regime provides means for limiting births through contraceptive pills, abortions and sterilizations. It also effectively discourages marriage for males before age 27 or 28 and for females before 25 or 26. One of this writer's male Intourist interpreters had married at age 27 and, at 35, was still childless.

"Nobody wants many children any more," said Mrs. Hu Fang-tsu, 35, head of a small collective farm in the big Machiao Commune, 20 miles outside Shanghai. "Children are just a lot of trouble. Two are considered the right number." Mrs. Hu and her husband have only one child. She reported that, out of 124 women on her farm, 80 are married, and 20 of these practice birth control, mostly using pills but some through sterilization. The largest family on the farm, she said, has only four children. She added that men as well as women were joining in birth control practices, as evidenced by the fact that the farm hospital had performed three vasectomies on men in the third week of April.

When the visitor hears the Machiao story repeated over and over in many parts of the country, he must conclude that a substantial curb is being put on population growth and that, despite the persisting desire for big families in less-modernized rural areas, one of China's biggest problems—overpopulation in relation to natural resources—is being alleviated, if not solved. Queries in Peking elicited the reply that national statistics are too rudimentary at this stage to permit an accurate calculation of the present population growth rate, but the evidence suggests that it could now be below the 2-percent rate usually given for it.

The State of Medicine

In the sphere of health care, too, the visitor from Hong Kong is struck by the general effectiveness of a system which has been greatly expanded and modified as a by-product of the Cultural Revolution. The proliferation into the countryside of paramedical personnel, or "barefoot" doctors, the emphasis on medicine serving the masses, on hygiene, sanitation and maximum use of native traditional as well as modern medicines and methods—these things all appear more logical and beneficial when observed on the spot than when read about in the flood of extravagant propaganda beamed outside the country.

The "barefoot" doctors, both men and women, are found to exist in large numbers, particularly in the rural areas, and despite their brief training—in some cases for only a few months as a starter—they undoubtedly do much for better health among the people through their knowledge of basic remedies and their counseling on cleanliness and other preventive practices. And when the visitor actually sees evidence of the curative qualities of herbal and other traditional medicines—which are employed along with the latest pharmaceutical products—and of such traditional therapeutic techniques as acupuncture, he can understand that the expanded health care program constitutes a remarkably valuable and practical component of the regime's whole welfare system. Medical costs to the people are minimal: the prices of medicines have been greatly reduced, and the "barefoot" doctors labor part-time in the fields and workshops, receiving only enough additional compensation for their medical services (out of collective farm funds) to give them an income equivalent to the average income of collective farm members. Thus, for the individual in both city and country, annual outlays for medical care total only a few dollars.

(Health care fits into an overall welfare system which also provides a job, support in old age, housing at a few dollars per year, and basic grain and cloth rations for everybody. Salaried incomes range from beginning wages of $10 to $15 a month to top pay for senior workers of $60 to $70. The cash earnings of peasants are much less—in the range of $50 a year depending on the part of the country—but peasants own their homes and have no rent to pay, and they get their food at little cost from the collectives or their private plots.)

In contrast to the mass health program, the practice of more sophisticated medicine has clearly suffered from the excesses of the GPCR and has not yet been restored. Foreign diplomats in Peking report that the country's premier medical establishment, the Peking Medical College and its associated hospitals (before 1949 the college was the American-endowed and -operated Peking Union Medical College), was taken over during the Cultural Revolution by unqualified subordinate personnel, who forced the doctors to go out and work in the countryside or to perform menial tasks in the college and hospital. The doctors are now back at their regular tasks, but their status is still shaky under a revolutionary committee dominated by non-professionals,

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and standards have not been fully restored. This appears to be typical of the state of quality medicine in other mainland centers. There are, however, incipient indications of a return to esteem for the well-trained doctor as well as of a renewal of quality medical education to be provided in a somewhat shorter time span than formerly.

Defense and Detente

One thing the visitor to Communist China sees little of and learns less about is the military machine. This is true despite the presence of military personnel throughout the governing structure. Glimpses are caught of combat aircraft taking off and landing at airports; troops in moderate numbers are seen on ceremonial occasions or in passage through city streets; digging for air-raid shelters is visible in cities and sometimes in the countryside. But beyond these visual scraps, one cannot go. The visitor talks with civilian officials and with military men in civilian roles, but never with military men about the *verboten* topic of military affairs.

It is readily apparent that the tensions of two years ago that seemed to threaten impending war with the Soviet Union have subsided. Still, the visitor sees enough to know that the operational forces of the regime's 2,800,000-man army, navy and air force are busily engaged in heightening their preparedness for war, with a large part of them deployed against a possible conflict with Russia. China's vast production for defense, including the fabrication of nuclear weapons and missiles, is of course never opened to inspection nor discussed, and the visitor must accept the estimates of foreign researchers in and outside the country that the development of heavy and sophisticated weapons and equipment and the training of the armed forces have reached an advanced stage consuming an estimated 10 to 15 percent of the gross national product.

Perhaps a desire to reduce this drain is one of the reasons for the new, more flexible and moderate approach in foreign policy that has made the reopening of China's door to contacts with the West possible. Certainly another reason for the détente is the threat of the Soviet Union and a desire to diminish tensions with the United States as a counterbalance. Peking also may be anxious to pave the way for its participation in another international effort to settle the ever-threatening war in Southeast Asia. And more basically the new approach is another by-product of the new internal stability of the People's Republic.

The pragmatists now in power in Peking realize that stability in external relations should go hand-in-hand with this internal stability. The wall slogans that greet the China visitor and the daily outpourings of the press and radio still vaunt revolutionary struggles abroad and ideological opposition both to "U.S. imperialism" and to Soviet "revisionist social imperialism." But a measure of the détente that has occurred not just toward the United States but even to some degree toward the USSR is provided by Peking's *de facto* acts of relaxation such as the decision to receive President Nixon in Peking, the avoidance of incidents along the Soviet border, a noticeable diminution in the stridency of anti-Soviet propaganda, and continuation of the Peking talks looking to a settlement of the Sino-Soviet dispute over frontier boundaries.

Without saying so outright, Chinese spokesmen clearly convey to the visitor that the Peking regime hopes, by the new détente, to influence US and world opinion to the degree necessary to gain United Nations membership for the People's Republic this year. Such a success, they confidently believe, will vastly strengthen Peking's position vis-a-vis the Nationalist Chinese government on Taiwan even if Peking fails to induce the United States to abandon the Nationalists politically and militarily. They also are confident that Peking has assured itself not only of the opportunity to participate and assert its interests in the approaching settlement of the Indochina war, but also of a future voice in all major world decisions. Last but not least, their recent moves have already secured a lowering of trade barriers which could be of considerable importance to China's economic development.

Future Uncertainties

This, then, is the picture that the latest parting of the curtain has revealed. It portrays a China that is entering a new era, internally and internationally. But despite the new stability and the encouraging prospects for the future, the visitor must end his once-over with the cautious reminder to himself that the present state of affairs has not lasted long enough nor consolidated itself sufficiently to warrant the conclusion that it will be permanent and that Chinese communism has entered upon an enduring period of progress.

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Looming just ahead is the problem of the succession. When Chairman Mao—who is now 78—dies, as he inevitably must within a matter of years, what then? A collective leadership headed by the sickly Lin Piao will doubtless take over, but it will be a leadership mainly of old men. Inner rivalries and tensions will make it difficult for this leadership to remain united, and as the remaining older leaders pass on one by one, dissension over who will run China will inevitably increase. When that stage is reached, military men who today function in civilian roles *without* guns might shift to asserting themselves *with* guns. Dictatorships have always had problems with the matter of succession, and there is no reason to expect that the Chinese Communist dictatorship will be an exception.

Economic prospects now look reasonably good, but how long can production by exhortation be maintained? The population today is still cowed by the frightening experiences of the Cultural Revolution, and consequently the mechanics of discipline remain effective. But continuing stability will breed a sense of security among the people that will make the present system of drives and controls progressively less effective. Can the reinstitution of income incentives, entailing the risk of encouraging a revival of revisionism and a domineering bureaucracy, be avoided? Premier Chou En-lai and other regime spokesmen have said that successive Cultural Revolutions are the answer, but can a country with such a narrow base of economic development survive the setbacks and disunity that a succession of Cultural Revolutions would bring?

The need for capital in order to generate a really major economic advance is still great. The regime at present is dedicated to self-reliance—to getting ahead on the country's own resources. This may be an impossible task for a nation that remains heavily overpopulated (despite progress in birth control) and which is less endowed with natural resources than it needs to be if it is to abjure foreign investment.

Even Peking's move toward more friendly relations with the United States may create internal problems for the regime. The very fact that it is now cultivating an understanding with the world's foremost capitalist power seems certain to raise serious questions in the minds of the Chinese people about the logic and sincerity of their leaders' longstanding campaign of anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist hate propaganda picturing the United States as Communist China's inexorable enemy. By permitting the US to become something less than the bogeyman it has heretofore been made out to be, the regime may risk blunting one of the weapons it has used to maintain popular unity and the mass discipline that makes the present system operate.

China may be developing a communism with enough decentralization, enough of a balance between the self-interest of individuals and their obligations to society, enough controls operating through the system of mutual surveillance and enforcement by social groups, and enough welfare and security for everyone, to be more successful than communisms elsewhere. But very serious hazards still lie ahead.

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Urban Guerrillas in Uruguay

By Robert Moss

A new model of revolutionary warfare is evolving in Latin America: the war of the urban guerrilla. The Tupamaros (or Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional—Movement of National Limeration) of Uruguay are the most successful of the new urban guerrilla groups on the continent, in the sense that a relatively small band of men, resorting to outlaw tactics of robbery, ambush and kidnapping on city streets, has managed to cause serious disruptions in the national life despite the determined opposition of the government, the police and the army. Similar groups are operating in other countries, most notably a terrorist organization in Brazil and the so-called "revolutionary Peronists" of Argentina.[1]

There are a number of reasons why the men who set out in the early 1960's to try to duplicate Castro's revolution on the mainland have transferred their activities from the countryside to the city. The most obvious is that over the past decade Latin American governments have managed to put down rural uprisings in Peru, Bolivia, Colombia, Venezuela, Guatemala and Nicaragua. The death of Ché Guevara in the Bolivian hills in October 1967 climaxed the failure of the rural strategy for revolt. Dwindling support from Cuba and the frequent hostility of local Communist parties partly explain the failure of the rural guerrillas; other factors that were probably as crucial were their isolation, their insensitivity to local conditions, and their lack of a political base.[2]

The guerrillas' shift to the cities was also an attempt to adapt to changing social conditions. The mushrooming growth of Latin American cities since 1945 has far outstripped industrialization and has led to the rise of enormous slums that provide an easy refuge for both criminals and revolutionaries.[3] In many countries, the peasants are now in a minority. Nearly 75 percent of Uruguay's population are townsmen; the comparable figures for Argentina, Chile and Brazil are respectively 72, 68 and 50 percent.[4] Mao Tse-tung's vision of the countryside surrounding the cities is hardly applicable under these conditions. And, of course, the great attraction of the city for a small revolutionary group is that it offers enormous scope for self-dramatization. It is easier to win headlines by kidnapping a diplomat than by subverting a village in a remote provincial backwater. Carlos Marighella, the late Brazilian guerrilla leader, once pointed out that when a group under his command held up a payroll van in 1968, they really made much more money than the 120,000 cruzeiros (about $9,500 at the present exchange rate) they got away with, since the coverage the robbery got in the mass media would have cost at least 5,000,000 cruzeiros (just under $400,000)

[1] A series of articles on the Argentine guerrillas and their links with Peronism and the Tupamaros appeared in *Granma* (Havana) between Dec. 12, 1970, and Jan. 3, 1971.

[2] See this author's *Urban Guerrillas in Latin America*, London, Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1970.

[3] *E.g.*, the population of Sao Paulo increased from 1.75 million to 4 million betwen 1940 and 1960 and doubled again by 1970. For a stimulating study of the political attitudes of rural migrants, see E.J. Hobsbawm, "Peasants and Rural Migrants in Politics," in Claudio Véliz, ed., *The Politics of Conformity in Latin America*, London, Oxford University Press, 1967.

[4] See the chart on page 25 of the author's *Revolution in Latin America*, London, The Economist Brief Book No. 24, 1971.

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as paid advertisements.[5] For extremists cut off from the normal news media, urban operations offer the chance of winning international notoriety at the cost of a very limited outlay of manpower and resources.

Strategic Considerations

While there are thus obvious tactical advantages in the shift to urban struggle, it is harder to define the guerrillas' underlying strategy—to the extent that they have formulated one—because they have been conspicuously disinclined to theorize about their objectives. Indeed, they have as yet to produce a single coherent statement of ideology. Marighella has perhaps come closest; yet even his most notable work, *Minimanual of an Urban Guerrilla,* is basically a technical handbook that offers more instruction about simple weaponry than about the kind of society he wanted to create.[6] It is this lack of a theoretical underpinning, along with an indifference to the normal forms of political agitation and a virtual silence about social conditions, that makes most urban guerrillas "Blanquists" in the sense that Lenin defined the term: military conspirators with a tactic rather than a political philosophy.[7]

Nevertheless, it is possible to discern at least the rudiments of a strategic theory in guerrilla statements. Like Ché Guevara and Régis Debray, the proponents of urban guerrilla warfare believe in the primacy of armed struggle. To quote Marighella once again, "the urban guerrilla's reason for existence, the basic condition in which he acts and survives, is to shoot." [8] The urban guerrillas believe that by forcing a government to adopt repressive techniques, they will isolate it and make converts to their cause. Their approach could be called a strategy of militarization; as Marighella put it:

It is necessary to turn political crisis into armed conflict by performing violent actions that will force those in power to transform the political situation in the country into a military situation. That will alienate the masses, who, from then on, will revolt against the army and police and blame them for the state of things.[9]

Like their rural predecessors, the urban guerrillas claim global and continental, as well as national, perspectives. In the case of the Tupamaros, it is significant enough that in their first public manifesto they defended an act of terrorism as a protest against the war in Vietnam. On the continental level, the outlook of all the urban guerrilla groups was expressed by Captain Carlos Lamarca, a Brazilian revolutionary, when he said: "We cannot separate the revolution in Brazil from the revolution in Latin America as a whole. Each country represents both a vanguard and a rearguard for the rest." [10] In this connection, the various guerrilla groups appear to have maintained close contact with one another.

It might be pointed out that in contrast to other groups, Brazil's urban guerrillas have not thought exclusively in terms of city-based revolution.[11] By attacking the "industrial triangle" of Rio de Janeiro-Sao Paulo-Belo Horizonte, they hope to throw the government forces onto the defensive and still make it possible to establish rural guerrilla *focos.* The situation in Uruguay and Argentina is rather different. Besides being the two most highly urbanized countries in Latin America, each has a powerful union movement controlled by political groups that are hostile to the existing regimes (the Communists in Uruguay; the Peronists in Argentina). In terms of revolutionary potential, the cities are thus the natural arena for the guerrillas' struggle.

Like most of the other urban guerrilla groups, the Tupamaros have remained studiously vague about their political goals, on the ground that they wish to draw support from all left-wing political parties without getting bogged down in sterile theoretical debate. A number of them were exposed to Marxist teachings in their university years, but it is doubtful whether the movement harbors any genuine theoreticians. A comparison could be drawn between the Tupamaros and the MIR (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario—Movement of the Revolutionary Left), in Chile, which experimented with urban ter-

[5] See *Carlos Marighella,* Havana, Tricontinental Press, 1970, pp. 15-16. Marighella was killed in a police ambush in 1969.

[6] Carlos Marighella, *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla*, London, Grassroots Publications, 1970. Reprinted from *Tricontinental* (Havana), January-February 1970.

[7] Lenin, "Letter to Comrades," *Collected Works,* Moscow, 1967, Vol. 26, pp. 212-13.

[8] Marighella, *Minimanual . . ., supra.*

[9] *Ibid.* The same idea is expressed in the National Liberation Action (ALN) document, "On Principles and Strategic Questions," reprinted in Carlos Marighella, *Pour la libération du Brésil* (For the Liberation of Brazil), Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1970.

[10] Interview printed in the *Bulletin* of the Front bresilien d'information (Algiers), No. 11, July 1970.

[11] The importance of the countryside in the strategy of Brazil's urban guerrillas is clearly outlined by Captain Lamarca in *ibid.*

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rorism before Sr. Allende won power in the presidential elections of November 1970. When a group of "young Turks" seized control of the MIR in 1967, a veteran member of the Chilean Socialist Party commented: "You might as well ask these people whether Marx was a soccer player or a disc jockey." [12]

However, the lack of a credo seems in no way to have hampered the Tupamaros. The fact is that in a few short years they have managed to establish what almost amounts to a "dual power" situation in Uruguay, with the government hard put either to safeguard its friends or track down its enemies. They have made vigorous efforts to demoralize the armed forces, provoked successive cabinet crises, and deepened the country's economic recession by frightening off foreign investors and conspiring to wreck the 1971 tourist season. At the same time, they have proved to be uniquely image-conscious as terrorists, with a flair for public relations and a strict regard for their own definition of the norms of so-called "revolutionary justice." They have shown that the act of kidnapping and humiliating a member of the ruling elite has much more symbolic effect than the crude device of gunning him down in the street (though they are not averse to killing when they deem it necessary). Given the impact of these tactics to date, it seems just possible that under certain circumstances—and barring outside intervention—the Tupamaros might be successful in triggering an armed insurrection. To understand how this situation has come about, one has to take into account the peculiar social and geographic character of Uruguay.

[12] *Ercilla* (Santiago), March 11, 1970.

OBJECTIVE: DISTRACT AND DESTROY

The urban guerrilla is an implacable enemy of the government and systematically inflicts damage on the authorities and on the men who dominate the country and exercise power. The principal task of the urban guerrilla is to distract, to wear out, to demoralize the militarists, the military dictatorship and its repressive forces, and also to attack and destroy the wealth and property of the North Americans, the foreign managers, and the . . . upper class. . . .

The urban guerrilla must have a certain minimal political understanding. . . . But the fundamental and decisive characteristic of the urban guerrilla is that he is a man who fights with arms. . . . The armed struggle of the urban guerrilla points towards two essential objectives: (a) the physical liquidation of the chiefs and assistants of the armed forces and of the police; and (b) the expropriation of government resources and those belonging to the big capitalists, latifundists, and imperialists, with small expropriations used for the maintenance of individual urban guerrillas and large ones for the sustenance of the revolution itself.

—From Carlos Marighella, *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla*, as translated in *Survival* (London), March, 1971, p. 98.

The National Setting

With a population of only around 2.8 million,[13] Uruguay really amounts to one sizable city, a stretch of rolling cattle country, and a small patch of jungle up in the extreme northern corner—consisting of the kind of terrain on which guerrillas would be no match against tanks. As a Tupamaro document puts it:

We have no impregnable strongholds in our country where we can set up a guerrilla base, although there are places it is difficult to attack. On the other hand, we have an enormous city that contains more than 300 kilometers of streets and buildings, ideal for the growth of an urban struggle.[14]

At the root of Uruguay's political problem is the paradox that it is a country with very advanced social institutions but a backward, lagging economy. At the start of this century, José Batlle y Ordonez, in two remarkable terms as Uruguay's president, created the basic apparatus of a welfare state[15]; today, however, the government can barely manage to meet its obligations. The bulk of the country's exports comes from the pastoral sector of the economy, but since the Korean War there has been a steady decline in the world price of wool and violent fluctuations in the price of meat. Outmoded methods have also brought a dangerous slump in productivity; in 1969, sugar beet production fell by 55 percent, and the area of wheatfields dropped by nearly 40 percent.[16] The crisis in the export sector was ag-

[13] Uruguay has a very low birth rate and a high rate of emigration. More than 17,000 people left the country in 1968, compared with just under 3,700 in 1961. See Maria Esther Gilio, *La guerrilla tupamara*, Havana, Casa de las Americas, 1970, p. 61.

[14] See *Punto Final* (Santiago), June 2, 1968.

[15] His terms were 1903-07 and 1911-15. On the Batlle period, see Roque Faraone, *El Uruguay en que vivimos* (The Uruguay We Live In) Montevideo, Arca, 1969.

[16] See *Latin America* (London), May 15, 1970.

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gravated by the flight of local capital and a mounting foreign debt.[17]

By the end of 1967, when Jorge Pacheco Areco succeeded to the presidency, the country that used to be called "the Switzerland of Latin America" and was admired for its democratic institutions and its social services was also the country with the lowest growth rate and the highest level of inflation in Latin America. The rate of inflation in 1967 was above 135 percent.[18] The government's lack of funds led it to skimp on social services and to be trapped into infuriating delays in the payment of salaries and the completion of state projects, such as a new and much publicized university city. The bureaucracy (which numbers more than 300,000) was the first to feel the pinch—which partly explains why the Tupamaros have found friends within the civil service.

The Tupamaros first signed their name to a manifesto in 1965, when they tried to justify the bombing of the Bayer plant in Montevideo as a protest against the American involvement in Vietnam.[19] But the origins of the movement go back to the beginning of the decade. Ironically, the men who founded the MLN served their political apprenticeship as rural activists. Raul Sendic—imprisoned in 1970 but still regarded as the Tupamaros' leader—abandoned his law studies in 1960 and went to work as a cane-cutter among the impoverished sugar-beet laborers of the northern department of Artigas. He organized a sugar workers' union, the UTAA (Union de Trabajadores Azucareros de Artigas), and led a "poor people's march" on the capital in May 1962—a demonstration that has been repeated every year since. He quickly ran into trouble with the local landowners and at that point made the decision to resort to violent tactics as the only way to press the workers' claims. The first guerrilla operation he organized was a raid on the Swiss Rifle Club in July 1963. The police soon identified him as the ringleader, and he fled to Argentina. When he slipped back across the border, at the end of 1964, it was to organize an urban guerrilla movement in Montevideo itself.[20]

At this stage, the Tupamaros were in the main still anonymous, and they lacked a political strategy. But they were already concerned with their public image: on Christmas Eve 1963 a commando group hijacked a delivery van and handed out presents and parcels of food to the poor people of the Aparicio Saravis slums. These first Tupamaros were of mixed background. Some were radical cane-cutters and frustrated unionists whom Sendic had brought with him from the plantations of Artigas. Other recruits were political leftists who joined the movement following a schism within the Uruguayan Socialist Party and a humiliating defeat of the left-wing parties in the 1962 elections; as a result, a few young dissidents were converted to the idea of armed struggle. But from the beginning, the Tupamaros depended most heavily on support from students, professional men and low-grade civil servants and public employees. Police dossiers on the 150-odd Tupamaros arrested in the years since 1965 reveal the bourgeois origins of a majority of the guerrillas and the fact that several had led double lives as highly regarded professional men. Captured Tupamaros include Julio Marenales Saenz, a professor of fine arts; Pedro Almiratti, a prominent engineer and building contractor; Jose Manuel Lluveras, another engineer; Raul Bidegain Creissig, an advanced student of agronomy, the son of a police chief, and a member of a very wealthy family; and a significant number of journalists, bank employees, and minor bureaucrats. There has also been some support from the lower ranks of the clergy, although not on the same scale as in Brazil or Argentina.[21] It would be fair to generalize that the rank and file of the movement are young, with some university education, and of middle-class antecedents.[22]

It is important to note that the Tupamaros have never let themselves become an isolated group.

[17] The foreign debt stood at $530.6 million at the end of August 1970. See *Review* (London), published by Bank of London and South America, December 1970, pp. 671.

[18] President Pacheco took stern measures to curb inflation, which was down to about 15 percent in 1970. But there were wage increases of more than 20 percent at the end of that year, and fears of even more inflationary rises in the period leading up to the presidential election.

[19] The name Tupamaros is derived from the Inca prince, Tupac Amaru, who led a revolt against the Spanish government in the late 18th century. It was also used by José Artigas, the hero of the first Uruguay wars of independence (1810-20), to describe his followers.

[20] The events of these early years are still relatively obscure. Two useful accounts are Alain Labrousse, *Les Tupamaros: Guerilla Urbaine en Uruguay* (The Tupamaros: The Urban Guerrilla in Uruguay), Paris, Editions de Seuil, 1971, pp. 35-40; and Carlos Nunez, *The Tupamaros*, New York, Times Change Press, 1970, pp. 10-18 (reprinted from *Tricontinental*).

[21] A priest, Indalecio Olivera da Rosa, was killed in fighting with the police in November 1969, and four seminarians were arrested and charged as active guerrillas in the following month. On the attitudes of the higher clergy, see Marcel Niedergang in *Le Monde* (Paris) Jan. 11, 1971.

[22] See *Marcha* (Montevideo), Aug. 26, 1967.

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There has been frequent movement of cadres to and from Brazil, Bolivia, and in particular Argentina. There is some evidence that the Tupamaros have provided training for guerrillas from neighboring countries,[23] and the Argentine terrorists in particular have been following their example. The members of the Argentine ERP (Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo—Revolutionary Army of the People) have even imitated the Tupamaros in using a five-pointed red star as their emblem.[24]

In the period up to 1968, Tupamaro operations were mainly restricted to securing supplies of money, arms and equipment and recruiting cadres. It was during this preparatory phase that the interlocking cell structure that enabled the guerrillas to survive the early police raids was devised. The movement is composed of "firing groups" of four or five men, including a group leader who maintains contact with the man above him in the guerrilla hierarchy. This simple form of organization, familiar to all urban terrorists, means that the capture of one cell (or the presence of a police spy in one group) can only do limited damage to the movement as a whole. More recently, the Tupamaros have organized "support committees" and shown the capacity to mobilize large numbers of men for a single operation—as was the case in the occupation of the town of Pando in 1969.

Since 1968, the Tupamaros have taken the offensive against the government, carrying out a number of operations aimed specifically at undermining the position of President Pacheco. Depending on the outcome of presidential elections next November (more on which shortly), there is a possibility that the Tupamaros may soon try to move over to a new, more intensive phase of urban guerrilla warfare characterized by armed insurrection synchronized with political strikes. In the meantime, they have concentrated on three techniques: political kidnapping, armed propaganda, and subversion within the armed forces. It may be useful to discuss each of these in some detail.

Political Kidnapping

Political kidnapping was not invented in Latin America—but the example set by terrorists in Brazil, Guatemala and Uruguay has certainly made the kidnapping of diplomats one of the familiar hazards of life by the 1970's. Governments have been divided over how to respond. President Pacheco, like the Argentine government, has refused to bargain with kidnappers. The Brazilian junta has consistently acceded to their demands, and the result has been runaway inflation in the price exacted for diplomatic hostages. It cost the Brazilian authorities 15 political prisoners to free the American ambassador, Burke Elbrick, in 1969; the price later rose to 40 prisoners for a West German ambassador, and then to 70 for a Swiss ambassador.

The Tupamaros' first experiment with political kidnapping was designed to humiliate the government. In August 1968 they abducted Ulises Pereyra Reverbel, a close friend of the president and a man popularly regarded as an *éminence grise* behind government policy. President Pacheco promptly detailed half of the Montevideo police force to hunt for Pereyra. Failing to find any trace of the hostage, the police invaded the university campus, and the death of a young Communist student in the rioting that followed provided the guerrillas with one of their first martyr-figures—conveniently named Liber Arce (which sounds like *liberarse,* "to free oneself"). Pereyra was released, crumpled but unharmed, after five days in captivity.[25]

The Tupamaros performed a similar exercise in September 1969, when they kidnapped a leading banker, Gaetano Pellegrini Giampetro, and held him for more than 10 weeks. The Pellegrini kidnapping was timed as a show of sympathy with bank employees, who had gone on strike in protest against the firing of 182 of their colleagues and who were subsequently "mobilized" and forced to return to work under the terms of the *medidas prontas de seguridad* (emergency powers sanctioned by Article 168, paragraph 17, of the constitution).

The Tupamaros first turned their attention to the

[23] Some of the 70 political prisoners freed by the Brazilians in exchange for the Swiss ambassador, Giovanni Bucher, had received training in Uruguay. Two who admitted this were Edmur Pericles Camargo and Pereira da Silva. See *O Jornal do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro), Jan. 12, 1971, and *O Globo* (Rio de Janeiro) of the same date. The Tupamaros have been publicly thanked by leaders of the Bolivian Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (ELN).

The social origins of the Tupamaros are notably similar to those of the members of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) in Chile. See *Vea* (Santiago), July 23, 1970, on the backgrounds of *Miristas* arrested on criminal charges.

[24] The ERP (whose ideology is a blend of Trotskyism and Peronism) has been receiving a good deal of publicity recently from Havana Radio, which has stressed its imitation of Tupamaro "Robin Hood" tactics (on which more shortly). In February ERP guerrillas held up an armored bank van in Cordoba and escaped with $302,500—the biggest bank haul in Argentine history.

[25] See Nunez, *op. cit.,* pp. 7-10.

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diplomatic corps after the Brazilian guerrillas had made world headlines with their abductions of Burke Elbrick and Herr von Holleben. A rash of kidnappings began in July 1970, with the capture of a magistrate who had been responsible for the trial of guerrillas. On the last day of the month, the Tupamaros seized the Brazilian consul, Aloysio Dias Gomide, and an American police adviser, Dan Mitrione. They followed up by kidnapping a third hostage, the American soil expert Claude Fly, early in August. But President Pacheco dug his heels in when the guerrillas demanded the release of political prisoners and the publication of manifestos, and the outcome was the murder of Dan Mitrione.[26] The Tupamaros later tried to justify this crime: the remarks of one of their spokesmen to the Cuban Communist party newspaper, *Granma*, give a taste of the terrorist logic. "Urbano" described the technique of diplomatic kidnapping as "a game of chess in which the capture of one piece forces the other side to change its tactics." He claimed that it was necessary to kill Mitrione for two reasons: first, because President Pacheco had tried to call the guerrillas' bluff, and it was necessary to show that they were prepared to carry out their threats; second, because "we were not just thinking of our own situation but of the significance of kidnapping as a method for other revolutionary movements." [27] The latter statement showed that the Tupamaros are very conscious of their kinship with other urban guerrilla movements, and that they are well aware that the success or failure of political kidnappers in one country will influence extremists elsewhere.

Dias Gomide was eventually released after his wife collected a ransom of more than $250,000 from sympathizers in Brazil. The Tupamaros made the gesture of "pardoning" Fly after he collapsed with a heart attack, and he was finally released in March 1971.[28] Despite diplomatic pressures from the Brazilians and differences of opinion inside the cabinet, the President stuck to his hardline attitude of "no negotiations" with kidnappers. But the authorities showed very little capacity to back this up with efficient policework. By a stroke of luck the police managed to nab Raul Sendic and several other guerrilla leaders on August 7. But although 15,000 men, aided by helicopters, combed the streets of Montevideo, they failed to find any trace of the hostages.

There were four more kidnappings of major importance early in 1971. The British ambassador, Mr. Geoffrey Jackson, was captured on January 8 and was still being held, at the time of writing, in what the Tupamaros have taken to calling (not without arrogance) "the people's prison." [29] In March, the Attorney General, Guido Berro Oribe, was also kidnapped. According to the Tupamaros' "Communique No. 18," he was cross-examined "on the matter of serious irregularities that have occurred during his term as court prosecutor." [30] He was eventually released after he had ad-

[26] See *Le Monde*, Aug. 4 and 12, 1970; *The Washington Post*, Aug. 2, 1970; and *The Economist*, Aug. 15, 1970.

[27] See *Granma*, Oct. 8, 1970.

[28] See *ibid.*, March 14, 1971, and *Latin American Roundup* (Havana), published by Prensa Latina, March 8, 1971.

[29] The Cuban journalist, Leopold Madruga, conducted an interview with Jackson in captivity that was published in *Granma*, April 11, 1971. See *The Times* (London), Feb. 25, 1971, on private moves to free Jackson; see also *The Economist*, Jan. 16, 1971.

[30] Quoted in *Granma*, March 21, 1971.

CRIMES—OR "ACTION MODELS"?

. . . A political revolutionary and an ardent patriot, [the urban guerrilla] is a fighter for his country's liberation, a friend of the people and of freedom. The area in which the urban guerrilla acts is in the large . . . cities. There are also bandits, commonly known as outlaws, who work in the big cities. Many times assaults by outlaws are taken as actions by urban guerrillas. The urban guerrilla, however, differs radically from the outlaw. The outlaw benefits personally from the action, and attacks indiscriminately without distinguishing between the exploited and the exploiters. . . .

Another element just as prejudicial as the outlaw and also operating in the urban area is the right-wing counterrevolutionary who creates confusion, assaults banks, hurls bombs, kidnaps, assassinates, and commits the worst imaginable crimes against urban guerrillas, revolutionary priests, students and citizens who oppose fascism and seek liberty.

Before any action, the urban guerrilla must think of the methods and the personnel at his disposal to carry out the action. . . . The action models which the urban guerrilla can carry out are the following: (a) assaults; (b) raids and penetrations; (c) occupations; (d) ambush; (e) street tactics; (f) strikes and work interruptions; (d) desertions, diversions, seizures, expropriations of arms, ammunition, explosives; (h) liberation of prisoners; (i) executions; (j) kidnappings; (k) sabotage; (l) terrorism; (m) armed propaganda; (n) war of nerves.

—From Carlos Marighella, *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla*, as translated in Survival (London), March, 1971, pp. 95-96 and 97.

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mitted—in tape recordings circulated to the press—that he had agreed to hand political prisoners over to military tribunals and to delay their release after their sentences expired.[31] At the end of March, Pereyra Reverbel was abducted for the second time, and the way he was treated by the guerrillas—and the president's response—was a clear indication of the greatly increased strength of the Tupamaros. They announced that they had "sentenced" him to life imprisonment. Two months later, President Pacheco appointed Juan Fabini to succeed him as the head of the state electricity and telephone corporation, UTE (Uninas Electricas y Telefonas del Estado). This looked like a tacit acknowledgment of the fact that the president was powerless to help his friend.[32] As if to drive the point home, the Tupamaros seized yet another hostage early in May—a former Minister of Agriculture, Frick Davies. It is clear that, for the Tupamaros, kidnapping has become very much more than a propaganda exercise.

Armed Propaganda

One of the central problems for guerrilla movements is how to get their message across to the man in the street. As a Tupamaro mouthpiece put it, the problem is that "for the urban guerrilla, discretion must take the place of the rural guerrilla's hideout in the jungle." [33] The Tupamaros have also had to overcome the government's attempts to censor news of their operations.[34] They have relied on two basic techniques: armed propaganda and the construction of "countermedia." To broadcast their own version of events, the Tupamaros have used a mobile radio transmitter, and they have also been able to enlist the help of electronics experts to interrupt regular transmissions. Another favorite technique has been to take over cinemas, workers' canteens and other public meeting places to deliver impromptu harangues to a captive audience.

One of the strengths of the Tupamaros has been the way they have combined astute criminal operations with claims of the "revolutionary justice" of their actions. They finance themselves, for example, by the classic method of so-called "expropriation"—as did the Bolsheviks before 1917. But when they raided the lending institution Financiera Monty early in 1969, they seized not only cash and securities but some secret account books that provided evidence of the misuse of public funds. The scandal that ensued led to the resignation of then Minister of Agriculture, Frick Davies. Similarly, when a commando group invaded the home of a tobacco magnate, Luis Mailhos Queirolo, early in 1970, with the help of one of his former employees, they not only stole gold worth $25,000 but produced evidence of grand-scale tax evasion. Mailhos was forced to pay a record fine of $2,300,000 (578 million pesos).[35]

"Armed propaganda" is essentially the attempt to prove to the people, through successful operations, that the government is weak and the guerrillas are strong. According to Debray, "the destruction of a troop transport truck or the public execution of a police torturer is more effective propaganda than a hundred speeches." [36] The most dramatic instance of armed propaganda staged by the Tupamaros so far was the occupation of the town of Pando on the occasion of the second anniversary of Ché Guevara's death on October 8, 1969. The action highlighted their love of disguises and their penchant for the spectacular (for, whatever else they lack, the Tupamaros do not lack imagination). A funeral cortege was hired on the pretext that an "uncle" who had died in Buenos Aires was to be buried in a village outside Pando.[37] Along the way, more "relations" were picked up. Once in the town, the guerrillas and some accomplices waiting at the bus depot launched a three-pronged attack on the police barracks, the telephone exchange, and three leading banks. The operation lasted slightly longer than the scheduled 15 minutes, because an isolated policeman opened fire. The getaway was marred by the fact that a highway patrol outside the town managed to get word to Montevideo by radio. Some of the guerrillas thus found army patrols waiting for them as they made their way back through the outskirts of the capital. Their losses were heavy: three dead and 20 captured. All the same, one Tupamaro interviewed by a journalist described the operation as "a

[31] *Latin America*, March 19, 1971.

[32] See *Latin American Roundup*, April 7, 1971, and Christopher Roper in *The Guardian* (London), May 8, 1971.

[33] *Granma*, Oct. 8, 1970.

[34] Uruguayan newspapers are not permitted to refer to the Tupamaros directly, so they are called "criminals" or "the nameless ones."

[35] For a fairly full, if not wholly reliable, account of the Mailhos robbery, see Jean Stubbs, "Uruguay: A Role for Urban Guerrillas?" in the Trotskyite publication, *International* (London), Jan.-Feb. 1971.

[36] Régis Debray, *Revolution in the Revolution?* Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1968, p. 51.

[37] This account generally follows the one which emerged from the interviews recorded in Gilio, *op. cit.*

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qualitative leap." "We took a city . . . I believe that for the first time a great part of the population saw the guerrilla [method of struggle] as a possibility." [38]

Guerrillas in the Barracks

Lenin wrote: "Unless the revolution assumes a mass character and, affects the troops, there can be no question of a serious struggle." [39] By their own reckoning, the ultimate success or failure of the Tupamaros will hinge in large part upon their campaign to demoralize and subvert the forces of order in Uruguay. The Tupamaros' initial advantage was that the government forces were few and inexperienced: there were only about 12,000 men in the Uruguayan armed forces, and the police had more experience in traffic control than in countersubversion. Since then, the United States has provided counterinsurgency training, and a special police corps, the Metropolitan Guards, has been formed. Yet the Tupamaros apparently have had some success in enlisting members of the army and the police as agents.

It was the presence of a man working for the guerrillas on the night watch of the naval training barracks in Montevideo that enabled the Tupamaros to capture it on May 29, 1970. That operation was an excellent illustration of their methods. After a marine named Fernando Garin had given them the signal by waving his cap, several men approached the guard at the door of the barracks, showed him false police identity cards, and asked to speak with the duty officer. While this was happening, several other young men appeared and were promptly challenged by the "policemen." They claimed to be students, and were instantly placed under arrest. The whole group was allowed to enter the barracks, where they overpowered the guards and opened the doors to another 17 guerrillas. Within 30 minutes, everyone in the barracks had been taken prisoner, and the Tupamaros delivered a violent lecture in which they accused some of the naval officers present of cruelty toward civilian prisoners. The guerrillas finally made their escape with about 350 rifles, some machine guns and quantities of explosives. They left behind copies of a leaflet writen by Garin in which he asserted that "We have dishonored our uniform. . . . We must choose between a new breed of tyrants and the just and independent Uruguay of the future." [40]

Until late fall in the year 1969, the Tupamaros avoided killing, and their only victims were gunned down in the course of street battles with the police. The first man they assassinated was a police agent, Carlos Ruben Zambrano, who was shot while traveling on a bus on November 15, 1969. That marked a shift in tactics. In April 1970 Hector Moran Charquero—a police inspector accused of torturing prisoners—was murdered in a Montevideo street. There were more murders of police agents in June. But on June 17, the Tupamaros issued a remarkable statement in which they said that they were prepared to observe a truce until early in July. During this time, the government was supposed to reconsider its policy, and soldiers and policemen who no longer wanted to fight were urged to find new jobs. This bit of psychological warfare had its effect. Policemen went on strike in mid-June, demanding danger-money and the right to work in civilian clothes so as not to present an easy target for assassins. The government arrested 66 policemen for "insubordination." [41]

The Prospects

The Tupamaros have gone on chipping away at police and army morale, and their task has been made easier by the fact that the Uruguayan armed forces lack the "elite" formations that have provided the backbone for counterinsurgency operations in other countries. In April 1971 they issued an "open letter" to the armed forces in which they declared that every time soldiers "defend the regime, in one way or another, they are defending an antinational and antipopular policy." [42] But the guerrillas' most effective propaganda tool has been simply that they have been able to evade rather easily the units assigned to track them down. Waning confidence in the government forces has been further undermined by differences at the top. In 1968 General Liber Seregni—then Inspector-General of the army and now the presidential candidate of the leftist Frente Amplio (Broad Front)—resigned his commission in pro-

[38] *Ibid.*, pp. 167-69.

[39] "Lessons of the Moscow Uprising," *Collected Works*, Vol. II, p. 174.

[40] The leaflet is reprinted in Labrousse, *op. cit.*, pp. 127-28. Garin signed himself "A soldier who has joined the MLN."

[41] *Le Monde*, June 14, 1970.

[42] *Granma*, April 18, 1971.

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test against what he called government "repression". Later on, Police Commissioner Otero had to give up his job after making some exceptionally critical remarks about police methods.[43]

The issue that has dominated Uruguayan politics since late 1970 is the presidential election that is due to be held in November this year. President Pacheco's bid to run for a second term in office, in disregard of constitutional provisions, has divided his faction-ridden Colorado party more deeply than before, and the failure of the Colorados to join forces with the other established party, the Blancos, has made it appear increasingly possible that a left-wing electoral alliance might win the election. Complicating the political scene rather late in the campaign (in June), a "strong man" on the right emerged in the person of General Oscar Mario Aguerrondo, a former chief of police with a reputation for toughness, who is running as a Blanco candidate.

Meantime, in a published manifesto at the end of 1970, the organizers of the Frente Amplio had called for an alliance of left-wing parties and insisted that "no group would be excluded because of its views." [44] The outcome of this was a popular front uniting a baffling variety of parties and factions, ranging from Rodney Arismendi's Moscow-line Communist party, as well as Trotskyites and Maoists, to the Christian Democrats and dissident splinters from the Blanco and Colorado parties.[45] General Liber Seregni, who presents himself as a liberal of mildly socialist views,[46] was finally chosen as the Frente Amplio's electoral candidate.

The formation of a popular front closely modeled on Salvador Allende's Unidad Popular coalition in Chile posed a difficult tactical problem for the Tupamaros—especially since the alliance has some hope of success.[47] The guerrillas published a communiqué in January in which they insisted that "the people can only win power through armed struggle" but welcomed the popular front as a convenient instrument for rallying mass support.[48] If General Liber Seregni should become the next president of Uruguay, it is entirely possible that the Tupamaros might decide to play along with him and thus come to exercise the kind of influence that the *Miristas* (the former urban guerrillas of Chile) exercise under Sr. Allende.[49]

Clearly, however, some of the forces assembled behind the Frente Amplio would make uneasy allies. Most important in the present context, the Tupamaros have never gotten along with the local Communists, who have always rejected the idea that armed struggle is relevant in Uruguay.[50] The guerrillas' distrust in this respect expresses the general disillusionment of Latin American guerrilla groups with local Communist parties, whose cautious and essentially negative attitude toward guerrilla activity has been dictated by a combination of self-interest and the influence of the Soviet line of peaceful coexistence. (It is worth noting, in the latter respect, that Soviet hostility toward the Tupamaros actually seems to have intensified in recent months, despite their apparent tactical successes. A Russian writers' magazine recently attacked them as "petty bourgeois pseudo-revolutionaries" and "rollicking, loud-mouthed thugs" pursuing "gangster tactics." [51])

For their part, the Uruguayan Communists have tried consistently to steer a middle course between Moscow and Havana. On a recent visit to Rome, the CP leader Rodney Arismendi repeated his standard line when he praised the guerrillas for their "courage and sincerity" but insisted that "we will make the revolution by other means." [52] In any political alliances, the Communists are also bound to be influenced by the fact that they have had a pretty easy time of it in Uruguay, running their own radio station as well as their own newspaper; even in the midst of the crisis created by the Tupamaros, the government has made a point of letting the Communist party hold rallies and mass meetings.

In considering future prospects, it is necessary to return to an issue that was touched upon earlier and that is central to this article: what are the Tupamaros *really* after? It is evident that the guerrillas have a clearer idea of what they want to tear down than of what they want to construct. They profess to be socialists, but vehement anti-US sentiment is

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[43] See interview in *Ya!* (Montevideo), Aug. 14, 1970.

[44] *Marcha*, Oct. 9, 1970.

[45] See *Intercontinental Press* (New York) March 1, 1971, p. 180.

[46] See an interview in *Vision*, May 8, 1971.

[47] There have been a series of public opinion polls conducted in Montevideo on the electoral chances of the major parties. The results have been inconsistent and often hotly disputed. A poll reported by *El Popular* (Montevideo) on June 24, 1971, predicted that the Frente Amplio would get 37.87 percent, the Colorados 36.4 percent, and the Blancos 25.73 percent of the vote. By contrast, a survey conducted by the University of Uruguay gave the Frente Amplio only 25 to 30 percent of the vote.

[48] See *Marcha* Jan. 8, 1971.

[49] On the *Miristas*, see *Ercilla*, March 11, 1970, and *The Economist*, April 10, 1971.

[50] *Punto Final*, July 2, 1968.

[51] See D. A. Kunaiev, "Uruguay—So Near and Yet So Far," in *Prostor* (journal of the Kazakhstan Writers' Union), March 1971.

[52] *L'Unita* (Rome), Jan. 16, 1971.

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probably as crucial an influence on their way of thinking. Like other urban guerrilla groups, they have imitated Guevara and Debray in nurturing an elitism and an unreasoning faith in the primacy of the revolutionary deed, partly derived from a distorted reading of the Cuban experience.

The Tupamaros' reluctance to articulate concrete political programs was explained, with apparent conviction, by a guerrilla spokesman in 1968:

It is not by carefully elaborating political programs that one makes the revolution. The basic principles of a socialist revolution have been established and are being carried further in Cuba. It is sufficient to accept these and to follow the way of armed struggle that will make it possible to put them into practice.[53]

Recently, however, in the process of enlisting support and in particular making overtures to union workers, the Tupamaros have tended to become more specific in elaborating demands, *e.g.*, for redistribution of the land, for confiscation of foreign investments, and for establishment of a state-run economy. In March they issued a six-point "revolutionary program" which called for the expropriation of large estates and factories and the parceling out of land to the tillers. It also called for the confiscation of foreign-owned assets without compensation. It proposed a system of "workers' rule" in education as well as in industry. Although the guerrillas said nothing about the kind of government they wanted to introduce (presumably an authoritarian system modeled on Castro's regime), they promised to abolish what they called "the bourgeois system of justice" and to set up "people's courts" which would deal with "counterrevolutionaries." [54]

Obviously, such simplistic and belated formulations do not explain the measure of direct and/or tacit support that the Tupamaros have attracted—a phenomenon that is the more puzzling since most Uruguayans are clearly opposed to their methods. It is true that the government has been forced to adopt strong measures against the guerrillas and has thereby helped to win them popular sympathy; yet the official "backlash" has been milder in Uruguay than in countries like Guatemala or Brazil—as has been attested to by visitors to the Punta Carreras jail who report that the incarcerated Tupamaro leaders continue to function almost openly as a command post for guerrilla activity.[55]

There seems to be significance in the fact that Latin America's most successful urban guerrilla movement has taken root, not among downtrodden people in some backward police state, but in a democracy with high ideals that has come upon hard times. The Tupamaros' capacity to find recruits among middle-class students and among the country's 300,000-odd civil servants has to be related to the phenomenon of high personal expectations which cannot be fulfilled, owing to the present state of deterioration in the Uruguayan economy.

Other factors also help to explain the Tupamaros' appeal. One is undoubtedly their success in projecting a Robin Hood image, combining brazen robbery with tactics to isolate the government and expose corruption in official quarters. The guerrillas have aimed to push President Pacheco farther and farther out on a limb by choosing their victims only from the ranks of his adherents and by pressuring him to adopt progressively tougher countermeasures. They have also been quick to fraternize with elements who consider themselves injured by the regime—most notably, the students, whose campus was invaded in 1968, and the bank employees, who were subjected to military call-up in 1969.

The future course of events in Uruguay is still in doubt. It will hinge on whether the traditional parties can pool their resources to fight the left-wing Frente Amplio at the coming elections. If the present regime is successful in retaining power, the Tupamaros can surely be expected to intensify their terrorist activities. If the Frente Amplio should win, the guerrillas might abandon the tactics of terrorism, but it is hard to imagine that they would become a tame and acquiescent ally in a leftist coalition; more likely they would turn to other pressure tactics to accelerate the radicalization of Uruguayan society. Whatever the outcome, it has become clear that the Tupamaros cannot be shrugged off as an isolated gang of romantic conspirators. They have demonstrated that a small group of revolutionaries can set in motion a cycle of violence and counter-violence that eventually tends to undermine democratic institutions. They may fail to bring about armed revolution. But they have proved that urban guerrillas can pose a very real threat to the state, and their example is being closely studied by terrorists in other places.

[53] *Punto Final*, June 2, 1968.

[54] *Latin American Roundup*, March 26, 1971.

[55] See *Los Angeles Times*, Feb. 2, 1971.

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What Makes "Socialist Law" Socialist?

By Harold J. Berman

In his recent work, *Communists and Their Law,*[1] John N. Hazard challenges the reader to examine the similarities and differences among the legal systems of the 14 countries ruled by Communist parties and also to compare this "family of socialist legal systems" with Western law (and, in one chapter, with their "African sibling," the law of the Republic of Mali). Thus by its broad scope the book raises the fundamental question of comparative law: What is the nature of the legal system—or legal order—of which particular legal rules and institutions are only parts and from which they take their character?

Indeed, the contemporary interest of social scientists in systems analysis, paradigms, and models has been to a certain extent anticipated by almost two centuries of the comparative study of legal systems. Unfortunately, however, legal comparatists have not always clearly distinguished between (a) the systems of law by which the people of an individual political entity, such as a national state, are governed (contrary to what is often assumed, the people of each national state live under at least two legal systems, the national and the international, and usually under others as well, such as customary law, ecclesiastical law, etc.); (b) the historical types of law into which national legal systems fall (traditionally, these have been divided into the "common law system" of England and North America and the "civil law system" of countries more heavily influenced by Roman law); (c) types of law identified in terms of cultures (*e.g.,* Western law, Oriental law, "primitive law"); (d) types of law identified in terms of political-economic-social orders of particular cultures (feudal law, bourgeois law, socialist law—to use Marxist terminology); and (e) types of law identified in terms of religious orientation (Canon law, Talmudic law, Islamic law).

The comparison of the "common law system" with the "civil law system," which has occupied most Western legal comparatists until recent decades, focuses on differences in legal style and technique among countries which share many important elements of both a common cultural tradition and common political, economic, and social institutions. Hence the emphasis upon judicial precedent and upon the adversary system in the English and American legal traditions may be contrasted with the emphasis upon codification and upon judicial initiative in questioning witnesses in French and German law, and these contrasts may lead to insights concerning the respective roles of judges, lawyers, law professors, etc., in the various countries involved—without having to go much beyond the expertise of legal craftsmen into questions of politics, economics, and sociology. By the same token, however, the inquiry may have only a limited interest for non-lawyers—and for lawyers as well.

On the other hand, when comparison of systems of law in wholly different cultures and wholly different political, economic, and social orders is attempted (for example, comparison of contemporary Western legal systems with the law of traditional

[1] *Communists and Their Law: A Search for the Common Core of the Legal Systems of the Marxian Socialist States,* Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1969.

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China or that of the Ashanti tribesmen of Africa)—the cultural and social differences may be so overwhelming as to leave little scope for specific comparison of legal institutions. Tribal adjudication may be more comparable to American political settlements or intrafamily settlements, for instance, than to American court procedure.

It follows that from the standpoint of social science the most valuable kind of comparison is apt to be one that focuses on legal systems of countries similar enough to have comparable legal institutions, yet different enough to permit meaningful generalizations concerning the relationship of their legal differences to their political, economic, and social differences. If this is so, the direction of comparative law should shift—as it has perhaps begun to shift—toward comparison of Western law with legal systems of industrialized or rapidly industrializing countries partly outside and partly inside the Western tradition, like the USSR and Japan.

Such a shift presupposes that there is indeed such a thing as a Western type of law, or—as the German legal comparatists say—*Rechtskreis* ("circle of legal systems"), which includes both the "common law system" and the "civil law system." From this perspective, the differences between the American practice of trial by judge and jury in civil cases and the European trial by a three-judge court (to take one of many possible examples) seem less critical when one brings into the picture the Soviet comrades' courts or the traditional aversion of the Japanese—until recently—to formal adjudication of any kind and their corollary attachment to mediation and conciliation. As a matter of fact, the English, from whom we inherited the civil jury, have themselves given it up in most cases. In many other respects as well, traditional differences between the "Anglo-American" and "Continental European" legal systems are being softened. Even viewed from inside, then, the two Western *Rechtskreise* are "converging." In actuality, they were never so far apart as 19th-century legal scholarship maintained. For four centuries, after all, England and all the other countries of the Occident were ruled in part by the same body of law—namely, the Canon law of the Roman Catholic Church, with a system of appeals from local ecclesiastical courts to the Papal court in Rome; this law governed not only the entire lives of the clergy but also a large part of the lives of the laity, including almost all matters of family relations and inheritance and many matters of crime, tort, property, and contract. Even after the breakup of Western Christendom as a political entity in the 16th century, the great national revolutions of 1517, 1640 and 1789 had repercussions throughout the West, and the national legal systems ultimately produced by these successive upheavals—including the English—constitute a single family.

Russia, however, was for many centuries only on the periphery of these historical developments. Not until the mid-19th century can she be said to have joined the family of Western legal systems; then, quite rapidly, there came into being a professional judiciary, a professional bar, systematic codes, and a body of scholarly legal literature—all based on Western models. The reformers of the 1860's deliberately, and creatively, incorporated into their new law those features of the West European legal systems, especially the German and French, which seemed best adapted to Russian circumstances.

In the period immediately prior to 1917, then, it would have been difficult to speak of the official, written Russian law as a *Rechtskreis* separate from the Western "civil law system," although below the surface, even two generations after the great reforms, much of the characteristically Russian customary law of the villages and much of the characteristically Russian customary law of the bureaucracy still survived. Nor did the architects of the Russian Revolution of November 1917 set out to establish a new type of law. On the contrary, it was Lenin's idea that under socialism law would gradually die out. Meanwhile, he sponsored new Soviet codes modeled on those of prerevolutionary Russia and of the West, though reflecting the policies of the new regime and containing various escape clauses which would permit adaptation of the laws to the needs of the Revolution as perceived by its leaders. For two decades, moreover, Soviet political and legal writers fiercely contended that Soviet law remained essentially a "bourgeois" law which served the proletarian dictatorship in the period of transition to socialism.

It was only in the mid-1930's that Josef Stalin—chiefly through his legal spokesman, Andrei Vyshinsky—began to talk about "socialist law" as a "new type of law." After World War II, as other countries became Communist, they, too, claimed to have a "new" socialist type of law.

During the immediate postwar period, few in the West were willing to accept the idea that the legal systems of the Communist countries constituted a *Rechtskreis* comparable to "the civil law system" or "the common law system." In terms of the technical criteria by which the latter two types of legal sys-

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tems are distinguished from each other, there is little to differentiate "socialist law" from other "civil law" (or "Romanist") systems. At the same time, the Soviets and East Europeans assigned little importance to these technical criteria. From their point of view, both Anglo-American law and Continental European law are basically the same—*i.e.*, "bourgeois."

In the late 1950's, however, with the fading of the cold war in Europe, history forced an ideological compromise between these two viewpoints. Law professors from the USSR and Eastern Europe met with those of Western Europe and America to discuss the characteristics of their respective legal systems. Since the Western professors were unable to bring themselves to surrender the traditional distinction between the common-law system and the civil-law system, and since the Soviet and East European jurists refused to identify their law with either, they all agreed simply to add socialist law to the other two as a third *Rechtskreis*.

In effect, this compromise presupposes that Western law now encompasses at least four circles—"common" law, "civil" law, "socialist" law, and "bourgeois" law—with each country belonging to at least two (for example, "common" law and "bourgeois" law, or "civil" law and "socialist" law, etc.). Moreover, none of the circles is very stable. Indeed, the very concept of "circle," with its connotation of stability, obscures the fact that they are all moving in time. The divisions in terms of traditional legal technique are no doubt more stable than the divisions in terms of political and economic systems, yet today even the traditional techniques of law are changing rather drastically.

As for the political-economic classifications, it was just at the time that Western law professors began to accept the existence of a "great family of socialist legal systems" that that family began to become badly split. In 1957, the People's Republic of China, which had in the early 1950's received Soviet law in fairly large measure, began to repudiate it entirely; for the Chinese today, Soviet law is also "bourgeois." Moreover, Yugoslavia, officially restored to membership in the socialist family in the mid-1950's, has kept moving further and further away from the kind of law that the Soviets consider to be the "new type." Other East European countries have also made substantial changes in the model. It is becoming harder and harder to find any single characteristic that is common to the legal systems of the 14 countries generally called Communist.

In *Communists and Their Law*, Professor Hazard, who has participated actively in the effort to strengthen the worldwide community of comparative legal scholars, treats the tripartite division into "common" law, "civil" law, and "socialist" (or "Marxist-oriented") law as axiomatic. In searching for the "common core" of the third type, he explores the ways in which the political, economic, and social structures and values of the Communist countries are reflected in their legal systems. His first example is that all have systems of public law which in practice establish the supreme leadership of the Communist party as an elite corps of rulers who espouse Marxist-Leninist doctrine and maintain an iron discipline (pp. 31–32).[2]

Yet with China included among the 14, a question arises even about this elementary postulate of Communist doctrine, for, as Professor Hazard mentions, Mao Tse-tung apparently at one time replaced party rule with army rule (p. 65). Indeed, either China or Yugoslavia or both are an exception to almost every one of the principles that Hazard examines in his search. Even state ownership of the means of production—which he terms the "keystone concept" of the family of Marxian socialist legal systems, for it more than anything else justifies "the unique place claimed for that family" and is the principle on which "all else rests" (p. 145)—has been replaced by the Yugoslavs with what they call "social ownership," something quite different both in theory and in practice from state ownership (pp. 186–90).[3] But still more surprising is the fact that only in the USSR and the Mongolian People's Republic has the land been nationalized (p. 168). While cooperative ownership of land is widespread in the 12 other countries, private ownership also exists on a large scale in many, so that Hazard concludes that what is common to all is not the form of ownership but "collectivization of use" (p. 168).

To parody Alexander Pope, "O'er forms of ownership let fools contest—that state's most socialist

[2] The 14 countries are listed on p. 8 as "running from those of the Communists in the People's Republic of China on one geographical and philosophical extreme to the Communist leaders of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the other. Between lie the positions of the Eastern European states of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the USSR; the Asian states of the People's Republics of Korea, Mongolia, and Vietnam; and the lone state in the New World—Cuba."

[3] Professor Hazard refers to Yugoslav social ownership in the context of workers' control of production enterprises.

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whose plan is best." National economic planning is surely the hallmark of Soviet socialism, and, as Professor Hazard shows, in all the states that have come under direct Soviet influence a law of planning was introduced at first—in the sense that a specialized administrative apparatus was created to prepare and implement the national economic plan, the plan was enacted as a law, state economic enterprises were established as legal entities with the right and duty to make contracts with each other in conformity with the plan, a special system of tribunals was established to settle disputes over such contracts, etc. (see p. 343 ff.). Here again, however, first Yugoslavia and then China have deviated, with Yugoslavia abandoning national economic planning (except in the sense of indicative planning without legal force) and with China abandoning (so far as one can learn) the formal legal processes for making and implementing national economic plans.[4]

When one turns from basic legal elements of the political and economic structure to family law (Chap. XII), inheritance (Chap. X), individually-owned property (Chap. IX), copyright (Chap. XI), patents (Chap. XI), torts (Chap. XV), and other matters of what has traditionally been called "private law," the differences among all 14 countries in question —and not merely between those inside and those outside the Soviet bloc—become exceedingly numerous. At the same time, the general similarity of "socialist" law to non-socialist law in these areas becomes quite striking.[5]

And so the search for a "common core" of socialist law, in Professor Hazard's sense and that of the international fraternity of comparative law, seems to end inconclusively. There are basic similarities in public law in the USSR and the seven countries of Eastern Europe under its direct political influence; however, these similarities do not extend to Yugoslavia or China or, presumably, to North Korea or North Vietnam or, possibly, to Albania or Cuba. As for the other branches of law that Hazard examines, not much in them appears in his analysis to be distinctively socialist, at least in those countries where the Revolution has "settled down."

Such a counting of heads may seem crude; but if a legal system is to be defined primarily in terms of the political order of which it is a part and of the political values it expresses, then one must be prepared for fluctuations in its character. Some degree of stabilization is added when the legal system is defined not only in terms of the political order and political values but also in terms of the economic order and economic values; and an even greater degree of stabilization, when it is defined in terms of the social order and social values as well. Yet the puzzlement about the concept of socialism remains. It is surely true that the legal systems of all 14 states under consideration share the absence of certain features that have characterized Western law in recent centuries: none of them provides for elections of political parties with more or less equal opportunity to persuade the electorate; none permits widespread private ownership of production enterprises, or large-scale private investment, or a stock market. All, in short, have to a greater or lesser degree eliminated what Marxists call "bourgeois democracy" and "capitalism." But this tells us what socialist law is not, *not* what it *is*.

In the last pages of his pioneer work, Professor Hazard offers a different kind of characterization of a legal system. A primary purpose of law in Marxian socialist countries, he states, is "mobilization for total social involvement." Citing the establishment of the duty to work and the Soviet constitutional provision "he who does not work shall not eat," Professor Hazard writes (p. 524):

Ancient moral law established by holy writ has been utilized as inspiration for the community of total involvement which Marxists seek to erect by compulsory means.

Thus while one may find wide variations among the legal systems purportedly based on Marxian socialism—so wide, indeed, that there is probably not a single provision of positive law, a single legal principle, however broadly formulated, that is absolutely essential (not the hegemony of the Communist party, not state ownership of the means of production, not national economic planning)—all neverthe-

[4] Professor Hazard discusses Chinese state economic planning in passing (on pp. 345 and 361-63), but his sources of information may be dated. So little is known about Chinese law in this area that it is difficult to generalize. Its extreme "flexibility" is noted on pp. 98-99. The abandonment of formal processes for settling disputes between state enterprises is treated on pp. 361-62.

[5] The method used in each of the principal chapters, as Professor Hazard states in his preface, "focuses on the political, social, and economic structures of the USSR as reflected in its legal system, since that is the inspiration for the others within the family. Materials taken primarily from the Polish, Yugoslav, Czechoslovak, and Chinese systems are then introduced, along with lesser quantities of data from others within the family, to provide the basis for generalizations about the common core" (p. xii).

In addition to the topics indicated above, Professor Hazard discusses contracts between state economic enterprises (Chap. XIII) and criminal law (Chaps. XVI and XVII).

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less share a certain outlook, a certain set of attitudes. One way of characterizing this outlook or set of attitudes is in terms of mobilization for total social involvement. Another is in terms of creating a new type of man. As a leading Soviet jurist once put it, the basic task of Soviet law is "the fundamental remaking of the conscience of the people." [6] From this point of view, socialist law would seem to belong in the *Rechtskreis* of the great bodies of religious law such as Talmudic law, Islamic law, and the Canon law of the Church.

In contrast to Professor Hazard, Samuel Kucherov, in *The Organs of Soviet Administration of Justice*,[7] focuses almost exclusively on Soviet law and especially on the evolution of the Soviet court system, procuracy, and legal profession (including legal education). His approach is primarily historical and institutional. Thus he adds an element which is essential to any "systems analysis" of law. For a typology of legal systems cannot be derived solely from an analysis of how political, economic, and social values are reflected in legal doctrines and procedures in various countries; at least equally important is an analysis of the historical development of legal institutions, over long periods of time, in the context of the historical development of the societies of which they are a part.[8]

Of course, different kinds of historical approach give different kinds of results. Dr. Kucherov's method, in general, is to trace the evolution of Soviet law from its foundations in the Westernized Russian law of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. He treats the initial period of the Revolution as one of complete destruction of legal institutions and subsequent periods as marking a gradual, step-by-step return to a system of administration of justice which—as he puts it at the very beginning of his book (p. xvii)—"does not differ to any extent—on paper—from other systems accepted in the West," but which is distinguished by the "yawning abyss between the written law and its implementation" and by the "flagrant violations of legality" that "take place whenever the party chooses to interfere with the administration of justice." Thus his volume portrays the socialist character of Soviet law almost entirely in terms of abuse of the courts and the legal profession by the Communist party; the only thing socialist about the system, he concludes (p. 703), is "the principle of coercion."

The differences between these conclusions and those of Professor Hazard are striking. Though emphasizing that law in all Communist countries is an instrument of politics, Hazard does not consider violations of legality by the Communist party to be an intrinsic feature of the Soviet system. He holds (pp. 92–93) that Soviet judges are required to support "the official, generalized party position," but that their decisions in individual cases are "not dictated from above." He believes that legal "stability" becomes a necessity for Communist countries as the Revolution settles down and that this will eventually prove to be so even in China (p. 143). He does not list the use of law to preserve orthodoxy of belief—which is perhaps the chief source of legal instability—as part of the common core of the 14 legal systems he examines. And he finds many elements in Soviet law, other than the principle of coercion, which are socialist.

Fortunately, Dr. Kucherov presents ample material from which the reader may draw his own conclusion about the socialist elements in the Soviet system of administration of justice. For example, the system of tribunals established to resolve disputes (chiefly contract disputes) between state economic enterprises—one of whose tasks is to help ensure contractual relations which conform to national economic plans—is clearly such a socialist element (though both the Yugoslavs and the Chinese, for quite different reasons, have abandoned it). Kucherov believes that this system of tribunals, called *arbitrazh*, applies expedience, not law (he gives no evidence to support this judgment); and he dismisses Soviet statements to the contrary (p. 152) as "little more than *pia desiderata* so long as the Soviet Union continues to be a totalitarian state in which the interests of the state prevail over everything

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[6] I. T. Goliakov, quoted in Harold J. Berman, *Justice in the U.S.S.R.*, 2nd ed., Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1963, p. 307.

[7] *The Organs of Soviet Administration of Justice: Their History and Operation;* Foreword by John N. Hazard, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1970.

[8] Professor Hazard acknowledges the importance of the long-range historical method in his foreword to Dr. Kucherov's book, where he says (p. xxii): "As pressing problems have been faced by Lenin's successors, they have been prone to search their Marxist doctrine for suggestions as to solutions but to resort in the final balancing to policies mindful of the Russian past." This statement goes farther in the direction of historical causation than anything suggested by Kucherov, who tends to treat historical precedents as analogies rather than as sources. For instance, in rebutting the view that the anti-parasite laws may be traced to early 19th-century Russian laws providing for administrative exile, Kucherov declares (p. 240) that it seems to him "futile to search for the continuity up to the present time of measures taken at the time of serfdom, under completely different social and political conditions." In developing his own theory that the prerevolutionary Russian justices of the peace were precursors of the comrades' courts (see below), Kucherov only argues that the two institutions are parallel.

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else." Professor Hazard, though not so skeptical of *arbitrazh,* feels that in time it might be replaced by *ad hoc* arbitration, similar to that practiced in the Western world; this development, he says (p. 135), "would generally mark the end in Marxist-oriented states of Europe of a prominent characteristic of the family of Marxian socialist legal systems." But whether or not *arbitrazh* constitutes a necessary feature of socialist law, it is surely socialist—not Russian and not Western, though perhaps "acceptable" to both traditions to the extent that a planned economy is "acceptable" to both.

Comrades' courts, too, would seem to have strong roots in socialist attitudes and socialist conditions, although they may possibly be more compatible with the Russian and Chinese traditions than with the Western. Dr. Kucherov's discussion of the Soviet comrades' courts adds one important element to the existing Soviet and Western literature on the subject: he compares them with the courts of the justices of the peace in Tsarist Russia, which examined petty cases with dispatch, without formalism, and on the basis of the judge's sense of justice. Kucherov writes (p. 195) that "there is no doubt that the institution of justice of the peace . . . pursued the same prophylactic and educational goals as the comrades' courts." And at this point he lets down his ideological guard a tiny bit. "The comrades' courts," he states (p. 197), "are a step from strict legality. But this step is not dangerous because they deal with petty cases, a great many of which concern moral and not law violation." [9]

In general, Dr. Kucherov treats the socialist features of Soviet law simply as deviations from Western standards of legality. An example may be found in his discussion of the evolution of the Soviet legal profession. The trend toward increased independence of the lawyer in defending his client is dealt with sympathetically. "It must be said," he writes (p. 574), "that this evolution moved in the direction of liberalization." In 1956, he continues, he himself concluded an article on the Soviet legal profession by quoting a statement of a Soviet jurist asserting: "The Soviet lawyers have nothing in common with the bourgeois lawyers; they differ from them fundamentally and in principle." "In 1968," he adds (p. 576), "when these lines are written, Kudriavtsev's words seem grossly exaggerated, the Soviet advocates moved 'fundamentally and in principle' nearer to the Western lawyer. Still between the Soviet and the Western lawyer stand the collectivization [*i.e.*, the organization of lawyers into colleges of advocates], the lack of freedom of speech and the semi-official position of the former." But from another perspective, it would be possible to speak of these last three features in positive as well as negative terms—not only as deviations from Western standards but also as manifestations of socialist concepts of the legal profession's social responsibilities, loyalty, and semipublic character.

Some will find (as the writer did) Dr. Kucherov's perspective too narrowly pre-Communist and his evaluations too dogmatic;[10] nevertheless, the rich detail with which he portrays the historical evolution of the Soviet courts (pp. 3–126 and 313–72),[11] the

[9] *Cf.,* however, p. 189, where he suggests that serious consequences may flow from the fact that the acts punishable by the comrades' courts are not specifically limited by statute (doctrine of analogy), and p. 192, where he argues that there is a real danger that public opinion will threaten their objectivity and justice. On the other hand, he does not seem to be so concerned with the danger of invasion of the citizen's private life by the comrades courts (p. 189), though his evaluation of this point is obscured by the polemical nature of his discourse.

[10] The evaluations are marred by frequent polemics with various writers—including this author—which may leave the reader baffled, but the main judgments are clear enough. A good example of both the evaluations and the polemics is the discussion of the notorious antiparasite law—to which Kucherov devotes 50 pages, including 22 pages reporting and commenting upon the 1964 case of the Leningrad poet Josef Brodsky. Kucherov notes that Brodsky was released in September 1965, and he also records—though he draws no connections—that in September 1965 the antiparasite law was amended. He then quotes this writer's statement that if the amendment is followed, it will be difficult, perhaps impossible, to convict a person in a case like Brodsky's. Kucherov responds, "Yes, if . . .," and remarks caustically (p. 235): "What difficulties ever stood in the way of the Communist Party securing a violation of the law by the organs of administration of justice?" His point seems to be that the amendment of the law has little or no significance.

What he neglects, in this writer's opinion, is the fact that the party pays a price for its abuses of justice. The 1965 amendment quite likely constituted the price of abuses in cases like Brodsky's. In this connection, it should be noted that after Kucherov's book went to press, most of the anti-parasite law was repealed, and a new procedure was established whereby a person must first be warned to find a job, may then be assigned to a job if he does not find one himself, and may only be sentenced by a court if he refuses to obey the order to take the job assigned. This by no means ends all problems. It leaves open, for example, the substantive question of who must take a job or else be sentenced to a labor colony on the ground of "leading an anti-social parasitic way of life." But it should end the procedural abuses that took place under the earlier legislation. Therefore, the new law may properly be characterized as "socialist legality"—a procedurally fair measure for enforcing a duty to work. (It is also, of course, "Puritan legality," and it has an obvious counterpart in the Massachusetts Body of Liberties of 1641.)

[11] The chapter on the people's assessors includes an illuminating discussion of the prerevolutionary Russian jury, which was free to decide cases without regard to the law, and on the current renewal of the debate among Soviet jurists concerning the merits of restoring a jury system for certain types of criminal cases.

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procuracy (pp. 373–446),[12] the legal profession (pp. 447–577),[13] Soviet judicial procedure (pp. 593–660), and legal education (pp. 251–312)[14] gives the reader a sense of the ensemble, and hence of the type of law, that cannot be conveyed by a comparative survey of features which Soviet law shares with that of other socialist countries, as valuable as such a study is for other purposes.

Neither of the two authors discusses at any length what this writer regards as the most distinctive feature of Soviet law—namely, its "educational role." Professor Hazard indirectly refers to it when he speaks of "mobilization for total social involvement" and creation of the new "socialist man" (in the passage already cited). Perhaps he has something similar in mind when he states that socialist law "is notable because of the law's conscious and purposeful involvement with politics, economics, and social organization" (p. 521)—although a great deal of meaning must be attached to the words "conscious and purposeful" to distinguish socialist law from, say, American law in this respect. But the educational role of law in the Soviet Union is too important to be left to a few paraphrases. From 1958 to 1970, for instance, the three leading Soviet law journals published about 400 articles on the educational role of law or some aspect thereof.

The educational role of the Soviet court is proclaimed in Article 3 of the Fundamental Principles of Court Organization of the USSR and the Union Republics, which states:

By all its activity a court shall educate citizens in the spirit of loyalty to the Motherland and to the cause of communism, and in the spirit of exact and undeviating execution of Soviet laws, of a protective attitude toward socialist property, of observance of labor discipline, of an honorable attitude toward state and social duty, and of respect for the rights, honor, and dignity of citizens and for the rules of socialist community life.

This provision is applicable to civil as well as criminal cases. Its underlying philosophy pervades not only court procedure but every branch of the entire legal system. Central to the Soviet concept of justice is the assumption that the person to whom law is addressed, the citizen, has responsibilities with respect to the motherland, the cause of communism, legality, socialist property, labor discipline, the state, the society, his fellow citizens, "socialist community life"—responsibilities which not only are implicit but which are supposed to be explicitly inculcated in every legal proceeding and in the application of every rule of law.

Thereby the division between "private" and "public" law is abolished. Indeed, the word "private" is eliminated in favor of "personal." There are many kinds of personal rights, but they are expressly distinguished from private rights and are said to be derived from social responsibilities. The preamble to the Civil Code of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, which is rarely included in Western translations, declares that personal ownership is derived from socialist ownership. This is to be understood not just as a limitation upon what a person may own, but primarily as a limitation upon what he may do with what he owns.

It is not enough to say that Soviet law is an instrument of politics or that under Soviet law the state has extended the range of its interests and its powers. The more important fact is that in the Soviet Union law is viewed, *above all*, as a means of educating, guiding, training, disciplining, and mobilizing people to fulfill their political, economic, and social responsibilities.

Is this socialist? Is it Russian? Is it Western?

[12] By insisting on calling the procuracy the "prosecuting body" and thus failing to direct attention to its "ombudsman" functions, Dr. Kucherov finds himself in the awkward position of reporting that a "prosecutor" is obliged to protest to higher courts unlawful convictions secured by a subordinate prosecutor.

[13] Strangely, Dr. Kucherov rejects the idea that legal advisers to state enterprises—called *jurisconsults*—are lawyers, despite the fact that they have the same legal education as those who represent individual clients—called advocates—and despite the fact that they may appear in behalf of their corporate clients in the regular courts (in copyright cases, labor cases, and others) as well as in *arbitrazh*. See Donald Barry and Harold J. Berman, "The Jurists," in H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths, Eds., *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1971, pp. 291-333.

[14] This chapter provides an excellent description of the evolution of legal education under the tsars and in the Soviet period, but the appraisal at the end is weak and contains errors. For example, it gives the erroneous impression that there is not much teaching of law to the general population in the Soviet Union, whereas in actuality there is far more such teaching there than in the United States and probably in most other countries as well. Moreover, the final assessment indicates that a substantial number of persons without higher legal education continue to be selected as judges. This contention is contradicted by a quotation from a Soviet jurist in the next chapter (p. 331); however, Dr. Kucherov finds the quoted assertion "more than improbable." Yet if one considers that in 1936 almost 93 percent of Soviet judges lacked a higher legal education and that by 1967 this figure has shrunk to 15 percent, one can reasonably credit Soviet statements to the effect that it is practically impossible to enter any branch of the Soviet legal profession today without a higher legal education and that it is almost entirely older persons who lack such training. See Barry and Berman, *op. cit.*, p. 300.

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Prospects for Soviet Agriculture

By Roy D. Laird

The record of Soviet agriculture for 1966–70 was an obvious source of pride for those, including General Secretary Brezhnev, who formulated and enacted a major shift in agricultural policy beginning in March 1965. According to Soviet reports, the average annual output of most food products actually equaled or exceeded the revised 1966–70 goals announced by Premier Kosygin in April 1966.[1] The average annual volume of gross output of agriculture for 1966–70 was reportedly 21 percent greater than for 1961–65, and the production of grain increased 29 percent.[2] Proceeding according to custom *ot dostignutovo* (*i.e.*, looking upon current successes as the minimum acceptable goal for future performance), the regime has outlined in the Directives for the Ninth (1971–75) Five-Year Plan an ambitious 20- to 22-percent further expansion of agricultural production.[3] A reading of the Directives might suggest that the Soviet Union is truly on the road to the solution of its agricultural problems. But are these targets as realistic or attainable as those published in 1966? Will the regime expand or even sustain its innovative agricultural policy? Can Soviet agriculture overcome the enormous losses inherent in the collectivized system? On each count the answer is probably "No." A point of diminishing returns seems to have been reached in Soviet agriculture, and further progress toward increased per capita output of food is highly problematic.

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The evidence supporting this gloomy forecast falls under three general heads: 1) an appraisal of the Soviet Union's objective potential for meeting its ambitious goals, with particular emphasis on examination of the prospects for the pivotal grain sector in light of the USSR's performance in 1966–70 and of comparative North American experience; 2) an assessment of the impact of the post-Khrushchev reforms in agriculture and the dim prospect for further policy innovations; and 3) an analysis of the costs still to be borne by Soviet agriculture as a result of unwavering adherence to the Stalinist collectivized system of rural management. This multiple approach affords us the opportunity to examine all the major factors entering into the complex equation which is Soviet agriculture.

As an introduction to exploring the feasibility of the Soviet agricultural targets for 1971–75, it would be useful to examine briefly the production record for key food items in 1966–70 and compare the results with the production goals set out in 1966. This is done in Table 1, which shows that the reported output of all major food categories—with the exception of potatoes—did indeed equal or exceed expectations. In the important grain sector, the reported

[1] "Direktivy XXIII sezda KPSS po piatiletnemu planu razvitiia narodnovo khoziaistva SSSR na 1966-70 gg" (Directives of the 23rd CPSU Congress for the Five-Year Plan for the Development of the USSR National Economy in 1966-70), *Pravda* (Moscow), April 6, 1966. It should be noted that nature favored the Soviet Union with exceptionally good weather in 1966-70—with bumper or near-bumper harvests in 1966, 1968, and 1970.

[2] L. I. Brezhnev, "Otchiotnyi doklad Tsentralnovo Komiteta KPSS XXIV sezdu Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskovo Soiuza" (Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union), *ibid.*, March 31, 1971.

[3] "Direktivy XXIV sezda KPSS po piatiletnemu planu razvitiia narodnovo khoziaistva SSSR na 1971-75 gg." (Directives of the 24th CPSU Congress for the Five-Year Plan for the Development of the USSR National Economy in 1971-75), *ibid.*, April 11, 1971.

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Table 1: Production of Key Food Items in 1966-70
(million tons)

	Reported annual results					Annual average 1966-70 (plan)	Annual average 1966-70 (reported)
	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970		
Grain	171.2	147.9	169.5	160.5	186.9*	167.0	167.5
Sugar beets	74.0	87.1	94.3	71.0	78.3	80.0	81.0
Potatoes	87.9	95.5	102.2	91.7	96.6	100.0	94.8
Meat	10.7	11.5	11.6	11.6	12.3	11.0	11.6
Milk	76.0	79.9	82.3	81.6	82.9	78.0	80.5
Eggs (billions)	31.7	33.9	35.7	37.0	44.4	34.0	36.5

* Inferred from Sokolov and Brezhnev data.

SOURCES: A. N. Kosygin, Directives for the 1966-70 Plan, *Pravda* (Moscow), April 6, 1966; Report on Results of the State Economic Plan in 1969, *ibid.*, Jan. 25, 1970; *Selskaia zhizn* (Moscow), Feb. 4, 1971; T. I. Sokolov in *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta* (Moscow), No. 1, January 1971, p. 3; and L. I. Brezhnev, Report to the 24th CPSU Congress, *Selskaia zhizn*, March 31, 1971.

average annual output was 167.5 million tons, or roughly 29 percent more than the figure reported for 1961–65. Meat and dairy products each grew 24 percent, clearly benefiting from the increased availability of grain for fodder. In per capita terms, the reported output of grain amounted to 707 kilograms per annum in 1966–70 compared with 588 kilograms in 1961–65.[4]

What are the Soviet objectives for 1971–75? The goals set forth in the Directives are presented in Table 2, along with the results of the three preceding five-year periods and the author's estimates of output *potential* for 1971–75 and for 1976–80. Assuming that the acreage available for sugar beet and potato crops remains constant and the requisite fertilizer and other aids are forthcoming, the implied increases in the yields per hectare for these root crops do not seem unreasonable. Soviet yields still trail those of their fertilizer-short East European neighbors, are roughly half those realized in the US, and lag even further behind those of Western Europe. The regime's targeted 28 percent increase in egg production (from 36.5 to 46.7 billion eggs a year) also seems feasible and will place only marginal demands on feed grain.[5]

It is the grain sector which is critical from the regime's standpoint. As General Secretary Brezhnev stated in July 1970:

The key problem in the development of agriculture, as we have pointed out many times, has been and remains an increase in grain production.[6]

It is only through increased grain production that the regime can expand the output of meat and dairy products, which are so essential to its goal of raising the protein content of the Soviet diet to West European or North American standards.[7] For 1971–75 the Soviet leadership plans a 16-percent increase in average annual grain output, 23 percent for meat, and 15 percent for dairy products. These compare with a projected 6.3-percent increase in the average population, from 237 million in 1966–70 to 252 million in 1971–75.[8]

It is clear from this that the Soviet planners themselves see a point of diminishing returns, since the

[4] Brezhnev, *op. cit.*, and A. N. Kosygin's report on the 1971-75 Plan Directives at the 24th Congress, "Direktivy XXIV sezda KPSS po piatiletnemu planu razvitiia narolnovo khoziaistva SSSR na 1971-75 gg." (Directives of the 24th CPSU Congress for the Five-Year Plan for the Development of the USSR National Economy in 1971-75), *Selskaia zhizn* (Moscow), April 7, 1971. The per capita data were based on average-population estimates of 222 million for 1961-65 and 237 million for 1966-70.

[5] Kosygin, *ibid.*

[6] Brezhnev's report to the July Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, "Ocherednye zadachi partii v oblasti selskovo khoziaistva" (The Party's Immediate Tasks in the Field of Agriculture), *Pravda*,. July 3, 1970.

[7] In 1968 Soviet consumption of meat and fats per capita is estimated to have been only 47 kilograms, contrasted with a US per capita consumption of 96 kilograms. *The Agricultural Situation in Communist Areas. . . .*, US Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service, Washington, D.C., 1971, p. 10.

[8] These figures represent a comparison of Soviet claims (Table 1) and targets of the Directives for 1971-75 (Table 2). The population average is based on a year-1980 projection in *Projection of the Population of the USSR by Age and Sex: 1969 to 1990*, US Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C., Series P-91, December 1969.

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increases targeted for 1971–75 are substantially more modest than those achieved in 1966–70 (*e.g.*, a grain increase of 16 percent compared with 29 percent in the earlier period). However, this author's calculations arrive at even more modest projections —a maximum increase in average annual grain output of no more than 14 percent and gains of 17 percent for meat and 11 percent for dairy products (see Table 2).[9] Thus, the pace of advance in these sectors registered during 1966–70 should slow even more than the leaders anticipate in the current five-year period. And it should be noted further that our projections gave the Soviet farms the benefit of the doubt in every case. Bad weather, shortfalls in investment, or other negative factors could result in absolute declines in the per capita supply of these basic foodstuffs.

In arriving at our projections for 1971–75 (see Appendix), we deducted a "system-loss factor" of 15 percent from the technically-feasible Soviet grain output in those years. The author has elsewhere demonstrated that large bureaucratized farms in Communist systems have experienced a loss of at least 18 percent in grain yields attributable to system costs.[10] Also, Western students of Soviet agriculture have agreed that available grain has been substantially less than the figures officially reported. In past years, US Department of Agriculture analysts have consistently reduced official Soviet grains figures by more than 15 percent—to allow for spoilage and excess moisture. Therefore, we have applied a uniform 15-percent reduction. It should be noted that the Soviet Union might come close indeed to its goal of 195 million tons of grain a year in 1971–75 were it not for these systemic losses.[11] Thus, we move from the concrete variables of soil and climate into the realm of agricultural policy and the whole issue of the Stalinist agricultural system.

Policy Innovations

It should be recalled that the current regime came to power at least in part as a result of the failures of Khrushchev's agricultural policies. The former First Secretary had tinkered with Stalin's administrative system to the extent of amalgamating smaller and weaker collective farms into huge kolkhozes and had gambled on major programs such as extensive sowing of corn and the plowing of huge tracts in the New Lands in an attempt to boost agricultural output. The drought of 1963 underlined the failure of his policies, and these failures in turn played a significant part in Khrushchev's ouster in the autumn of 1964.[12]

The Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership launched its tenure with a promise to bring a better deal to rural

[9] The calculations on which these projections are based are presented in the Appendix.

[10] Roy D. and Betty A. Laird, *Soviet Communism and Agrarian Revolution*, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England, a Pelican Original, 1970, pp. 146-47. There an analysis of Polish collective farms showed that the largest farms produced 28 percent less grain per hectare than the smallest. The 18-percent figure represented an attempt to allow for the poorer soil and for mineral fertilizer shortages on the larger farms.

[11] By restoring the system loss (161.5 million tons divided by .85) we would arrive at an average annual harvest of 190 million tons of grain in 1971-75.

[12] For examples see Roy D. Laird, "Agriculture Under Khrushchev," *Survey* (London), No. 56, 1965, pp. 106-17.

Table 2: Agricultural Performance and Plan for 1956 to 1980
(million tons)

	1956-60	1961-65	1966-70	Plan 1971-75	Author's Projections 1971-75	1976-80
Grain (adjusted)*	105*	111*	142*	195	161.5	181
Sugar beets	46	59.2	81	90+	90	..
Potatoes	88	81.6	94.8	115	115	..
Meat	7.9	9.3	11.6	14.3	13.6	14
Milk	57	64.7	80.5	92.3	89.9	89.9
Eggs (billions)	22	29	36.5	46.7	51	..
Fertilizer	11	18	35	..	72	..
Population (millions)	205	222	237	..	252	..

* Official statistics reduced by 15 percent for system losses.

SOURCES: Brezhnev's Report to 24th Congress, *loc. cit.;* Kosygin's report on the 1971-75 Plan Directives at 24th Congress, *Pravda,* April 7, 1971; *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR* (National Economy of the USSR) volumes for 1956-69.

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Soviet society, and at the March 1965 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee it laid out a low-key but far-reaching program which antedated the inauguration of the more publicized economic reform in industrial management by a full six months.[13] This was perhaps an indication of the genuine priority which was accorded solution of the agricultural problem. And, in fact, the regime brought about major improvements in economic policies vis-a-vis agriculture, advances which were clearly reflected not only in farm output but in the economy-wide successes of the Eighth (1966–70) Five-Year Plan.

Perhaps the single most important departure was a substantial increase in the level of investment in agriculture. The Directives for the Eighth Five-Year Plan targeted 71 billion rubles for such investment from the state budget and from collective farm revenues,[14] as compared to some 43 billion rubles invested during 1961–65.[15] Although state-financed investment in agriculture may have fallen 20 percent short of the planned goal for 1966–70, kolkhoz-financed investment appears to have met its target.[16] This is an impressive record. In fact, Professor Alec Nove suggests that Soviet agriculture no longer subsidizes industry but itself receives an annual subsidy amounting to over 11 billion rubles.[17] Apparently this subsidy will continue to increase, despite a drive to place all state farms (sovkhozes) on a *khozraschiot* (cost-accounting or self-financing) basis—a program to reduce costs of agricultural production as well as to eliminate the remaining differences between collective and state farms (the kolkhozes have always been on a cost-accounting basis).[18] The growing agricultural subsidy is indicated in the 1971–75 Plan Directives, which targeted a total of 82.2 billion rubles in state investment and an added 46.4 billion rubles in kolkhoz investments.[19] Judging from 1966–70 capital:output relationships, it would have required only 90 billion rubles (not 129 billion) to sustain a 22-percent increase in agricultural output for 1971–75.[20] Thus, the regime seems clearly aware that gains in agriculture are becoming progressively more expensive.



Figure emerging from "collective farm headquarters" shouts: "Let's get a move on! A delivery of spare parts has arrived at the district center!"

—From Krokodil (Moscow), No. 13, May 1971, p. 6.

A second major policy of the current leadership was a sizable improvement in incentives for rural labor. During 1966–70, peasant wages increased some 42 percent.[21] In August 1970 USSR Minister of Agriculture V. V. Matskevich reported that rural incomes now trail those of the average urban worker by only 15 percent.[22] Also contributing to the improved morale of collective farmers were the decisions to make them eligible for social security benefits and to adopt a guaranteed minimum wage on most kolkhozes at a level comparable to the wages

[13] Brezhnev's report to the March 1965 Plenum of the CPSU CC, "O neotlozhnykh merakh po dalneishemu razvitiiu selskovo khoziaistva SSSR" (Urgent Measures for the Further Development of USSR Agriculture), *Selskaia zhizn,* March 27, 1965, and "Primernyi ustav kolkhoza" (Model Kolkhoz Charter), *ibid.*, March 24, 1965.

[14] Directives for the 1966-70 Plan, *loc. cit.*

[15] M. Lemeshev, "Normativy kapitalnykh vlozhenii v selskoe khoziaistvo" (Norms of Capital Investment in Agriculture), *Voprosy ekonomiki* (Moscow), No. 3, 1970, p. 117. Lemeshev actually reported an average annual investment in agriculture of 8.59 billion rubles for the years 1961-65.

[16] See Keith Bush, "The Eighth and Ninth Five-Year Plans for Soviet Agriculture," Radio Liberty *Research Paper,* No. 4, 1970, pp. 3-5.

[17] From a personal conversation with Professor Nove in September 1970.

[18] By May 1970 some 5,000 sovkhozes reportedly were operating on the new self-financing basis. V. Boldin, "Khozraschiot: pervye itogi" (Economic Accountability: First Results), *Pravda,* May 18, 1970.

[19] *Loc. cit. supra.*

[20] If 71 billion rubles produced a 21-percent gain, it presumably would require only 90 billion rubles to generate a 22-percent growth on a production base which is 21 percent larger.

[21] Brezhnev's report to the 24th Party Congress, *loc. cit.*

[22] This was furnished by Matskevich in response to a question after his address to the 14th International Conference of Agricultural Economists, Minsk, USSR, August 24 through September 2, 1970, which the author attended. (Hereafter referred to as "Minsk conference.")

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on state farms.[23] Khrushchev's tight limitations on the peasants' use of private plots were lifted, and private peasant enterprise received encouragement through arrangements to supply fertilizer and machinery.

As a result of the investment program, the machine park has been expanded, rural construction has increased, wetlands have been drained and arid lands irrigated, fertilizer deliveries have been increased, and new rural roads have been constructed. However, rural life is still somber. On the famed *Gigant* sovkhoz, it will be 1975 before construction of all-weather roads will permit pupils to commute to school by bus rather than board at the farm's central secondary school.[24]

Another important element in the regime's agricultural policy is the use of stable plans for compulsory sales of produce to the state. Deliveries above the planned quotas receive premium prices, although it is apparent that such above-plan production is also "planned." (It would have to be in order for Soviet agriculture to reach its plan objectives.) Nevertheless, the premium prices are much more attractive than the confiscatory prices of the past. Furthermore, increased peasant incomes have also played a role in releasing surplus grain and other products for marketing and thereby have reduced the need for "administrative" intervention in this process.

All the above policy initiatves combined with the favorable weather of 1966–70 to provide the Soviet Union a productive five years in agriculture. The obvious question which poses itself on the threshold of a new five-year period is whether the CPSU leadership will carry on with the policy innovations of the past six years.

Investment Shortfalls

Even if the tremendous investment targeted for agriculture in 1971–75 actually materializes, Soviet output of grain, meat, and dairy products seems destined to fall short of stated targets. Soviet history, furthermore, suggests that new investment shortfalls can be anticipated. Agriculture has perennially been the first sector to suffer when allocable resources grew short.[25] It is therefore interesting to note that in July 1970—as in March 1965, predating the release of new five-year plan directives by many months—General Secretary Brezhnev announced a target of 77.6 billion rubles for state investment and 43 billion rubles for kolkhoz investment in agriculture for 1971–75.[26] As five years earlier, so in 1970 Brezhnev appeared to be staking out an early claim for agriculture in the allocation of investment resources under the Ninth Five-Year Plan. Promotion of F. D. Kulakov, the CPSU Central Committee's secretary in charge of agriculture, to membership (and *full* membership at that) on the Politburo at the 24th Party Congresss may signal another effort to increase the stress on agriculture in top party circles. At the Congress, Brezhnev noted that 1971–75 investment in agriculture would be "as much as in the two preceding five-year periods," [27] and the Directives came up with the 128.6 billion-ruble total mentioned above. All this would seem to indicate a concerted effort to commit the party to a costly investment effort in the countryside, but only time will tell whether the regime can see it through.

Despite possible shortfalls in targeted investment, the regime should make good on most of its promises of material inputs—a 30- to 35-percent gain in farm incomes, more fertilizer, more machinery, more reclaimed land.[28] However, the leadership does appear to be backing away from strong reliance on material incentives. In October 1968 Brezhnev already had attacked those kolkhoz chairmen who allowed wage increases to outstrip productivity gains. The December 1969 Central Committee Plenum likewise seems to have stressed moral incentives and discipline in all sectors of the economy and played down the role of material interest in increasing productivity. Thus, despite a continued improvement in rural living standards and income, the kolkhoz peasants cannot anticipate the same dramatic improvements which spurred them to exceptional efforts in the first half of the Eighth Five-Year Plan.

[23] Minsk conference. One Soviet agricultural expert stated that the average *kolkhoznik* wage in Belorussia was 115 rubles a month; this is presumably higher than the level elsewhere in the USSR.

[24] Information gathered during a tour of state and collective farms following the Minsk conference. (Hereafter referred to as "Farm tour.")

[25] See Brezhnev's admission in this regard in his report to the October 1968 Plenum of the CPSU CC, "O khode vypolneniia reshenii XXIII sezda i Plenumov TsK KPSS po voprosam selskovo khoziaistva" (Progress in Fulfilling the Decisions of the 23rd Congress and of the Plenums of the CPSU CC on Agricultural Questions), *Pravda*, October 31, 1968.

[26] Report to the July 1970 Plenum of the CPSU CC, *loc. cit.*

[27] Report to the 24th Party Congress, *loc. cit.*

[28] For specifics see the Directives for the 1971-75 Plan, *loc. cit.*

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As impressive as the Brezhnev-Kosygin agricultural policy is, it hardly compares with the scope of the 1921 New Economic Policy of Lenin, which combined economic concessions to the countryside with widespread liberation from the stifling central restrictions imposed in the early Bolshevik years. In fact, the present leaders have left the Stalinist collectivized system—with all its inherent costs and waste—fundamentally intact.

Collectivization was imposed on the Russian countryside as a means of organizing farming along "industrial" lines and bringing the "advantages of communism" to the countryside. More important, however, it was an effective means of extracting maximum possible capital from the peasants in order to build industry, since it gave the state complete control of farm output. Politically also, collectivization provided a framework through which to exercise general control over the peasants—the most backward and potentially most counterrevolutionary social group. On all accounts *except production,* Stalin could rightly judge collectivization a success.

Khrushchev, in his turn, also believed in the superiority of collectivization, although he expended considerable effort in attempts to "improve" the system. A major legacy of his era was the creation of Leviathan-size collective farms (amalgamations of numerous small kolkhozes), which securely linked the farms to the bureaucratic hierarchy of the state.

Table 3: Farm Organization

	Collective Farms	State Farms
Total farms:		
In 1960	44,900*	7,375
In 1965	36,900*	11,681
In 1969	34,700*	14,310
Average per farm (1969):		
Number of households	420	450
Brigades	5–6	6
Number of workers	500+	650
Workers/brigade	100	100
People	1,400	2,100
Total hectares	6,100	21,900
Sown hectares	3,000	6,700
Cattle	1,000+	2,000
Sheep	1,500	4,000
Pigs	600	900

* Including fishing collectives.

Sources: Constructed from data in *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR* volumes, other published sources, and materials presented at the 14th International Conference of Agricultural Economists, Minsk, USSR, Aug. 24-Sept. 2, 1970.

His policies also allowed the party and its control apparatus to enter the kolkhozes directly, thus rendering the machine tractor stations (MTS) of the Stalin era redundant as an instrument of political and economic control and leading to their dissolution in 1958. Except for these minor adjustments, however, there have been no significant changes in the structure of Soviet agricultural management since the forced collectivization of the early 1930's.

System Stagnation

The current leadership, too, gives no hints of any impending *fundamental* systemic changes. General Secretary Brezhnev's emphasis on discipline and moral incentives in recent pronouncements harks back to the Stalin era and suggests declining confidence in policies of economic incentives for agriculture. At the March 1965 Plenum on agriculture, Brezhnev did suggest that many of the Soviet farms had become too huge and cumbersome, and he also called for a new Model Kolkhoz Charter.[29] On both counts, however, little has been accomplished. Although the pace has slowed down, there has been *no reversal* of the trend toward amalgamation of small kolkhozes into larger ones or the conversion of kolkhozes into sovkhozes (state farms). By the end of the 1960's, there were fewer than 35,000 kolkhozes and more than 14,000 sovkhozes, with the average dimensions presented in Table 3. The Model Kolkhoz Charter, finally adopted at the end of 1969,[30] also brought little new except the codification of social security benefits and the creation of kolkhoz councils. The latter, far from representing "kolkhoz democracy," promise to become new "company unions" in the countryside, if one is to judge by their concentration to date on making promises to fulfill and overfulfill state delivery plans for farm output.[31]

Other recent measures—of an administrative nature—also have not appreciably modified the reality of centralized control of agriculture. For example, the district (*raion*) agricultural production administrations (which formerly reported directly to the higher agricultural agencies and also were closely

[29] Brezhnev's report to the March 1965 Plenum of the CPSU CC, *loc. cit.*

[30] "Primernyi ustav kolkhoza" (Model Kolkhoz Charter), *Selskaia zhizn,* Nov. 30, 1969.

[31] See for example "Zasedanie vserossiiskovo soveta kolkhozov" (Meeting of All-Russian Council of Kolkhozy), *Ibid.,* July 24, 1970.

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controlled by the party) have been transformed into *agricultural administrations* of district executive committees (local governments), but their control functions remain the same. In addition, *state inspectorates for the purchase and quality* [*control*] *of agricultural products* were set up at the district, province, and territory levels to facilitate "an increase in state discipline and in responsibility for fulfilling the established plans for production and purchase of grain, cotton, meat, milk, and other products." [32] Neither of these developments seems likely to foster creative initiative on the part of the collective and state farms. The general impression gathered from contacts with leading agricultural administrators and scholars of the Soviet Union suggests institutional stasis, if not stagnation.[33]

Since Stalin's death there has been much discussion of ways to decentralize Soviet agriculture and to encourage greater initiative among farm managers and chairmen. In practice, however, the high proportion (some two-thirds) of a farm's output required by plan to be delivered to the state really demands that outside party officials and bureaucrats continue to meddle in farm affairs. It is the province and district officials who incur Moscow's wrath when plans go unmet. The sovkhoz director is indisputably an instrumentality of the state, and despite claims for "kolkhoz democracy," the kolkhoz chairman is likewise responsible to higher party and government officials, *not* to the collective farmers.[34] In each case, the state's representative rules with an iron hand, as typified by the proud sovkhoz director who, through a telephone-radio communications system, knows "what every tractor is doing at all times." [35]

The prevailing concept of "efficiency" in Soviet agriculture is that each peasant must do precisely what he is told. There are bonuses to reward extra accomplishment, but this is mostly measured in terms of harder work and/or longer hours, not in improvement of techniques. Abandonment of the old workday (*trudoden*) pay system and adoption of a



Слаломист поневоле.

This cartoon, captioned "Running an involuntary slalom," depicts the problems faced by Soviet agriculture due to the encroachment of administrative buildings on good cropland. Buildings on the "slalom course" (from top to bottom) are a supply depot, an information center, a directorate, a clothing shop, and an office.

—From *Krokodil* (Moscow), No. 9, March 1969, p. 5.

[32] See Brezhnev's report to the July 1970 Plenum of the CPSU CC, *loc. cit.*

[33] Minsk conference. Our Soviet colleagues showed some interest (as well as a justified skepticism) concerning the applicability of mathematical models to farm production. They also expressed concern over the manpower drain from the Soviet countryside, but seemed to have little concrete to offer in halting it.

[34] Farm tour. At one kolkhoz the author suggested that the chairman was included on the *oblast nomenklatura* (the list of critical administrative posts appointment to which is controlled by the provincial party committee); the chairman and his staff discussed the matter at great length but did not refute this contention.

[35] Farm tour.

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guaranteed minimum wage has not done much to eliminate inefficiency. One kolkhoz chairman, when pressed to explain existing bonus procedures, admitted that "hundreds of norms" (relating ruble bonuses to concrete work tasks) are prescribed for the peasants.[36] This requires armies of checkers to verify that jobs were actually performed.

System costs arising from excessive bureaucratic layers and the lack of room for initiative have been little affected by the current regime's policies. We have argued previously that adoption of the independent *zveno* (team or link) could unleash considerable peasant initiative.[37] For years, the Soviet press has reported highly successful experiments in which kolkhozes have been divided into units of several hundred hectares, each managed and farmed by a *zveno* consisting of six or seven members, whose income depends on its success in tilling its assigned segment of the farm. Lack of sufficient machinery to be assigned on a semi-permanent basis to the *zveno* is one major obstacle. Ideological scruples about a return to "private" ownership of the land is another. It is notable that in the face of these drawbacks, the RSFSR Premier, G. I. Voronov, who serves as a member of the CPSU Politburo, as well as various Soviet commentators have continued to advocate adoption of the *zveno* system.[38] Despite such support for the proposal, Minister Matskevich has emphatically denied any plans to adopt the *zveno* on a wide scale.[39]

So the future course is determined. Brezhnev & Company have correctly determined that even higher levels of investment in agriculture will be required in 1971–75. They also correctly anticipate further production advances during this period. However, a point of diminishing returns from increased investment seems to have been reached. Unless introduction of the *zveno* or some other means of encouraging peasant entrepreneurship shatters the Procrustean bed of bureaucratic management, a new crisis in Soviet agriculture could erupt before the end of the 1970's. Even in the summer of 1970, we were told, there was a shortage of meat in most cities.[40]

[36] *Ibid.*

[37] See for example "New Trends and Old Remedies," *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1966, pp. 21-28.

[38] Voronov supported the *zveno* in *Komsomolskaia pravda* (Moscow), May 11, 1969. (It was learned on July 22, 1971, that Voronov had been transferred to chairmanship of the USSR People's Control Committee; M.S. Solomentsev replaced him as RSFSR Premier on July 28.—Ed.) See also A. Yanov, "Zhivaia praktiki i konservatizm myshleniia" (Live Practical Operations and Conservative Thought), *Literaturnaia gazeta* (Moscow), No. 15, April 8, 1970, p. 10, and I. Altaisky and V. Zurikov, "O formakh organizatsii i oplaty truda" (Forms of Organizing and Remunerating Labor), *Ekonomika selskovo khoziaistva* (Moscow), No. 12, 1969, pp. 83-88.

[39] Minsk conference.

[40] *Ibid.* In June 1970 Premier Kosygin had admitted the inability of Soviet farms to satisfy the public demand for meat products (Radio Moscow, June 10, 1970).

Appendix: Agricultural Projects

The author's estimate of the grain-output potential of the Soviet Union for 1971-75 was calculated as follows: First, the acreage of each of the three major grain-producing regions was examined. Then an assessment was made of the possibilities for increasing the acreage under cultivation in each area; the 1966-70 yield and the technically-feasible future yield in each area for 1976-80 were determined; the total estimate was reduced by 15 percent (representing anticipated losses due to the bureaucratized management of agricultural production) [1] and then averaged back for 1971-75. The calculations assume normal weather conditions and a continued advance in Soviet investment in agriculture.

Soviet grain is produced in three primary regions: the established small-grain areas; the relatively small area with suitable moisture and warmth to grow corn to full maturity; and the New Lands area of Kazakhstan and the southern RSFSR. Some 123 million hectares (one hectare equals 2.471 acres—Ed.) were sown to grain in 1969.[2] In attempting to apportion this land, we find that data on the area sown to corn seem the most reliable. During 1966-69 the corn

[1] For a brief explanation of this system-loss factor see page 33 above.

[2] *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1969 godu* (National Economy of the USSR in 1969), Moscow, Statistika, 1970, p. 324.

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acreage increased from 3.2 to 4.2 million hectares.[3] As for the New Lands, the author's calculation is that in 1963 as many as 36.6 million hectares were newly sown to grain in Khrushchev's ambitious New Lands program.[4] Since then Soviet farm officials appear to have partially heeded Western advice and left as much as 25 percent of these lands fallow each year in order to maximize total production. However, during 1969 a total of 3.7 million hectares of the planned fallow were actually sown to grain. The implication is that in that area roughly 31 million hectares were sown to grain each year during the 1966-70 period.[5] By 1970—assuming sowing of a total of 125 million hectares to grain—the combined estimated acreage in the New Lands and the corn regions totaled 36 million hectares, which left some 89 million hectares sown in the traditional small-grain areas during 1969.

What is the potential expansion of total grain acreage and of the acreage of each crop area? Soviet Academician S. Udachin and V. Sotnikov, Director of the State Scientific Research Institute of Land Resources, have reported that three million hectares of new irrigated or drained land were added to the Soviet land bank during 1966-68 as a result of the massive program of land melioration announced in May 1966. The "tentative" goal is to add a total of 19 million irrigated hectares and 29 million drained hectares by 1980. Owing to loss of land to urban and industrial use, the target will not be met. Thus, these Soviet experts stated that it would be "possible" to increase arable land by 12-13 million hectares by 1980 as compared with 1967.[6] Based on a 1980 population of 274 million, they forecast an absolute decline in arable hectares per capita (for *all* agricultural uses) by that year. This fact makes it all the more important that the new acreage be planted to grain and that yields be significantly increased.

Assuming that a total of 12 million hectares are added to grain by 1980, one must next determine where this new acreage will be located. Natural conditions would seem to preclude any expansion of sown acreage in the New Lands. As for the corn areas, increased irrigation might expand the total hectares sown to that grain to 10 million by 1980. This would leave 96 million hectares to be sown in the traditional small-grain areas, out of a 1980 total of 137 million hectares.

What is the potential yield of grain from each area in the next decade? Unfortunately, the data base is rather sparse on current yields. Little specific information on yields in the New Lands has been provided by Soviet statistical sources since the early 1960's. During the period 1956-63, when more data were available, yields in the area were virtually the same as for the whole of Kazakhstan.[7] Incomplete data for 1966-70 permit a reasonable estimate of 8.0 centners per hectare for Kazakhstan in those years.[8] Assuming this level of yield was also achieved on the 31 million hectares of the New Lands, we can estimate an average annual production of 24.8 million tons.

In assessing the potential of the arid New Lands, we are indebted to the pioneering research of Carl Zoerb. He indicated the extraordinary comparability of New Lands conditions with those of Saskatchewan, Canada, and demonstrated that the Soviet farms must leave some 40 percent of this land fallow to achieve a maximum yield of 12.8 centners per hectare.[9] If such an approach is applied in the New Lands, it would place 22 million hectares (60 percent of 36.6 million) under cultivation with a gross potential output of 28 million tons of grain a year.

During 1966-69 the average annual reported production of corn in the USSR was 9.6 million tons, with a constant yield of 26.2 centners per hectare in the first three years of that period.[10] If one assumes that by 1976-80 the USSR, using only the choicest land, might reach the US yield-level (for 1960-64—the most recent five-year average available) of 39 centners per hectare, one can project annual output of 39 million tons of corn on the estimated 10 million hectares.[11]

If, during 1966-70, the Soviet farms produced each year an average of 24.8 million tons of grain in the New Lands and 9.6 million tons of corn, the remainder of the reported total of 167.5 million tons—or 133.1 million tons—must have originated in the old small-grains areas, with an implied yield of 14.9 centners per hectare. What is the potential yield of the estimated 96 million hectares to be sown to grain in this area by 1976-80? Western and Soviet specialists agree that soil and climate conditions in the USSR are less favorable than in the US. While some 80 percent of US wheat land is

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[3] *Ibid.*, p. 308, and *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1967 godu* (National Economy of the USSR in 1967), Moscow, Statistika, 1968, p. 359.

[4] Roy D. Laird, "Soviet Output in 1980: An Appraisal," *Osteuropa Wirtschaft* (Stuttgart), No. 2, June 1965, pp. 90-124.

[5] If the 36.6 million hectares were reduced by 25 percent left fallow and then 3.7 million hectares of the latter were restored to cultivation, we are left with a balance of 31.1 million hectares under cultivation in the New Lands area. For information on the sowing policy in these areas, see *Selskaia zhizn* April 20, 1969, and *Pravda*, March 31, 1969.

[6] Udachin and Sotnikov, "Zemelnye resursy i ikh ispolzovanie" (Land Resources and Their Use), *Ekonomika selskovo khoziaistva*, No. 4, 1969, pp. 17-25.

[7] Officials yields for 1956-63 in Kazakhstan averaged 7.4 centners per hectare, while those of Tselinnyi Krai in the neighboring New Lands area of the RSFSR were 7.2 centners. Calculations were made from the *Narodnoe khoziaistvo* volumes for 1956 through 1963 and from data in Carl Zoerb, "The Virgin Land Territory: Plans, Performance and Prospects," in Roy. D. Laird and Edward L. Crowley, Eds., *Soviet Agriculture: The Permanent Crisis*, New York, Praeger, 1965, pp 29-44.

[8] At this writing, the Kazakhstan yield for 1970 is not known. However, the average for the years of 1966-69 was 8.0 centners per hectare, and one may confidently predict that the 1966-70 figure can hardly have exceeded 8.0 centners. *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1967 godu*, pp. 362 and 371; *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1968 godu* (National Economy of the USSR in 1968), Moscow, Statistika, 1969, pp. 341 and 350; and *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1969 godu*, p. 324.

[9] Zoerb, *op. cit.*

[10] *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1967 godu*, pp. 363 and 386; *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1968 godu*, pp. 318 and 334; *Moscow News*, No. 38, 1968, p. 2; and Brezhnev's report to the July 1970 Plenum of the CPSU CC, *loc. cit.*

[11] This estimate is one-third lower than the projection we made in 1965. The earlier figure was based on the Soviet practice of including corn in the milk-wax stage in its ripe-grain statistics and on the assumption that the Soviet Union would continue to plant a total of 14.1 million hectares (which included sizable acreage planted to corn which only reached the milk-wax stage). The US yields of 39 centners per hectare (*i.e.*, 62.5 bushels per acre) were reported in US Department of Agriculture, *Agricultural Statistics 1968*, Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1938, p. 31.

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sown to higher-yielding winter varieties, in the USSR—even after subtracting the vast spring wheat sowings in the New Lands—some half of the land sown to wheat is in spring varieties. One can therefore assume, for natural reasons alone, that the maximum yield for small grains (most of which are wheat) in the USSR will be at least 10 percent lower than in the US. During 1960-64 average wheat yields in the US were 16.9 centners per hectare,[12] or about one-third higher than the 1966 record Soviet yields. Reduced by 10 percent, we arrive at an implied yield of 15.2 centners by 1976-80. This would give a technically-possible yield of 146 million tons of grain from the traditional areas.

Summing up the output from all three areas, we arrive at a technically-possible total annual-average output of 123 million tons of grain for 1976-80.[13] However, as noted above, it has been estimated that Soviet agriculture loses some 15 percent of its grain production because of systemic losses, which reduces the above figure to an average annual output of 181 million (213 million × .85) tons of grain for 1976-80. Averaging this with the adjusted output total of 142 million tons a year in 1966-70, we finally arrive at an estimated 1971-75 figure of 161.5 million tons of grain per annum, or a gain of some 14 percent.

Although the estimates contained herein may have erred on the conservative side, there is at least one important check on possible error. Assuming that the maximum possible area is sown to grain (allowing for 40 percent fallow in the New Lands), we arrive at a 1976-80 average grain area of 128 million hectares and an implied area of 125.5 million hectares in 1971-75. Yet, in 1968 Brezhnev noted that the future grain needs of 190 to 200 million tons would require "a countrywide yield of 16 to 17 centners per hectare.[14] By dividing 16.5 centners per hectare into the now precise target of 195 million tons, we have an implied acreage of 118 million hectares for 1971-75, or some 7 million hectares below our working estimate. Thus, if anything, our estimates may be overly generous.

While the real gains in grain output likely to be registered over the current five-year period will be significant, they fall far short of the absolute gains necessary to sustain the targets for meat and dairy products. If the Soviet Union is indeed to achieve its planned increase of 2.7 million tons of meat products and 11.8 million tons of dairy products, it will require 37 million additional fodder units.[15] If the Soviet Union actually achieves its production goal of 195 million tons of grain a year, it would have available an additional 27.5 million tons of grain or 27.5 million fodder units (assuming all grain increments were channeled to fodder). If we add 10 million more feed units from increases in non-grain sources, the Soviet Union would just produce the fodder units required to meet their 1971-75 meat and dairy product targets. And, in fact, *actual* grain increments will, according to our estimates, amount to only 19.5 million tons (161.5 million minus 142 million), bringing the total shortfall of new fodder to some 8 million units. On the basis of these figures, we therefore project at least a 20-percent shortfall in the increases in meat and milk production planned for 1971-75, as demonstrated in Table 2.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 5. Our earlier projections were based on a 14.8-centner-per-hectare Soviet yield, which may have been a bit low (Laird, *op. cit.*). The final figures for 1970 may be somewhat higher than 15.2 centners.

[13] This compares with the 214 million tons projected for the same period in the author's 1965 article cited above.

[14] See his report to the October 1968 Plenum of the CPSU CC, *loc. cit.*

[15] It requires 11.7 fodder units per ton of meat and 0.5 fodder units to produce a ton of milk. One ton of grain is the equivalent of one fodder unit.

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An Inconclusive Dialogue

By Edmund Demaitre

Eight years have now passed since the publication of the papal encyclical *Pacem in terris*, which paved the way for a Christian-Marxist dialogue aimed at bringing about at least a limited rapprochement between the two conflicting world-views. Occasional attempts to establish contact between Christian, particularly Protestant, theologians and Marxist theoreticians had been made earlier; but it was only after the publication of Pope John XXIII's last encyclical and the deliberations of the Second Vatican Council in 1963 that the dialogue acquired a wider scope and became an important element in efforts to reduce the intensity of ideological confrontations in a dangerously fragmented world.[1]

To draw the balance sheet of the dialogue would be premature at this juncture; however, the exchanges of views that have taken place in the last few years have already revealed the complexity of the issues around which the respective positions of Christians and Marxists have crystallized. While no final conclusions have been reached on how to eliminate the traditional antagonism between Christians and Marxists, the theoretical premises on which any eventual rapprochement would have to rest have already been outlined by both sides within the framework of their respective metaphysical, ethical, and other commitments.

In assessing the nature of the difficulties which the participants in the dialogue face, one should first consider the overall rationale behind the attempts to bridge the chasm between a religion based on transcendence and revelation and a "secular faith" resting on a monistic-materialistic interpretation of the world. For quite a long time, it seemed to both Christians and Marxists that any effort to bring about a rapprochement between the two conflicting world-views would be doomed to failure. The excommunication of Communists from the Catholic Church and the intolerant atheism of the various Communist regimes provided dramatic evidence of the intensity of the conflict and the involvement of political as well as ideological issues. But the situation changed quite radically in the mid-1950's, when many non-Communists and Communists alike became convinced that as a result of military-technological developments, no fundamental change in the existing political status quo could be expected in the foreseeable future. The process of international stabilization that began around that time inevitably generated new perspectives as various Christian and Marxist thinkers set out to reconsider the facts of life in the nuclear era.

Those facts were too obvious to be ignored. Christians had to take into account that about one-third of the world's population, including millions of Christians, had come under Communist rule. Communists, on the other hand, had to realize that it would be impossible to consolidate Communist power in the preponderantly Christian countries of Eastern Europe without involving Christians in "the building of socialism." Moreover, since the possibility of immediate Communist takeovers in at least Western Europe had vanished, Communists were forced

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[1] Without explicitly invalidating previous papal pronouncements on socialism and communism in the encyclicals *Syllabus errorum* (Pius IX, 1864), *Rerum novarum* (Leo XIII, 1891), and *Divini redemptoris* (Pius XI, 1937), Pope John XXIII's *Pacem in terris* clearly distinguished between "false philosophical doctrines on the nature, the origin and the destiny of the universe" and "historic movements having economic, social, cultural and political aims." According to the encyclical, such movements may contain positive elements worthy of merit insofar as they conform "to the dictates of proper reason and serve as interpreters of the just aspirations of the human person."

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to recognize that bids for power there—especially in those countries (like France and Italy) where local parties had become an important factor in national politics—would have to take place within the framework of existing political and social institutions. Such tactics, in turn, required a broadening of the Communist parties' political bases, including a rapprochement with Christians, and the abandonment of rigid ideological commitments that had for a long time prevented these parties from performing any function other than that of a sterile, albeit vocal opposition.

The Opium Theory

These considerations provided ample justification for Christians as well as Marxists to engage in a dialogue. The problem was to find a more or less solid basis on which to conduct exploratory conversations so that they would not degenerate into sterile argumentation or reciprocal proselytizing. In the attempt to discover that basis, a number of obstacles had to be removed. To begin with, there had to be a clarification of whether the doctrinal foundations of dialectical materialism would allow modification of the intransigently hostile attitude that Marxist parties and movements had traditionally maintained toward religion in general and Christianity in particular.[2]

The Marxist position on religion was clearly defined by Karl Marx in the much-quoted passage from his *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right,* in which he described religion as "the opium of the people." This evaluation was the logical outgrowth of his endorsement, even though with significant reservations, of Ludwig Feuerbach's theory of alienation. Both Feuerbach and Marx deemed religion to be a characteristic and probably fundamental form of alienation. The main difference between their interpretations was that Marx saw religious alienation, like all other types of estrangement, as the result of production relations, while Feuerbach viewed it as the individual's tendency to "objectify" human nature by assigning man's essence—his creative powers—to something transcendent and mysterious outside man. Friedrich Engels fully agreed with Marx. In recalling how deeply both he and Marx were influenced by Feuerbach's materialism before setting it right, Engels wrote: "Nothing exists outside Nature and man, and the higher beings our religious fantasies have created are only the fantastic reflection of our own essence." [3] V. I. Lenin, in discussing "the fog of religion" in 1905, produced a slightly new variation on the opium theme by declaring that "religion is a spiritual vodka in which the slaves of capital drown their human shape and their claim to any decent life." [4] A few years later, he further delineated his position by listing atheistic propa-

[2] A complete bibliography of books and essays dealing with various aspects of the dialogue would fill several volumes. The problems briefly summarized in the present articles are extensively discussed in the following works: Nicholas Berdiaeff, *Le marxisme et la religion,* Paris, 1932, and *Le christianisme et la lutte des classes,* Paris, 1932; Jacques Maritain, *Humanisme intégral,* Paris, 1936; John Lewis, Ed., *Christianity and the Socialist Revolution,* London, 1936; Gaston Fessard, *Le dialogue communiste-chrétien est-il possible?,* Paris, 1937; R. Vancourt, *Marxisme et pensée chrétienne,* Paris, 1948; Emil Brunner, *Communism, Capitalism, Christianity,* London, 1949; M. Mackinnon, *Christian Faith and Communist Faith,* London, 1953; Charles W. Lowry, *Communism and Christ,* London, 1954; Jean-Yves Calvez, *La pensée de Karl Marx,* Paris, 1953; J. Hommes, *Koexistenz—philosophisch beleuchtet,* Bonn, 1957; Marcel Reding, *Der politische Atheismus,* Graz, 1957; *Die Stellung des Marxismus-Leninismus zur Religion,* East Berlin, 1958; Emil Fuchs, *Marxismus und Christentum,* Leipzig, 1958; J. C. Hromadka, *Evangelium fuer Atheisten,* Berlin, 1958: Charles C. West, *Communism and the Theologians,* New York, 1958; Helmut Gollwitzer, *Die christliche Kirche und der kommunistische Atheismus,* Dortmund, 1959; *Il dialogo alla prova,* Florence, 1964; Michel Verret, *Les marxistes et la religion,* Paris, 1965; Milan Machovec, *Marxismus und dialektische Theologie,* Zurich, 1965; I. P. Dubarle, *Pour un dialogue avec les marxistes,* Paris, 1965; Erich Fromm, Ed., *Socialist Humanism,* Garden City, N. J., 1965; Giulio Birardi, *Marxismo e Cristianesimo,* Assisi, 1966; *Marxistisches und Christliches Weltverstaendnis,* Vienna and Freiburg, 1966; *Gespraeche der Paulus Gesellschaft, Christentum und Marxismus-Heute,* Vienna, Frankfurt, and Zurich, 1966; Antonio Capizzi, *Dall'ateismo all'umanesimo,* Rome, 1967; Alasdair MacIntyre, *Marxism and Christianity,* New York, 1968; Lucio Lombardo Radice, *Socialismo e liberta,* Rome, 1968; James Klugmann, Ed., *Dialogue of Christianity and Marxism,* London, 1968; Roger Garaudy, *Perspectives de l'homme,* Paris, 1969; *De l'anathème au dialogue,* Paris, 1965; *and Marxisme du XXieme siècle,* Paris, 1966. Hans Braker's "Die Religionsphilosophische Diskussion in der Sowjetunion," *Marxismusstudien,* Vol. VI, Tuebingen, 1969, examines the Soviet position on some of the most important problems involved in the dialogue. Other significant contributions to the discussions have been made by the Catholic and Protestant theologians Karl Rahner, Gustav Wetter, Franz Cardinal Koenig, Wilhelm Dantine, Johann Baptist Metz, and James L. Adams, and by the Marxist theoreticians Cesare Luporini, Luciano Gruppi, Gilbert Mury, Asari Polikarov, Branko Bosniak, Walter Hollitscher, and Vuko Pavicevic.

[3] "Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy," in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Selected Works,* London, 1942, Vol. II, pp. 322-23.

[4] "Socialism and Religion," V. I. Lenin, *Selected Works,* New York, 1943, Vol. XI, p. 68. Neither Marx nor Lenin, incidentally, showed excessive originality in attributing to religion stupefying or intoxicating qualities. The simile had been well known since the 18th-century French materialist Baron d'Holbach used it in his anti-religious broadside, *Le Christianisme dévoilé* (1761). Long before Marx, many poets and philosophers, including Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Heinrich Heine, and Bruno Bauer, spoke of religion as having narcotic effects. See Helmut Gollwitzer, *The Christian Faith and the Marxist Criticism of Religion,* New York, 1970, pp. 15-23.

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ganda among the main tasks of the Bolshevik party. He justified his hostility toward religion not only on philosophical grounds but also by stressing that "every defense of the idea of God" only serves the interest of reaction.[5]

In light of the unchallengeable authority with which the words of the "founding fathers" have been invested by Communists—not to mention the important role that "citatology" plays in Marxist discussions—the pronouncements of Marx, Engels, and Lenin on religion appeared to place insurmountable obstacles in the path of a constructive dialogue between Christians and Marxists. The rigidity of the Marxist system of thought seemingly rendered the difficulties of working out a theoretical justification for reconciling the two world-views even more imposing, for an outright repudiation of the opium theory and its variants would necessitate revision of some of the fundamental tenets of Marxism-Leninism, including those of historical materialism, the role of the superstructure, alienation, consciousness, and the Marxist interpretation of subject-object relations.

Marxist theoreticians intent on preparing the terrain for a dialogue with Christians plainly could not perform a radical overhauling of Marxism-Leninism without giving further impetus to the already massive ideological fragmentation of the Communist world; hence, they adopted an oblique rather than a frontal approach to the problem raised by the opium theory. They did not repudiate the theory but put it into a new context by using an analytical method based on Marxist assumptions. First, they pointed out that even if Marx considered religion to be the opium of the people, his statement reflected an outlook determined by conditions prevailing at the time and place he made it. According to this explanation, Marx's views on religion were fully justified in an era marked by industrial expansion, unlimited *laissez faire,* unchallenged bourgeois supremacy, and an unshakable alliance between the Church and various states. However, it does not follow—so the argument runs—that one should apply Marx's judgments about religion without reservation to all religions everywhere and at every historical moment. This is particularly true in the postindustrial era, when the emergence of socialist states, the ideological conquests of Marxism-Leninism, and other new political and cultural conditions have compelled the Christian churches to stress not only the transcendental but also the "this-worldly" content of their respective messages.

[5] Letters to Maxim Gorky in V. I. Lenin, *Ueber die Religion,* East Berlin, 1956, pp. 44-50. Gorky, along with Anatole Lunacharsky, V. A. Bazarov, and other Russian socialists, belonged to the group known as "God-builders," who, in contrast to the so-called "God-seekers," regarded the collective achievements of mankind as the realization of divinity. See Gustav A. Wetter, *Dialectical Materialism,* New York, 1963, pp. 90-91.

RELIGION REAPPRAISED

Marx and Engels showed that only at the end of the eighteenth century had Christianity lost all progressive meaning. In 1936, Maurice Thorez referred to the age-old "progressive function of Christianity." And in our day, it is worth emphasizing that among peoples oppressed by colonialism, the national struggle was initiated in the name of God before being carried forward in the name of country.

It is important, therefore, not to mutilate Marxist teaching, and to understand that religion is not only a mode of *perceiving* the world, but also a way of *being present* in the world, and of assuming an attitude in it. Consequently, we cannot deny or reject the profound claims of believers, even if these claims express themselves and are impelled by the thirst for illusory satisfactions. The function of Marxists-Leninists, on the contrary, is to assume those claims for their own account, and to discover the means to give them real satisfaction, in order that communism may appear to the mass of believers—as Marx said in the *Jewish Question*—"the realization in non-religious terms of the human foundation of Christianity."

—Roger Garaudy, "How to Build the City of Men," *Rinascita* (Rome) March 27, 1965.

. . . we must find the language of dialogue . . ., freed of the blinders of traditional anticlericalism (which, however, has its historical justifications). In a word, it is necessary to steer clear of all dogmatism and all sectarianism. Dogmatism would consist in considering the Catholic religion a reactionary and obscurantist bloc just at the moment when it is more than ever setting itself in motion, is manifesting a diversity of tendencies like those which oppose each other in history and an overall and official orientation which, far from amounting to absolute social regression, is opening up to the future, even though it still keeps resolutely clear of the road of revolution. Sectarianism would mean that, unconscious of the real progress and confined in a maximum program which Christianity's social course renders unacceptable to the present-day Church, we rejected all search for points of agreement for which the Catholics, in part if not in toto, are already ready.

—Jacques Milhau, "Observations on the Work of the Council," *La nouvelle critique* (Paris), No. 178, August-September, 1966.

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Whatever Marx said, a prominent Marxist theoretician concluded, "religion is not always and everywhere an opiate of the people." [6]

In relativizing the opium theory—a patently heretical move from the standpoint of orthodox Marxism—the Communist promoters of the dialogue appealed to Marx himself. They contended that Marx's remark on religion had hitherto been misunderstood because it had been lifted out of context. The full paragraph in which it occurs reads:

Religious distress is at the same time the expression *of real distress and the* protest *against real distress. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, just as it is the spirit of a spiritless situation. It is the opium of the people.*[7]

Marx's italicization of the words "expression" and "protest" in the opening sentence enabled neo-Marxist exegetists to reinterpret the meaning of the entire passage.

These exegetists asserted that if Marx had looked upon religion as the expression of real distress, he had obviously regarded religion as a historical phenomenon subject to uninterrupted change in accordance with the laws of dialectical progression. This implied that any judgment about religion, as about all phenomena falling under these laws, applied only to the specific stage through which it was then passing in the course of its development. Consequently, religion might have been—indeed was—the opium of the people in certain historical periods, including that of the industrial revolution and the postfeudal world of a victorious bourgeoisie; but it might exhibit a different character at other historical junctures. In any case, to the Marxist promoters of the dialogue, Marx's reference to religion as an "expression of distress" clearly indicated that, in speaking of opium, Marx had had in mind opium's soothing rather than its stultifying effects.

Moreover, the neo-Marxist reinterpreters of the opium theory maintained that Marx, in emphasizing that religion not only reflected distress but also protested its cause, had apparently recognized the "positive"—that is, the revolutionary—nature of religion. To bolster their point, they cited Engels' well-known distinction between apocalyptic and Constantinian Christianity. The first, according to Engels, had possessed a marked socialist content, "as far as it was possible at that time," but the second had turned the millenarian message addressed to the enslaved and the impoverished into a state religion designed to protect the interests of exploiting classes.[8] Thus, the Christian prophecy had in its early stages clearly transcended the limits of a passive moral idealism by trying to eliminate poverty "in the world and not in heaven." [9] In Engels' eyes, the apocalyptic and revolutionary content of Christianity was clearly discernible in the heretical religious movements of the Middle Ages, in the theology of the German radical reformer Thomas Muenzer, and even in the initial manifestations of the Lutheran and Calvinist reform movements.[10] The neo-Marxists hold, therefore, that there are no doctrinal obstacles to a collaboration with Christians, provided that the Christian message remains, or becomes again, a "protest" against existing conditions and does not try to justify or to perpetuate those conditions in the name of other-worldly promises and expectations.

From the Christian point of view, there is little, if any, objection to such attempts to dispose of the opium theory by reinterpreting the Marxist classics. Most Christian theologians agree wholeheartedly with the neo-Marxists on the "protesting" nature of Christianity even though they refuse to attribute to religion a revolutionary character in the Marxist sense. They place the main emphasis on the Christian concern for justice and love and the Christian concept of individual responsibility. As for the social radicalism inherent in the Christian prophecy, some theologians believe that it may have been the redemptory message of Christianity that inspired Marx, and they point to some striking analogies between Christian eschatology and the great historical drama as conceived by Marx and Engels. For in the Marxian vision, too, the corruption of the world is attributed to an original sin—the introduction of private property; redemption from that sin has to come through the atonement of a sacrifical lamb—the proletariat; the message of salvation is contained in a holy writ—

[6] Gilbert Mury (formerly deputy director of the French Communist Party's ideological institute and now one of the chief theoreticians of a dissident pro-Chinese splinter group) at the Salzburg Conference on Christianity and Marxism (*Volksstimme* [Vienna], May 9, 1965). Similar conclusions were reached by other Marxist theoreticians, among them Professor Lucio Lombardo Radice (*L'Unita* [Rome], Feb. 6, 1966), Cesare Luporini (*Rinascita* [Rome], March 27, 1965), and Roger Garaudy (*Marxisme au XXieme siècle,* pp. 150-53).

[7] Karl Marx, "Einleitung zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie," in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Historisch-Kritische Gesamtausgabe* (hereafter referred to as MEGA), Frankfurt and Berlin, 1927-33, Vol. I/1, pp. 607-08. Italics in the original.

[8] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *On Religion,* Moscow, 1955, pp. 316-17.

[9] Karl Kautsky, quoted in MacIntyre, *op. cit.,* p. 105.

[10] Marx and Engels, *Selected Works,* Vol. II, pp. 98-99.

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the writings of Marx and Engels. With Lenin, the analogies (especially with Catholicism) become more complete: the interpretation of faith is entrusted to an infallible authority—the Central Committee of the Communist party; and the individual cannot discover truth without being in vital communion with the organism in which the spirit of truth resides.[11]

The Atheism Issue

Regardless of the validity of such comparisons, however, the fostering of a dialogue also necessitated clarification of the Marxist position on another momentous issue—namely, the uncompromising atheism inherent in the materialist conception of the world. Here again the founding fathers seemed to be most explicit. In discussing the development of Communist theories, Marx wrote that "communism begins from the outset with atheism," even though atheism is at first far from being communism.[12] He stressed that the criticism of religion is the presupposition of all criticism; religion is but the self-consciousness and self-feeling of man who "either has not yet found himself or has already lost himself again." [13] In Engels' opinion, God and supernatural powers are mere illusions or fantasies that reflect "in man's mind those external forces which control [his] daily life, a reflection in which the terrestrial forces assume the forms of supernatural forces." [14] Thus, atheism appears to be not only an integral part of the materialist world-view but also an important element in the class struggle, for it promotes the process of demystification that is to bring about the emergence of true human consciousness. Lenin had certainly reached this conclusion when he declared in a letter to Maxim Gorky: "God is (historically and socially) first of all a complex of ideas engendered by the ignorance of mankind . . . ideas which perpetuate this ignorance and blunt the class struggle. . . ." [15] Lenin's successors followed the same line of reasoning in listing atheistic propaganda among the paramount tasks of the Communist party.

One of the main reasons why Marxists deem "citatology" a most effective method of dialectical reasoning is the abundance of contradictory or ambiguous statements in the writings of the founding fathers. Indeed, many fundamental observations in these works are either contradicted by other equally apodictic pronouncements in them or are couched in sufficiently ambiguous terms to be reinterpreted according to dialectical needs. Those apropos of religion are particularly suitable for adroit dialectical manipulation. True, Marx said that communism (the elimination of self-alienation) begins with atheism; yet he also underscored that atheism no longer has any meaning, for socialism, which recognizes the sensuous consciousness of man and nature as the essence, no longer stands in need of a mediation such as that offered by atheism.[16] True, Engels defined religion as "an illusion" and "a fantasy"; but he also strongly criticized Eugen Duehring and the Bakuninists for trying to impose atheism on the working class. He particularly objected to Duehring's efforts to "incite gendarmes of the future against religion" instead of waiting for religion to die a natural death.[17] True, Lenin wrote that "our propaganda necessarily includes the propaganda of atheism;" [18] but he also said—before the Bolshevik seizure of power—that "everyone must be perfectly free not only to belong to any religion he pleases, but he must be free to preach his religion. . . ." [19] While neither the ambiguous nor the contradictory statements on religion would justify an outright rejection of atheism as an integral part of dialectical materialism, they have enabled many neo-Marxists to reconcile the atheistic premises of Marxism-Leninism with an acknowledgment of the positive functions that religion might play in the revolutionary transformation of the world.

In effecting the reconciliation, these Marxist philosophers have had to relativize the concept of

[11] Wetter, *op. cit.*, pp. 559-60, and West, *op. cit.*, p. 29. The French sociologist Raymond Aron is generally credited with defining communism as "a secular religion," but in fact he had numerous predecessors. Oswald Spengler had many years earlier described Christianity as "the grandmother of Bolshevism." Nikolai Berdiaev had viewed Russian Bolshevism as "a kind of sectarian idolatrous religion which has its own scriptures, catechism, Messiah and inverted theocracy, its own inquisition and eschatology." (West, *op. cit.*, p. 14). Charles W. Lowry *(op. cit.)* had drawn up a table of parallel doctrines in Christianity and Marxism. The Protestant theologian Paul Tillich had thought that socialism was merely an upsurge of religious forces. (Gollwitzer, *The Christian Faith and the Marxist Criticism of Religion*, p. 23.) Jules Monnerot, the French sociologist, had described communism as "twentieth-century Islam." (*La sociologie du communisme*, Paris, 1953.) The messianic content of communism has been thoroughly examined by various contributors to *Marxismusstudien* and by E. Sarkisyanz in *Russland und der Messianismus des Orients*, Tuebingen, 1955.

[12] Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*, Moscow, 1967, p. 96.

[13] *MEGA*, Vol. I/1, p. 607.

[14] Engels, *Anti-Duehring*, Moscow, 1962, p. 432.

[15] Lenin, *On Religion*, New York, 1935, pp. 45-46.

[16] *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*, p. 106.

[17] *Anti-Duehring*, p. 435.

[18] Lenin, *Selected Works*, Vol. XI, p. 661.

[19] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 284.

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atheism to render it more flexible. Their task was facilitated by the traditional Marxist differentiation of several types of atheism, each supposedly determined by concrete social and economic conditions and the level of development of science and materialist philosophy at a given period.[20] According to this classification, there was first the naive and speculative atheism of the Greek philosophers, who combined rejection of religious faith with admission of the existence of gods. Then came the inconsistent or limited bourgeois atheism (sometimes described as "vulgar atheism") of the French materialists and the Young Hegelians. The most perfect and final form of atheism, it is alleged, rests on the philosophical basis of dialectical and historical materialism as set forth and developed by Marx and his successors. This form of atheism is held to contain an unassailable critique of religion, a critique whose ultimate function is to destroy the social and economic roots from which religions have sprung. Such a categorization implies that atheism should be viewed mainly as an instrument in the class struggle that is to culminate in the emergence of the ideal Communist society.

Whether or not they regard the class struggle as the paramount driving force in human history, many Christian participants in the dialogue have been inclined to see it as an important part of efforts to eliminate social injustice and to put an end to man's alienation. Furthermore, in the opinion of one group of these theologians, atheism does not constitute a central theme in Marxism; it is not the logical consequence of the system of dialectical materialism but, rather, the motive for the creation of that system.[21] Another group has looked upon atheism as merely one of the many Marxist *Kampfbegriffe*—that is, a dialectical weapon which lacks organic links to the end for whose attainment it is being used.[22] According to this view, the essence of Marxism, both as a prophecy and as a blueprint for revolutionary action, is faith in redemption, even if that redemption is confined to the finite aspects of the human condition.

Therefore, most thinkers on both sides have felt that the dialogue should be conducted on the basis of analogous, though methodologically conflicting endeavors to improve or to perfect man's terrestrial existence. In this connection, they like to recall the words of the French Catholic writer Georges Bernanos, who pointed out that "the restoration of a human world is not a theological but rather a social problem." [23] If such is the case, Christian humanism and Marxist humanism ought to provide the framework in which the difficult task of social "restoration" could be jointly undertaken.

Humanism as an Approach

At first glance, this approach seems to be a reasonably simple and straightforward solution to the matter. On close examination, however, it becomes quite obvious that putting the emphasis on the "this-wordly" concerns of Christianity or turning Marxism into a social anthropology raises no less difficult questions than those posed by atheism or the opium theory; for if humanism is to provide the connecting link between the two world-views, an agreement has to be reached on the basic issue at the core of every humanistic pursuit: freedom. In theory, both world-views consider freedom the ultimate stage of human fulfillment. Christians are to arrive at that stage through love and justice; Marxists, by elevating their conscious activities to the apex through increasing cognition of the laws of nature and society. But for the Christian, freedom cannot exist without freedom of the spirit. The Marxist, on the other hand, deems the abolition of classes and the collectivization of the means of production to be the indispensable precondition for "leaping from the kingdom of necessity into the kingdom of freedom." [24]

On this point, the dialogue must inevitably transcend the limits of metaphysical, anthropological or sociological speculations; to borrow Engels' metaphor, it has to leap from the realm of theory into that of *praxis*. If freedom means the fulfillment of the individual through self-creation, as neo-Marxists argue, how do those self-creating activities manifest themselves in Communist societies? The question is of critical importance since the answer affords the only

[20] M. Rosenthal and P. Yudin, *A Dictionary of Philosophy*, Moscow, 1967, p. 35.

[21] Gollwitzer, *The Christian Faith and the Marxist Criticism of Religion*, pp. 85-87.

[22] Hromadka, Machovec, and Reding (see references in fn. 2) all adhere to more or less this line of reasoning.

[23] Quoted by Konrad Farner in the Swiss Communist weekly *Vorwaerts* (Basel), Sept. 21, 1962. Author of the recently published *Der Aufstand der Abstrakt-Konkreten*, Neiwied, 1970, art historian Farner is one of the most articulate Marxist supporters of the dialogue.

[24] Engels, *Anti-Duehring*, pp. 311-12. I have examined the Christian and Marxist interpretations of humanism in "In Search of Humanism," *Problems of Communism*, September-October, 1965, and in "The Christian-Marxist Dialogue," *Communist Affairs*, July-August, 1967.

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criterion by which one can effectively gauge the prospects of the dialogue.

That many Christians have posed this question does not necessarily reflect their concern over the sincerity of the Marxist participants in the dialogue. It does suggest, however, serious misgivings about the ability of Communist societies, as they are known today, to develop constitutional, political and social mechanisms which would guarantee individual freedom in the Christian sense. Clearly, that kind of freedom cannot be fully enjoyed as long as the very concept of freedom is inseparably linked with the class struggle on a national as well as international scale—a struggle whose objectives and methods are determined by all-powerful party bureaucracies. In this regard, it has been pointed out that the Communists who show the greatest willingness to reinterpret the orthodox Marxist-Leninist concept of freedom belong to parties not in power and thus are not in a position to limit or extend the freedom of any persons except those subject to party discipline. In other words, the commitment of these Communists to humanistic principles based on respect for individual rights is strictly theoretical, even if sincere. Not even a theoretical reinterpretation of freedom has taken place in the Communist-run countries, especially the Soviet Union, which is supposed to serve as the model for the great bulk of those nations with preponderantly Christian populations.[25]

The contrasting attitudes toward religion of Communists in and out of power are perhaps best illustrated by the polemics that have gone on between Italian neo-Marxists engaged in dialogue with Christians and Soviet theoreticians advocating strict adherence to a markedly atheistic position. Leonid Ilichev, at the time one of the Soviet party's chief ideologists, triggered the debate in 1963 with a report on ideological questions to the Soviet Central Committee. Urging the intensification of atheistic propaganda in the USSR, he asserted that "religion cannot but serve as a brake on scientific progress . . . and it supports a morality diametrically opposed to the principles of the moral code of the builders of communism."[26] In refutation, Professor Lucio Lombardo Radice, a member of the Italian party's Central Committee and one of the most prominent participants in the dialogue, described the Ilichev theses as an over-simplification which "will be of little or no use today, just as it has been of little or no use in the past," and he stressed that the alienation of individuals living in Communist societies should not be ascribed to residues or survivals of capitalism typified by religion. If those "residues" had not disappeared from Soviet society, the cause of the resulting estrangement should not be sought in religion but rather in the conditions of inferiority in which Soviet citizens found themselves because they harbored "certain opinions which one cannot express or cannot fully express or can only express by giving up certain rights." [27]

These conditions to which the Italian theoretician referred continue to prevail in most Communist-run states. The issue of religious freedom, it is true, has lost some of its acuteness in Yugoslavia, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and even Poland; however, religious freedom cannot be looked at in isolation, it cannot be separated from other freedoms, if humanism is to provide the basis for an effective coordination of efforts directed at improving the human condition. Thus, the central issue of the dialogue remains unresolved, even though some of the problems raised by the dialogue have been settled. This judgment does not mean that the dialogue is either futile or superfluous. It only suggests that the exchanges are unlikely to yield lasting and positive fruits as long as the Communist systems persist in denying to the individual those fundamental human rights whose possession alone can enable him to fulfill himself in accordance with either the Christian or the Marxist dispensation.

[25] Indeed, Soviet theoreticians have recently urged the stepping up of atheistic propaganda, particularly in the republics inhabited by Muslims.

[26] *Rinascita*, July 4, 1964.

[27] *Ibid.*

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Books

Stalinist Turned Reformer

By Carl A. Linden

Khrushchev Remembers.
Trans. and ed. by Strobe Talbot; introduction, commentary and notes by Edward Crankshaw.
Boston, Little, Brown & Company, 1970.

IN FAIRNESS TO the reader, a cautionary note should preface any assessment of the materials gathered under the title, *Khrushchev Remembers.* All reviews can at present only be tentative inasmuch as what is being reviewed has not yet been fully clarified. Are these materials true Khrushcheviana or apocrypha? The publishers say they are Khrushchev's "reminiscences" and "speak for themselves," but they have so far refused to provide any convincing verification of their assertions, on the ground that they have to protect their sources. We do not know exactly how the materials reached the West or through whose hands they may have passed: *Time-Life* and Little, Brown & Company, the publishers, merely say the materials emanated "from various sources at various times and in various circumstances"; and they prudently concede that "whether the author intended or expected his words ever to find their way into print, either in his own country or in the West, is a matter of speculation." Whether the publishers themselves have all the missing links in the story is by no means certain. Khrushchev's own disavowal of authorship in *Pravda* and *Izvestia* was equivocal: it was so phrased that it could be read as meaning only that the materials published in the West were not *authorized* by him, and not that they did not *originate* with him.[1] The belated publication of the statement seven days after it was dated suggests that the Soviet authorities' may have been dissatisfied with Khrushchev's imprecision.

But if *Khrushchev Remembers* is the shadow work of forgers, they must be accounted true masters of their art. With very few exceptions, the manner of speech and the narrative pattern are thoroughly Khrushchevian. Sir William Hayter, former British ambassador to Moscow, reacted to the book in much the same way as have others who either had personal contacts with Khrushchev or have closely followed his past statements, formal and informal. "Having just emerged from reading the book," Sir William remarked, "I have the strong impression of having resumed my personal intercourse with him."

At this stage, perhaps the most plausible and widely accepted hypothesis is that Khrushchev was indeed the original source of the great bulk of the materials, but that they in one way or another passed out of his control into other hands. It is surmised that for various political motives the materials then underwent some kind of filtering process and that this accounts for the omission of matters which Khrushchev might have been expected to mention,

[1] Khrushchev's statement, published in *Pravda* and *Izvestia* on Nov. 17, 1970, read as follows: "As is evident from press reports in the United States of America and in some other capitalist countries, the so-called memoirs or reminiscences of N.S. Khrushchev are being prepared for publication. They are fabrications, and I am indignant over them. I have never transmitted to anyone—neither to *Time* nor any other foreign publisher—memoirs or materials of that nature. Nor have I handed over such materials to a Soviet publishing house. Therefore, I declare all these "memoirs" to be forgeries. Time and again the mercenary bourgeois press has been caught in such falsehoods." It should be noted that Khrushchev's narrow affirmation that he had "neyer *transmitted* to anyone" any materials in the nature of memoirs scarcely constituted proof that the materials published in the West—which he almost certainly had not yet seen—were forgeries. It is also worth noting that while *Izvestia* gave the date of Khrushchev's denial as November 10, *Pravda* omitted it.

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such as his 1959 trip to the United States and the circumstances leading to his removal from power. As to how the materials found their way abroad, a dying Khrushchev son-in-law with nothing to lose, political dissidents, factional elements in the KGB or the leadership, the unconventional Soviet news correspondent Victor Louis with patrons in high places—all these have been named, either singly or in combination, as principals in various speculative reconstructions of the affair. In any case, the publishers evidently received from their unrevealed sources a disordered aggregation of typescripts, much of them reportedly based on voice tapes, which they proceeded to have editorially reassembled in topical order and then translated into a readable if not always true-to-the-original English text.

In spite of all this, there is very little here that Khrushchev would not be fully capable of saying, or might not be expected to say, especially if he were speaking off-the-cuff and not intending his remarks for public consumption in just that form. The published narrative, it is true, contains some baffling inaccuracies, strange omissions, and even outright errors. Moreover, in the second part, dealing with sensitive areas of Soviet politics since Stalin's last years, there is reason to suspect that the selectivity and particularly the omissions are not wholly attributable to Khrushchev himself. Some reviewers, however, have greatly exaggerated the notion that the text is peppered with errors which Khrushchev could not have made, and therefore that the errors constitute *prima facie* evidence of forgery.

If this *is* Khrushchev speaking —and I believe that for the most part it is—the reader still faces no mean difficulty in separating fact from fiction and intentional concealments from unwitting revelations. Not only does the aging ex-leader have many axes to grind and scores to settle with opponents past and present, but more importantly his own sense of veracity may well have been warped by a career in which skillful deception and manipulation were preconditions for survival and success. On the other hand, the speaker in *Khrushchev Remembers* never seems too sure just where his talk is taking him. Much of this becomes understandable, however, if the materials were drawn mainly from taped monologues or conversations in which the garrulous, tale-telling Khrushchev, drawing from a failing memory, embroidered upon his recollections of the past. Certainly, this is no memoir of a statesman carefully weighing every word so as to impart maximum polish to his glory. Rather, it is the rambling conversation of a raconteur of humble origin, capable of mixing banal stories with shrewd observations and shameless exaggerations with candid and revealing glimpses of the circle of power in which he moved.

Some readers have been shocked by the anecdotal, often casual quality of the narrative; others have been struck by the number of contradictory statements—some of them damaging to Khrushchev himself—scattered through the text. It should not be forgotten, however, that Khrushchev, even while he was in power, frequently verged on self-contradiction or spoke carelessly and then had to cover up his tracks by resorting to quick-witted rhetoric. *Pravda*'s editors were often kept busy smoothing over the rough edges and embarrassing *ad lib*s in his public statements.

No doubt there is much in the book that Khrushchev, if he had had any choice in the matter, would not have wanted to let stand in the public record; but there is also much that he presumably would have been anxious to convey to his countrymen—and perhaps to the world at large. Certainly, he would have the strongest personal motives for wanting to circulate a statement justifying his political record against the charges of his detractors. He undoubtedly resents the fact that his place in Soviet history has been cast under a shadow since his ouster, and it would be fully in keeping with his stubborn temperament to refuse to accept meekly the status of an "unperson" to which his successors have relegated him. In *Khrushchev Remembers,* he consistently presents himself not as a disgraced leader but as an elder statesman who honorably "retired" and, as such, retains the right to be heard in the party. He also insists that he speaks within the bounds of propriety and that what he has to say is neither "gossip" nor "slander" but intended as good counsel for the next generation of Soviet leaders.

IF THERE IS anything in the book that attests clearly to its Khrushchevian origins, it is the speaker's relentless animadversions on Stalin and Stalinism. Again and again, like a man possessed, he turns to wrestle with the specter that inhabits his mind. He seems only half aware of the deep contradictions which divide his thoughts and propel him into lengthy expatiations on the evils

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of Stalinism and the dangers of incipient restalinization in the Soviet Union. While he never lets the thought that his own political life may have been built on a grandiose deception find frank expression in his speech, it is nevertheless this worry that besets him. The Soviet experiment, he repeatedly argues, has a healthy core separable from the Stalinist bane: the USSR, as he puts it, is a "paradise" that need only be unlocked—implying that this would become reality if only his successors would let it.

Yet, as in his days of power, he remains something of a contradiction—an anti-Stalinist Stalinist. In one passage he launches devastating attacks on Stalin's tyranny and massive crimes, and in the next he acknowledges Stalin's greatness and achievements. Yet, there are some remarkably candid and perceptive comments here, of which the following stands out in particular for its understanding that greatness and great power for evil sometimes go hand in hand:

I will give Stalin credit for one thing: he didn't simply come with a sword and conquer our minds and bodies. No, he demonstrated his superior skill in subordinating and manipulating people—an important quality necessary in a great leader. In everything about Stalin's personality there was something admirable and correct as well as something savage. Nothing about him fitted into its own frame. Everything has to be seen in the light of his very complex personality.

Despite this ambivalence regarding Stalin as well as his own past, he is categorical in insisting that his successors must carry destalinization through to the end. He declares that Stalin cannot be proclaimed both a genius and a murderer, and he regards as absurd the efforts made by some Soviet military leaders in recent years to rehabilitate both Stalin and his victims! Moreover, despite the present leadership's attempt to clamp the lid once more on further revelations of Stalin's crimes, Khrushchev is convinced that the whole truth will out. "It's time will come. It will all come out in the end," he says in one passage. "Even the best-kept secrets will be brought out into the open." It is as if the speaker were prodded by a deep inner imperative insisting, against all evasions, pretexts and self-justifications, that something must be done to requite the monstrous wrongs perpetrated by Stalin. At the same time, it is not at all clear that he fully grasps all the implications of that imperative for the future of the party dictatorship itself.

The Khrushchev in *Khrushchev Remembers* repeats the same demand that was made by Khrushchev in power—that the party engage in a kind of collective exorcism. Few will have forgotten the ex-leader's bizarre but dramatic gesture at the 22nd Party Congress when he called for the removal of Stalin's remains from Lenin's tomb and the erection of a monument to the dictator's victims. In the same spirit, the man in *Khrushchev Remembers* calls for the "self-purification" of the party through the complete rehabilitation of Stalin's victims "to prevent the ghosts of those years from coming back from their graves to haunt us." The notion that the party must atone for injustices perpetrated by its leaders in the name of "class struggle" cannot be found anywhere in Marxism-Leninism but seems to have implanted itself in Khrushchev's thinking.

Khrushchev's preoccupation with the rehabilitation of every one of Stalin's victims is much more than just a psychological quirk. Rather, this demand touches the core issue of whether the post-Stalin regime will or can concede to Russia's need for a modicum of civil order and freedom. If it seems strange that the former Soviet leader would persist in forcing questions so menacing to the perpetutation of the Soviet party dictatorship, he nonetheless proved himself quite capable of doing so while he was in power. It was Khrushchev, for example, who in late 1962 sponsored the publication of Solzhenitsyn's *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich,* which stands as one of the most telling attacks on Stalinism so far written. That action was taken against opposition within the leadership, specifically from Suslov and Kozlov. Moreover, his sponsorship was no momentary aberration. After the neo-Stalinist countercampaign of late 1962 and early 1963 against anti-Stalinist literature had ebbed, Khrushchev in the summer of 1963 again praised Solzhenitsyn for "depicting Soviet reality and the Stalin cult truthfully." His patronage of the embattled author —now anathema to the Brezhnevs and Suslovs of the current regime—was a measure of how far Khrushchev was prepared to go towards banishing at least the more exaggerated forms of Stalinist repression.

IN THE REVIEWER'S opinion, this unpredictable man—half Stalinist politician, half reforming leader—understood to some de-

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gree that his anti-Stalinism implied a less restrictive political regime. Despite his inconsistencies, his tantrums over modern art, and his dislike of intellectuals, he did ease the restraints on writers and the intelligentsia, who now look back on the Khrushchev years as a period of relative freedom by comparison with the present under Brezhnev. *Khrushchev Remembers* continues to voice the same ideas. The speaker evidently has the Solzhenitsyns, Sakharovs, and Medvedevs in mind when he says that "we must start thinking about the people who don't deserve to be called 'scum'" —an epithet commonly used in the Soviet press to characterize the intellectual critics of the present Brezhnev-led oligarchy. Even the more far-reaching proposals advanced in *Khrushchev Remembers* for a loosening of the restraints upon Soviet citizens extend notions which the ex-leader was developing before he fell from power. There is an obvious kinship between his June 1963 decree ending the jamming of Western broadcasts (a practice which was reinstated by Brezhnev after the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia) and the proposal set forth in the present volume for an "open borders" policy granting Soviet citizens freedom to travel abroad. The speaker in *Khrushchev Remembers* roundly criticizes those in the present regime who see a defector in any Soviet citizen desirous of going abroad and who refuse to risk a relaxation of the restrictions on such travel. He says that Svetlana Stalin's defection to America might have been averted if she had been trusted and her request for a visa extension to stay in India had been granted. A note of genuine perplexity creeps in when, commenting on the closed-border policy, he exclaims: "It is incredible to me that after fifty years of Soviet power, paradise should be kept under lock and key."

Whether Khrushchev would or could carry out such proposals if he were in power again is, of course, questionable. However, despite all his deep flaws and ruthless opportunism, it is nevertheless this erstwhile Stalinist turned political reformer—this crude exhibitionist who shocked even his own colleagues, not to mention educated Russians, with his boorish shoe-thumping at the United Nations Assembly—who, virtually alone among Stalin's heirs past and present, has displayed flashes of awareness of his country's need for a more humane and civilized order. These moments of insight stand out here and there in the wandering and uneven narrative of *Khrushchev Remembers* and are among the more persusaive indications of its Khrushchevian origin.

In sum, *Khrushchev Remembers,* even if authentic, falls short of being the sort of document the careful historian or historiographer could rely upon: it is too full of factual inaccuracies, outright distortions, and dubious recollections to provide authoritative documentation of the past. For students, of Soviet politics, it is nevertheless a revealing document. On the one hand, it shows the warping effect of the Stalin tyranny on the mentality of a man of lowly origins and remarkable but abused talents; yet, on the other, it reveals a man whose human qualities were not wholly smothered by a life in the jungle of Stalinist politics. Most of all perhaps, in mirroring the antagonistic elements at play in the psyche of its presumed author, *Khrushchev Remembers* also mirorrs the deep contradictions imbedded in the contemporary Soviet political world.

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Inside Testimony

By Melvin Croan

ROBERT HAVEMANN: *Fragen, Antworten, Fragen. Aus der Biographie eines deutschen Marxisten* (Questions, Answers, Questions. From the Biography of a German Marxist), Munich, R. Piper & Co. Verlag, 1970.
ERWIN WEIT: *Ostblock intern. 13 Jahre Dolmetscher fuer die polnische Partei und Staats-fuehrung* (The East Bloc from the Inside. Thirteen Years as a Translator for the Polish Party and State Leadership), Hamburg, Hoffman und Campe Verlag, 1970.

POLAND AND EAST GERMANY together serve to anchor Soviet power in the European international political system. Yet, apart from the occasional journalistic tidbit, little is known about the inner workings of relations between Warsaw and East Berlin. As for each country's domestic political arena, reliable information is often no less difficult to come by. Short of a major internal upheaval, one is usually left guessing about the scope and significance of domestic dissidence, and the arcane realm of political relationships within the ruling elite typically appears all but impenetrable. For this reason, accounts by insiders or ex-insiders are bound to be of absorbing interest. These two books are no exception. The first is by a distinguished natural scientist and Marxist philosopher who still resides in East Germany and the second by a ranking official translator who fled Poland for the West as a consequence of the recent "anti-Zionist" campaign. Although each author writes from his own distinctive vantage point, both shed light into otherwise murky recesses.

Professor Robert Havemann's rather sketchy autobiographical account is basically the story of the transformation of a longtime Stalinist into one of the East German regime's most outspoken intellectual critics. Havemann joined the Communist party in the last days of the Weimar Republic and engaged in underground activity during the Hitler period, which he survived only because his scientific research was deemed to be of potential value to the Nazi war effort. After the war he resumed open agitation for various Communist causes, and following his dismissal as director of a research institute in West Berlin, he was quickly appointed to the position of Professor of Physical Chemistry at the Humboldt University in East Berlin. To all intents and purposes a highly prized regime intellectual, Havemann seemed to take the shattering revelations of the 20th Soviet Party Congress in his stride. But the Khrushchev dispensation did prompt him to begin to reexamine his own ingrained Stalinist perspectives.

This process culminated in a course of public lectures that Havemann delivered at the Humboldt University in 1963–64, which shortly afterward appeared in West Germany under the title, *Dialectics Without Dogma.*[1] The revisionist content of the lectures, not to mention their popularity with his audience and their publication in the West, led to Havemann's enforced retirement from academic life, his ouster from the SED, and various other forms of official harassment, including periods of virtual house arrest. Nonetheless, in the years since 1964, Havemann has persisted in his studied defiance of the East German authorities and has repeatedly succeeded in communicating to the outside world his by now utterly heterodox opinions.

Of the latter, the present volume offers a generous helping, even if the way in which it is served up leaves something to be desired. The presentation proceeds against the backdrop of a protracted narration of Havemann's several interrogations at the hands of the East German secret police; into this discourse he awkwardly interjects disjointed personal reminiscences and discursive political and philosophical speculation. Yet if the literary technique is infelicitous, the book

[1] Robert Havemann, *Dialektik ohne Dogma?* Reinbek bei Hamburg, Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, 1964.

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itself remains both informative and provocative. It offers much firsthand testimony to the narrow-minded rigidity of the Ulbricht regime and the calculated opportunism of its servitors. It also helps to clarify why intellectual dissidence has been of far less practical political significance in East Germany than in several other Communist states. For in addition to the traditional German cleavage between *Macht* (might) and *Geist* (mind), there is the special problem of Germany's national division and the unique influence that this factor exerts upon the critical intellectual himself.

Such influence is only too apparent in Havemann's own political thought. Granted that this one book alone may not indicate the full philosophical depth of his mind, it does convey a good sense of the range of his concerns. Even more to the point, it contains some quite revealing inconsistencies. Consider Havemann's attitude toward Stalinism. To begin with, he engages in a truly masterful critical analysis of the neo-Stalinist party dictatorship, which he depicts as an impersonal organism whose very lack of structure renders it virtually immune to internal reform. In view of his detestation of this "evil offspring of Stalinism," one might expect him to take a harsh view of its progenitor. But that is not quite the case. Rather, he rehearses the familiar apologetics for the historical necessity of the original Stalinism and faults it less for its excesses than for its failure to produce anything beyond "semi-revolution." This, in turn, leads him to condemn the 1953 East German workers' revolt on the logic that since the Stalinist order that prevailed at the time constituted an "unfinished revolution," the spontaneous rising against it could only lead to "counterrevolution."

No less perplexing is Havemann's attitude toward the New Left. On the one hand, he seems to applaud its activities unreservedly; on the other, he bemoans its becoming "poisoned by bourgeois culture" and turning elitist. To confuse matters further, he repeatedly equates student radicals in the West with the intellectual forces that helped to bring about the 1968 "Spring" in Czechoslovakia, something which few members of either group would accept. And how can one explain the glaring contradiction between his analysis of the tenaciousness of neo-Stalinism and his affirmation that a radical breakthrough to socialist democracy in the Communist world is inevitable? Is this simply to be dismissed as a case of the wish being father to the thought? Perhaps. But there is another important key to unraveling all the apparent contradictions in Havemann's thought. It is to be found in his animus against bourgeois society in general and toward the socio-political order in the Federal Republic of Germany in particular. To call attention to this is not in the slightest to detract from his great personal courage in speaking out against the repressive authoritarianism of neo-Stalinism, as practiced by the East German regime. It is, however, to point to an ultimate ambivalence in his attitude toward the GDR, however repressive the regime. Havemann's dilemma is perhaps best captured by an aphorism of his fellow East German dissident and close personal friend, the *chansonnier* Wolf Biermann, who remarked with respect to divided Germany, "I live in the better half but suffer twice the pain."

IN CONTRAST TO Prof. Havemann's agonized reflections, Erwin Weit's account restricts itself to a matter-of-fact recapitulation of his years of service as Gomulka's German-language translator. This service enabled Weit to observe at close proximity the behind-the-scenes behavior not only of ranking members of the Polish political elite but also of the top East German leadership and various Soviet and other Eastern bloc officials. While his book contains few startling revelations, it is full of fascinating incidents which vividly illuminate the actual character of "fraternal relations" within the Communist world. The deliberations and private discussions to which Weit was privy—including the talks at Karlovy Vary in April 1967 and also the five-power meeting in July 1968 that formulated the notorious "Warsaw Letter" to Dubeck—speak volumes in themselves. So do the chance ethnic slurs and insults involving nationality that were uttered within earshot of the author by the avowed protagonists of "socialist internationalism."

Particularly instructive are those sections of Weit's account that deal with Polish-East German relations and evaluate the ranking personages on each side. Predating plenty of recent evidence that East Berlin would like a decisive voice in coordinating bloc policy toward Bonn, Weit reveals that Ulbricht's efforts to limit Poland's freedom of maneuver ran back well into the 1950's. It has also been known that Ulbricht did not look favorably upon Gomulka's return to power in 1956, but Weit brings fresh evidence of how insistently

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and in what petty ways Ulbricht nursed his political grudge against the Polish leader—and with what contrived forbearance Gomulka sought to parry the thrusts of his East German counterpart. It took a long time, until the mid-1960's in fact, before their personal animosity finally began to subside, and by then Gomulka had shrunk as a political figure. Curiously, in the same decade—according to Mr. Weit—Ulricht had grown steadily in political and personal self-assurance, without for a moment forfeiting those qualities of persistence, meticulous attention to detail, cunning, and cynicism that had long stamped the man as an *apparatchik* par excellence. By contrast, as Gomulka's perspectives narrowed, his grasp of major policy issues weakened, and he seemed to lose heart in the political infighting that surrounded him. Weit's memoirs, which were completed well before Gomulka's ouster from power, make it crystal clear that the Polish leader's downfall was long in the offing and strongly intimate that it was staved off in 1968 only because of the events in Czechoslovakia.

In recording his own impressions of Gomulka and Ulbricht, Weit observes that despite their differences of personality, political method, and psychological makeup, both men shared one thing in common: the lack of any real interest in a genuine reconciliation between the German and the Polish peoples. This he deduces from an "unwritten commandment in the exercise of power" in the Communist world, namely, "no fraternization between peoples lest this weaken the hand of the leadership in a crisis situation." Weit's harsh indictment seems only too valid for the period which he himself experienced. It does not offer very much hope for the future, despite the new leadership in both Warsaw and East Berlin.

Another God That Failed

By Boris Goldenberg

HUGH THOMAS: *Cuba, or the Pursuit of Freedom.* London, Eyre & Spottiswood, 1971.
K. S. KAROL: *Guerrillas in Power.* New York, Hill & Wang, 1970.

IN SPITE OF the different timespans covered by the two books under review and the different professional positions and political philosophies of the authors, both works are of fundamental importance for anyone interested in Cuba and its development. Professor Thomas, a liberal British historian internationally known for his *Spanish Civil War*, presents two centuries of Cuban history from 1762 up to the "Missile Crisis" of 1962, supplemented by an Epilogue which summarizes developments from 1963 through 1969 and evaluates the achievements of Castro's revolution. K. S. Karol an independent Marxist of Polish descent and a well-known journalist who has previously published books on Poland, Soviet-US relations under Khrushchev, and Maoist China, focuses on the Cuban revolution and its progress up to 1969.

Professor Thomas' voluminous *Cuba, or the Pursuit of Freedom* (1,696 pp.) is a historical masterwork. The fruit of more than a decade of diligent research, it draws upon an amazing wealth of source material and deserves to be called the first reliable and scholarly history of modern and contemporary Cuba published in any language. After tracing the background developments from the colonial period through the late 1920's, the author gives an excellent portrayal of the genesis and course of the Cuban revolution of 1933, its aftermath, and the ensuing "Age of Democracy" up to 1952. This is followed by a detailed, all-encompassing treatment of the military, political and ideological aspects of the anti-Batista struggle; the ideology of Castro and his relations with other parties and groups; the numerical strength of Castro's guerrillas (which jumped from a mere 300 in mid-1958 to some 3,000 by the end of the same year — p. 1042); and the author's estimate of the total number of victims of

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the revolutionary struggle (1,500 to 2,000 rather than the 20,000 claimed by revolutionary mythologists), which, he says, is less than the number of persons killed or executed under the Castro regime from 1959 to 1969 (p. 1460). Perhaps the most interesting part of the book for the contemporary reader is that which presents the author's analysis of the transformations brought about during the first few years of Castro's rule (from 1959–60 through 1962) together with an account of such important events as the Bay of Pigs invasion and the 1962 Missile Crisis. The Epilogue, though brief (60 pages), sketches the most important developments of the years since 1962 and also essays an estimate of the "political lessons" of the Castro revolution. The 16 appendices include a highly interesting analysis of the social backgrounds of the members of Castro's small group of revolutionaries who attacked the Moncada barracks in 1953. This analysis shows that "intellectuals" formed only an insignificant minority of the group.

Professor Thomas sees one of the peculiar features of Cuba's postrevolutionary socialist transformation in the fact that "uniquely in the history of revolutions [it was] brought about without struggle." The Castro regime, he points out, "captured a series of concerns in prosperous working order," and there was consequently "no problem of postwar reconstruction." But the author goes on to say that this very circumstance caused the revolutionary leaders to entertain many illusions about the future, and it is against this background that the subsequent achievements of the Castro regime must be measured. While the author acknowledges and fairly describes the undeniable progress the regime has made in the areas of education and health, as well as the "positive" changes that have occurred in other social fields, he questions whether they are commensurate with the human cost. In his final evaluation, he writes:

Those who admire the social advances . . . must consider the brutalities of the gaolers, the arbitrary character of an unpredictable but ubiquitous tyranny, the tedium of an inefficient bureaucratic state, and the melancholy of a society where eccentricity and private experiment . . . are damned. . . . Those who abhor tyranny need to be reminded of the evident integrity of many of [the revolution's] leaders . . ., [of the fact] that universal schooling and medicine did not obtain before . . . and that rural poverty is much reduced. Lovers of the Revolution . . . need to recall that health and education are only aids to the good life, and that in Cuba, as elsewhere in the Communist world, where it is often supposed that the end justifies the means, the ends themselves seem forgotten" (pp. 1483-84).

It is, of course, impossible to write such a voluminous work without committing some mistakes. There are some factual errors, such as the statement (p. 1093) that the growth rate of Cuba's population (2.7 percent per year) is "close to that of northwestern Europe in the 1880's," whereas it is in fact considerably higher than the latter. Neither is the author's description of Havana as "a larger capital city in proportion to total inhabitants than any other city in the world except London and Vienna" accurate (Buenos Aires and Montevideo both falsify this statement). But such errors are relatively few and inconsequential.

This reviewer would also take exception to Professor Thomas' treatment of some substantive matters. For example, I question his description of the judicial system in prerevolutionary Cuba as "particularly corrupt," since in fact the majority of judges were much more honest than any other group of Cuban officials. I also object to the author's application of the term "blockade" to the US embargo imposed on trade with Cuba, since the former would imply that the US attempted to shut off all Cuban commerce with the Soviet bloc and Western Europe—which was not the case.

Nor am I happy about Professor Thomas' failure to explain satisfactorily why Cuba's originally democratic revolution changed so rapidly into a socialist one. The author refutes—quite rightly—the popular misconceptions that it was (1) because Castro was a "Communist" from the start, (2) because North American pressure drove him into the embrace of the Soviet Union, or (3) because he succumbed to the influence of the Russians themselves. Professor Thomas puts the turning point at sometime in the summer of 1959 "when Castro decided that he could afford to be authoritarian as well as radical, and [when he] also cast around for arms" (p. 1237); however, the only reason he gives for the radicalization is the "growing opposition" that arose to the new regime's agrarian reform (pp. 1223 and 1226-27.) I do not consider this an adequate explanation.

MR. KAROL IS a former "lover of the [Castro] Revolution" who

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became disenchanted after his last visit to Cuba in 1968, when he realized that the time of "heresies" was past and that Castro had renounced his earlier determination to forge a unique "Cuban socialism."

As a Marxist, the author is an "*engagé* writer and probably does not aspire to scholarly objectivity. Even so, his book displays too much "slant," or bias, which leads him to make statements that are not entirely true, and to omit facts which are rather disagreeable from his standpoint. His bias clearly manifests itself in his proclivity to regard a person's attitude toward the United States as the decisive criterion of either a "progressive" or a "reactionary" position. It is also apparent in his unjustifiable characterization of Theodore Draper as a "detractor" of the Cuban revolution (p. 16) just because Draper perceived quite early that the revolution harbored objectionable tendencies which Karol and his friends refused to recognize.

The same bias leads Karol to make the unwarranted assertion that in *September 1959* official US policy was already directed toward the overthrow of Castro "by fair means or foul, and in the briefest possible time" (p. 6). It also explains why he mentions the allegedly "fake photographs" presented by US representative Adlai Stevenson to the United Nations in 1961 but fails to mention the faked "photomontage" presented by the Cuban leadership to the world in November 1959 in order to prove the supposedly US-inspired "bombardment" of Havana by Diaz Lanz, which never happened at all. Again, in his effort to avoid unpleasant facts, Karol reduces his account of the highly important Matos affair of 1959 to a few lines (p. 183)—and even then is guilty of a factual error in identifying Camilo Cienfuegos, instead of Castro himself, as the person responsible for Matos' arrest and imprisonment.[1]

In spite of the author's bias and the presence of other factual mistakes, the book is nevertheless a *must* for serious students of the Castro revolution. It not only provides an excellent exposition of the whole historical process from 1952 on, including a number of previously unknown details, but also presents a penetrating analysis of the international Communist background of Cuban developments such as only a "specialist" in Communist affairs could attempt. Though no longer *persona grata* to the Castro regime, Mr. Karol boasts the added advantage of having been an "insider" who had intimate discussions with many important Cuban leaders, including Castro himself, and thus is uniquely qualified to describe and interpret the course of Castro's revolution. The criticisms offered here are therefore by no means intended to deter anyone from reading the book or to detract from its overall value.

According to Karol, the difficulties in which the Cuban revolution finds itself today are due to a "decline in revolutionary fervor" which in turn stems from the absence of democratic institutions (ambiguously described by the author as an "institutional void"). The democratic-socialist way, he says, has been closed because after 1967 the Castro leadership abandoned its "heretical" concept of a "Cuban way to socialism" and instead embraced the Soviet model (p. 532) calling "for a high investment rate coupled with low consumption . . ., in short for economic growth in the quickest possible time" (p. 517). Hence, the militarization of the country and the betrayal of the Latin American revolution (pp. 493 f.). The author views this whole development as the tragic outcome of a Soviet-Cuban marriage which "proves clearly that a marriage contract whose terms are not plainly set out deceives both parties" and results in a disastrous union (p. 210).

This, in essence, is the central thesis of Karol's book, and he claims that the vital decisions that brought about the present tragedy were taken in 1968. However, the "institutional void" he refers to—which is merely another way of describing the charismatic rule of Castro—existed from 1959–60 on and constituted one of the "heretical" features which made the Cuban revolution so appealing to the New Left. This one-man rule quite soon became a *"dictatorship"* imposed on the Cuban people from above, making impossible the development of any kind of democracy (Karol himself states this clearly enough in earlier parts of his book). Moreover, the achievement of economic growth "in the shortest possible time" was already Castro's aim in 1961 (when a "production conference" set annual growth-rate targets of over 10 percent), and it was this aim which inspired Guevara's nonsensical policy of rapid industrialization. Again, the "heretical" doctrines which reigned supreme in Havana during 1966–67 centered on the

[1] Huber Matos, a former officer in Castro's guerrilla forces, became revolutionary governor of Camaguey Province but later wrote a letter to Castro resigning his post in protest against the growing role of the Communists in the regime. As a result, he was declared a "traitor to the revolution," arrested, and condemned in December 1959 to 20 years' imprisonment.

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creation of an ideal Cuban "new man" through reeducation and constant pressure, and they could be realized only in a totalitarian state which left no room for any kind of democracy. As to the "marriage" with Soviet Russia—which can actually be dated from 1960 or 1961—it grew inevitably out of Castro's decision to provoke the Americans and "socialize" Cuba as rapidly as possible. I am not sure if Karol is prepared to recognize these facts, but they provide a vital dimension that is lacking in his otherwise excellent and intelligent analysis.

In his concluding chapters, Karol expresses the hope that Cuba will somehow, sometime, overcome its difficulties and introduce socialist-democratic institutions. Maybe, but up to mid-1971 there are as yet no signs of its happening. Since in the meantime Karol has been denounced (in Padilla's "confession" [2]) as a "CIA agent" and Castro has declared that no more critical intellectuals will henceforth be permitted to visit Cuba, Karol will not be able to observe at first hand whether and to what extent his hopes become true.

Finally, it must be noted that the English translation of Karol's book, which originally appeared in French, is sadly deficient. To quote just a few examples, the well-known term *"voluntarisme"* is translated as "individual freedom" (p. 287); *"les ambiguités du Castroism"* becomes instead the "contradictions of Castroism" (p. 431); and the French phrase *"une fuite en avant"* (a flight forward) —applied to Castro's "Revolutionary Offensive" of 1968[3]—is rendered as "a form of blindness"!

[2] After winning a prize in 1968 for his book *Fuera del Juego*, Cuban writer Heberto Padilla was accused by army propagandists of "anti-revolutionary" tendencies and lost his job, though he was permitted to stay in Cuba and to meet freely with foreigners, including Karol. He was arrested in April 1970 but was freed after writing a "confession" in which he renounced his earlier views and claimed to have been influenced by "CIA agents," among whom he named Karol and French writer René Dumont.

[3] Castro's "Revolutionary Offensive" of 1968 was a socialization drive in which some 55,000 small private businesses and shops were nationalized.

Comparing Communist Systems

By John W. Burton

CHALMERS JOHNSON, Ed.: *Change in Communist Systems.* Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1970.
SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON and CLEMENT H. MOORE, Eds.: *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society.* New York, Basic Books, Inc., 1970.

THESE TWO compilations have much in common, including some common contributors. Almost all the contributors are area specialists, mostly in the Chinese and Soviet fields; and all are persons who think basically in terms of the Western political environment in which they live. These two characteristics of the contributors condition the nature and approach of both books. As academic works, they are comparable to studies done by Soviet or Chinese scholars on Western political systems: both groups of scholars are apt to accept their own system—indeed, an ideal type of their own system—as the norm, and at the same time to make comparisons with other systems not as ideal types but rather as they are perceived to function. As a result, differences between systems tend to be overstated, while similarities go unobserved.

The Huntington-Moore book is in four parts: one-party systems in general, weak one-party systems, strong one-party systems, and patterns of adaptation. By definition these systems are not democratic—democracy being defined as a system where the principal leaders are selected by competitive elections in which the bulk of the population can participate (p. 509). The treatment is thus tied to a multiparty conception of democracy, which limits its value.

Despite the stress placed on the differences between authoritarian and democratic systems, there are some fundamental similarities between a one-party authoritarian system and the Western democratic party system as it

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operates in places like Northern Ireland, Cyprus, and elsewhere where cultural minorities form permanent oppositions. There are in fact similarities between the one-party system and the US political system from the point of view of minorities within the society that are not effectively included in the political decision-making processes. On the other hand, moreover, the involved processes of consultation that take place at some political levels in socialist states are highly participatory.

As its title indicates, the Chalmers Johnson book concentrates on problems of change in Communist systems. It is a comparative study, yet little consideration appears to have been given to problems of change in Western societies or to the recent literature on the process of change as such (*e.g.,* Karl Deutsch, Amitai Etzioni, Seymour N. Lipset, N. S. Demerath, etc.). In fact, the fundamental problems of change are of the same type in any form of society, and concentration on purely local and sometimes transitory features in one kind of system, such as one finds in the Chalmers Johnson book, can be misleading.

THESE PROBLEMS of comparative politics can be overcome to a large degree by adopting a systems approach—using the term "systems" here in the "General System Theory" sense and not in the popular sense referring to political systems or types of political organization. All political and social communities include many systems and subsystems, each of which has certain systemic needs to be satisfied. For example, systems require an ability to adjust to the rate of environmental change or, failing that, to alter that rate. Since any individual system consists of transactions between units of the same set, it implies the participation of units and, failing this, the breakdown of the system and the creation of new ones. This, however, is not the occasion to outline systems analysis (see this author's *Systems, States, Diplomacy and Rules,* Cambridge, 1968); the reference is made only to suggest that the political theorist probably has means of analysis which could be useful to the area specialist and student of comparative politics. Unfortunately, neither of the books under review seems to relate to the growing body of theoretical and empirical literature on systems analysis, which would provide a unified approach to the study of any particular area or situation. Within a systems framework there can be dialogue between scholars in different types of political and economic organizations, just as there can be dialogue between atomic scientists; the subject of discussion is systems properties and systemic needs, and these are universal. These two books, on the contrary, offer no basis for a transnational dialogue.

A systems approach draws attention to the fundamental problems of social and political organization and away from the cultural and immediate preoccupations of any particular society. The all-pervading preoccupation of both books—especially the Huntington-Moore study—with the presence or absence of one or more political parties is indicative of an approach, an attitude, a cultural value, which prejudges the issues being discussed. Furthermore, it leads the contributors into confusion once it is discovered that no useful classifications or typologies of political organizations can be made on this basis. Thus, Bienen (Huntington-Moore, p. 120) finds that typologies and definitions of one-party systems derived "from a literature that originally dealt with Communist parties have been misleading." In short, the comparative method is found not useful.

The party-parliamentary system is a means to an end—and in some circumstances a most inefficient one. The procedural end is effective participation, and the operational end is political justice, however defined. Concepts of the legitimacy of authority, as distinct from the legality of authority, are appropriate if an examination is being made of either democratic values or political stability. These have a universal application within a general systems framework, as all social organization involves authority and degrees of legitimization. Thus, comparative measures of legitimacy are possible. Whether a particular political structure contains one or more parties is not the most interesting consideration.

ALL POLITICAL systems, both national and international, are moving toward functionalism, which removes political decision-making from many fields of activity. Indeed, functionalism is beginning to appear as an alternative to political system. In many communities, radio and television, education, and numerous other areas are under functional control; and in areas of communal conflict such as Northern Ireland, housing is under such control. (The solution to the community relations problem could be further progression in this direction.) In any event, comparative studies based

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on functionalist trends would provide a different perspective on authoritarian systems, but this powerful notion of political science does not enter even into Mr. Meyer's contribution on "convergence" (Chalmers Johnson, p. 313).

Values such as economic development or modernization are not an appropriate basis for comparative studies, though they are featured in many of the contributions appearing in these books. Indeed, it is far from clear that these are any longer accepted Western values, except among those over forty or so. Moreover, as John Galtung has shown, there is an important difference between development in the broadest sense and economic development, and most political systems are under pressure to give more attention to the former. Insofar as political systems have different cultural values, comparison of the degrees of attainment of these values is not particularly useful; however, some interesting comparisons can be made once common systemic values are considered.

Above all, what strikes the political theorist—especially one who is not an area specialist but engaged operationally in applying theory to situations of conflict in many different areas—is the great methodological and conceptual gulf that exists between area specialists and students of comparative politics, on the one hand, and political scientists who are interested in recurrent and universal patterns of behavior, on the other. Indeed, the more scholarly contemporary literature cuts across not only political boundaries but academic boundaries as well. International relations, industrial relations, and relations at other social levels are found to have a common theoretical framework. Role theory, decision-making theory, theory of social change, and other stock tools of the political scientist all can be employed. This is a logical outcome of general systems theory. The study of Communist and other societies within this framework would help to control, if not eliminate, the strongly subjective flavor of conventional Sino-Soviet studies.

The Status of Soviet Women

By Ellen Mickiewicz

DONALD R. BROWN: *The Role and Status of Women in the Soviet Union.* New York, Teachers' College Press, Columbia University, 1968.
(Author unspecified): *Women in the Soviet Union: Statistical* Returns. Moscow, 1970.

ALTHOUGH THE "feminine question" is presently the center of much public attention and activism in the United States, it has long occupied an important place in the rhetoric of official pronouncements emanating from the Soviet Union. There, "sexism," or discrimination against women, allegedly ended with the Great October Revolution and the advent to power of a party dedicated to the emancipation of all the exploited, who—according to official Marxist-Leninist doctrine—included women. But do Soviet women today, some 54 years after that revolution, really have equal opportunities to gain the good things of life? It would appear that Soviet women today may still be viewed as an underprivileged "social class"—a distinct social grouping which finds itself at a collective disadvantage relative to its male counterpart—as can be seen by investigating briefly six characteristics by which one class can be distinguished from another: education, occupation, social mobility, political representation, psychological perceptions and aspirations, and life style.

Useful insights into these matters are provided by two recent books. The first, edited by Donald R. Brown, presents the papers (complete with the comments of the conference participants) delivered at a symposium on the status of Soviet women, which was held in 1968 at Bryn Mawr College. The second, *Women in the Soviet Union: Statistical Returns,* is an English-language set of So-

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viet statistics on demography, labor force, political participation, and education. Read in tandem, these two volumes permit us to assess in a reasonably balanced manner the several class aspects of Soviet womanhood mentioned above.

The first of these categories—education—is the basic element which tends to distinguish class position in modern societies. Or, as Professor Mark Field wrote in his essay entitled "Workers (and Mothers): Soviet Women Today," contained in the Brown volume:

> . . . *the indispensable underpinning for full participation of women in the economic, political, and social life of the country is undoubtedly education* (p. 14).

It was Professor Field's judgment that the educational status of Soviet women "is almost, but not quite, on a par with that of Soviet men" (p. 15). Table 20 in the Soviet volume documents this very impressive achievement: women comprised 44.4 percent of all Soviet university and institute students in 1965–66, compared with 39.4 percent in the US, 28.5 percent in England, 43.4 percent in France (1962–63), 36.8 percent in Denmark, and 30.9 percent in West Germany (1964–65). Professor Field reported, however, that the percentage of women among students of Soviet higher schools appeared to be declining slightly, and in his comment on Field's essay, Professor Norton Dodge suggested:

> . . . *the enrollment of women has been discouraged . . . by changing the admission regulations so that, in recent years, persons who have completed military service or who have worked satisfactorily for two or more years have been favored, and examination results or past academic performance have counted less. The effect of these changes has, of course, been unfavorable to women.* (*pp. 52–53*)

However, it is quite possible that the departure of Khrushchev from power has weakened the vocational emphasis which permeated his educational reforms. As a result, women may again progress toward virtual equality of opportunity with men in terms of education.[1]

When we turn from education to occupation—where educational attainment is translated into jobs and earnings—the evidence is ambiguous. Field noted in his essay that women comprise 48 percent of the Soviet labor force and that 82 percent of women aged 16 to 54 either work or study. In his supplementary comment, Professor Dodge observed that Soviet women have made pioneering inroads into fields that had previously been the preserves of men in Russia and still are male bailiwicks in other cultures—chemistry, biology, medicine, physics, and mathematics. The Soviet volume points with pride to the fact that, in 1966, 73 percent of Soviet doctors and 70 percent of all teachers in primary, incomplete secondary, and secondary schools in the USSR were women (pp. 42–43).

However, two cautionary notes should be sounded. First, the occupations in which women form the majority may not represent for Soviet society occupations of prestige or desirability. For example, there is some evidence to suggest that the teaching profession ranks low in the estimation of Soviet youth.[2] Second, within almost every occupational category, as Field noted, women have been "underrepresented in the positions that require managerial, decision-making, and executive functions, while they tended to be over-represented in the subordinate and junior positions" (p. 14). For example, Soviet data indicate that women comprised 49.5 percent of junior scientific workers and assistants in 1967, but only 12 percent of Doctors of Sciences and 8.8 percent of Academicians, Corresponding Members of the USSR Academy of Sciences, or professors.[3] Women comprise roughly half of the collective farm labor force in each of the USSR's 15 union republics (Table 14 of the Soviet volume) but account for only 600 collective farm chairmen (p. 11), a mere 1.7 percent of the total.[4] As for occupational satisfaction, Professor Field stated that laws protecting female labor are frequently ignored, and that women—often the least skilled members of a given work

[1] Recent data suggest that, in fact, the proportion of women in higher education is moving back toward 50 percent—it was 47 percent in the academic year 1968-69. *Zhenshchiny i deti v SSSR* (Women and Children in the USSR), Moscow, Statistika, 1969, p. 56.

[2] L. Borisova in *Sotsialnye problemy trudovykh resursov sela* (Social Problems of Rural Labor Resources), cited by V. Shliapentokh, *Sotsiologiia dlia vsekh* (Sociology for Everyone), Moscow, Sovetskaia Rossiia, 1970, p. 123.

[3] This was compiled from a comparison of data for 1967 contained in *Women in the Soviet Union: Statistical Returns*, p. 44, and *SSSR v tsifrakh v 1967 godu* (The USSR in Figures for 1967), Moscow, Statistika, 1968, p. 130.

[4] The calculation was based on a total of slightly more than 36,000 collective farms in the USSR in 1968, reported in *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1968 godu* (National Economy of the USSR in 1968), Moscow, Statistika, 1969, p. 313.

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force—fill in for labor-saving devices on many jobs.

Thus we discover a general incongruity between educational attainment and occupation. Despite educational backgrounds roughly equal to that of men, women do seem to be excluded generally from positions of authority. It is difficult to assess social mobility trends for the future from current information. One sociologist in the Novosibirsk area has observed, however, that although evening and correspondence schools are a good channel for upward social mobility, women make up only twenty percent of the students.[5] In another study, Yu. V. Arutiunian found that in the least desirable occupational category (low-skilled physical work), a total of 25 percent of the workers were upwardly mobile; the mobility figure for women in this category, however, was only 5 percent.[6] We are left with a generally unfavorable—albeit impressionistic—assessment of women's chances for social advancement.

Are political channels open for women to exercise civic authority and direct public policy toward realization of their aspirations? Here the situation is obviously unfavorable for women. From 1926 through 1968, female membership in the all-important Communist Party of the Soviet Union has grown at an average of 0.2 percent annually; only 21.2 percent of the party is female.[7] Field notes that, although women make up between two-fifths and one-half of the mass youth organization—the Komsomol—their representation in the leadership is "slim" (p. 16). In fact, there are no women in the position of first secretary in any republic Komsomol organization. There are no female first or second secretaries of the Komsomol in the entire Estonian and Latvian republics, or in the Tomsk, Kursk, Pskov, and Orlov regional Komsomol organizations. In Ivanovo Oblast—a textile center—women make up 65 percent of Komsomol membership but occupy only 7 out of a total of 24 district first secretaryships.[8]

Turning from the party and its youth organization to the formal instruments of government authority, we find that women comprise two-fifths of the deputies to local soviets (legislatures—Brown, p. 16), and the Soviet statistical collection shows (p. 33) that women comprised 33.7 percent of deputies to the supreme soviets of the 15 union republics and 28 percent of deputies to the USSR Supreme Soviet in 1966. However, these favorable statistics belie actual power relationships. When it comes to the important executive organs of the government, women fare considerably worse. Ye. Furtseva, of course, is the only woman on the USSR Council of Ministers. At the union-republic level there are only 27 female ministers (p. 16, Soviet volume). If one assumes an average of some 25 ministers in each of the 15 republics, we find that this amounts to only 7 percent of the total. A recent Soviet study of the executive committee of a soviet in an urban district of Leningrad found the distribution of women according to level of func-

Executive Committee of a Leningrad District Soviet

Groups		Women (% of Total)
I	Chairman, his deputies, and secretary of the executive committee	
	1962	24.9
	1964	24.9
	1966	24.9
II	Directors and deputy directors of divisions, directors of sectors	
	1962	63.1
	1964	59.1
	1966	40.0
III	Specialists (instructors, inspectors, and others)	
	1962	87.2
	1964	82.2
	1966	92.9
IV	Clerical personnel	
	1962	100.0
	1964	100.0
	1966	100.0

SOURCE: V. G. Lebin and M.N. Perfilev, *Kadry apparata upravlenia v USSR* (Cadres of the Administrative Apparatus in the USSR), Leningrad, Nauka, 1970, p. 176.

[5] L. Liashenko in *Sotsialnye problemy trudovykh resursov sela,* cited in Shliapentokh, *op. cit.,* p. 117.

[6] "Opyt sotsiologicheskovo izucheniia sela" (Trial Sociological Research in the Countryside), cited in Shliapentokh, *op. cit.,* p. 117.

[7] From the forthcoming *Handbook of Soviet Social Science Data,* ed., Ellen Mickiewicz, New York, Free Press.

[8] *Spravochnik sekretaria pervichnoi partiinoi organizatsii* (Handbook for the Secretary of a Primary Party Organization), Moscow, Politizdat, 1970, p. 723.

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tion to be as shown in the accompanying table. It is clear from this table that the route to political power is far more accessible to men than to women.

Problems of analysis are more complex when it comes to questions of psychological perceptions and life styles. In the absence of surveys that plumb attitudes and desires, it is difficult to generalize about women as a group, or even about certain categories of women. Vera Dunham, however, in her contribution to the Brown volume, entitled "The Changing Image of Women in Soviet Literature," took an interesting approach. She looked at current Soviet poetry and found that it manifests far more sensitivity to women's needs and strengths. The cardboard images of the Zhdanov era[9] have been replaced by more realistic, more ambiguous, and more vital images. Portraits are now three-dimensional and reflect in a new way admiration for the strength, courage, and emotionality of women. In her essay Prof. Dunham gave many illustrative examples of verse in Russian and in translation; it is fascinating reading.

If indeed it is true that these changing images are characteristic of Soviet society's view of women, it is an encouraging development. However, to round out our study of psychological perceptions, we would need to know women's images of themselves. One suggested approach would be study of the literature of female authors. Only thus could we ascertain whether women, or at least these women authors, view themselves as bound by class or sex ties and whether they have aspirations in common.

During the Khrushchev era, there were many sweeping reforms which sought to break through the growing barriers of class differentiation and to equalize conditions of existence for most Soviet citizens. In the essay "The Changing Soviet Family" in the Brown volume, Urie Bronfenbrenner examined the product of one such reform—the boarding school. Although it remains unclear how broadly this innovation was to have been applied, or where Khrushchev hoped to find the funds for this expensive institution,[10] it seemed designed to relieve at least some mothers of signficant child-rearing responsibilities, thereby allowing them to share equally with men in all public and employment activities. As Prof. Bronfenbrenner's analysis made clear, there was considerable divergence of Soviet expert opinion on this experiment. Those traditionalists who argued that the family (*i.e.*, women), rather than the boarding school, remained the most effective instrumentality for inculcating social values and norms in youth apparently won out. Khrushchev's successors curtailed the reform.

Closely related to the role of Soviet women as the transmitters of social values to the next generation is the question of leisure time. The working Soviet woman, as Professor Field wrote in his essay, must also engage in domestic duties—shopping, preparing meals, cleaning house—duties which are generally not shared by Soviet men. Mechanization of housework is still at a fairly primitive stage. In Pskov, for example, only 3.4 percent of the families have mechanical appliances. As a result, women there average only three hours of leisure time a day as compared to five hours for men.[11]

Thus, in all aspects, with the important exception of education, women's roles and characteristics in the Soviet Union are clearly differentiated from those of men, and their prospects for development and fulfillment seem to be distinctly inferior. What of the future? The outlook seems far from rosy. Without a channel through which to influence politics, it is questionable whether Soviet women can assert their right to genuine equality.

[9] Reference to the period 1947-49, when cultural Tsar A. A. Zhdanov tightened controls over all forms of artistic expression in the Soviet Union.

[10] For example, data from Azerbaidzhan in 1963-64 showed per-pupil expenditures of 657 rubles in the boarding schools *vs.* only 103 rubles in the regular school system. Herbert C. Rudman, *The School and the State in the USSR*, New York, Macmillan, 1967, p. 69.

[11] *Ob osnovnykh itogakh izucheniia biudzheta vremeni zhitelei g. Pskova* (Basic Results of a Study of the Time Budget of the Inhabitants of the City of Pskov), cited in Shliapentokh, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

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Tackling Technetronics

By Stanislaw Wasowski

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI: *Between Two Ages—America's Role in the Technetronic Era.* New York, Viking Press, 1970.

PROFESSOR BRZEZINSKI's provocative analysis of the relative potentials which American liberalism and Soviet Marxism have for alleviating the malaise of the contemporary world introduces three major interrelated issues which are specific to our age: the "technetronic revolution," the emergence of "global ghettos," and the existence of a pervasive "crisis of belief." The concept of the "techetronic revolution," outlined by the author two years ago,[1] refers to social change caused by swift progress in the development of electronics and communication. Our existence, already shaped by the requirements of production techniques characteristic of the industrial revolution, is now further affected by the impact of multiform and ubiquitous information as well as by the possibility of calculating complex interactions on electronic computers. This development has brought profound changes in our social, political, and cultural activities, changes whose full implications, very often, we still do not perceive. Our ability to influence nature and improve our own existence has increased, but the very tools which make this possible have certain built-in, undesirable side effects. For example, modern communications methods tend to develop interaction rather than intimacy, to promote protest against human suffering rather than development of constructive solutions, to develop emotions rather than understanding.

This paradox becomes evident in Prof. Brzezinski's discussion of the "global ghettos." He uses this term to define all underprivileged social groups of the globe—including dwellers in racial districts of American cities, the populations of the less developed countries of Asia and Africa, and the inhabitants of the urban slums of Latin America. Material conditions in these ghettos may be improving slowly, but their participation in the benefits of material progress under the "technetronic revolution" is still inadequate. The "global ghettos" suffer from social instability and insecurity, and, through the modern communications media, they are made aware of other groups which share both their plight and their hostility toward affluent social groups and countries. The doctrines of the satisfied (among them, liberalism and Soviet Marxism) have little appeal to the denizens of the ghettos. Instead, they are attracted to demagogic leaders such as Che Guevara or Frantz Fanon, who have no efficient solutions to offer but whose flamboyant rejection of the system that tolerates ghettos gains them admiration.

Through the communications media the well-fed and privileged are also alerted to the fate of the less fortunate part of mankind, and many have grown impatient with what they consider the general indifference to human want and suffering. Convinced of the power of science and technology, they see no reason for the neglect of the poor other than the bad faith of the leaders and/or the inadequacy of the existing sociopolitical systems. Their highly emotional outrage leads them often to extreme rejection of established institutions and their representatives.

The concerned radicals of the New Left make their protests clearly audible, but they are not so vocal about constructive solutions. The reason, says Prof. Brzezinski, is a "crisis of belief" affecting modern man (and not just the radicals). The complex working of modern societies and the need to relate multiple goals and coordinate varied interests of many social groups require a unifying view, a global frame of reference. Traditional religions, ideological universalism, and nationalism in the past have provided such a link, but the present generation apparently abhors the thought of philo-

[1] For examples, see his "America in the Technetronic Age," *Encounter* (London), January 1968, pp. 16-26.

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sophical synthesis and metaphysical structure.

Hence the modern radical—a child of his age in his extreme individualism, his volatility, and his penchant for privacy—is not really capable of the sustained effort needed to structure institutions and relations between people. Basically a middle-class intellectual in revolt against his own background, he lacks, for all his honesty and sincerity, the constancy and unity of purpose which are required for the task of improving the world. Hence, Prof. Brzezinski suggests we look elsewhere than to the New Left for a new synthesis of the spiritual and scientific aspects of human endeavor. He focuses on two surviving social creeds of yesterday—liberalism and Marxism, as typified by American and Soviet society.

The author quickly disposes of any pretenses by the Soviet Communists to a role in shaping the future of humanity as it grapples with the "technetronic" age. There is no promise in a movement that started by being intolerant and soon became a synonym for terror; that required enormous sacrifices from its population only to squander the results through inefficient and dogmatic management;[2] and that, after 50 years of experiments with wasteful planning, now hesitantly gropes its way back to the economic reforms proposed already in 1918.[3]

The Soviet past was both uninspiring and inefficient; how about the future? Will the revolutionary spirit of original Marxism come to the fore now? No, Prof. Brzezinski tells us, the Soviet leaders are not attuned to the future, for their Marxist belief has changed into a dull socio-political orthodoxy that closes minds and hardens hearts. Professional ideologues defend official doctrines and fight irrelevant battles against other Marxist sects. The official view of the world—dutifully repeated through propaganda media—becomes ever more remote from what was original and interesting in Marx's thought about how methods of production and social relations influence ideology. Marx's Soviet disciples disregard the development in the new industrial society and refuse to accept such facts as the constant decline in the relative size of the industrial proletariat. They refuse to look at the organization of industrial production and ponder how it could influence social relations in modern society, not to mention its potential impact on their own thinking. They have opted for a system in which changes in science and technology are used to prop up a petrified socio-political structure rather than lead to a new structure. In the Soviet Union, social thought is nonexistent; the crisis of belief is complete.

The Soviet Union does note the existence of global ghettos, but only to the extent that they may be used to further its political aims. As long as global ghettos participate in the anticapitalist, anti-imperialist campaign under the Soviet lead, the USSR pays considerable attention to them. As soon, however, as they fall under the spell of rival leftists of the Maoist, Castroite, or Marcuse ilk, Moscow's interest in the ghettos flags. And at no time does the Soviet Union have significant practical suggestions about steps to be taken to solve some of the problems experienced by the ghettos of the world.

The Soviets also are making increasing use of technetronic means of communication and production but seem intent on insulating themselves from the concomitant social impact. Information is mass-produced and homogeneous, and for that reason stultifies rather than enlightens. Industrial and managerial applications of technetronics came late, and even then, more for purposes of ideological display than out of a genuine understanding of the contribution they might make to efficiency. The techniques are harnessed to the goals of increasing central control over various aspects of social activity rather than to improving cooperation among semi-autonomous elements of the social and economic structure.

Concluding his remarks on the prospects for a Soviet role in the future of mankind, Prof. Brzezinski suggests that the Soviet oligarchy, mesmerized by the old issue of capitalism *vs.* socialism, distrustful of new ideas and material developments, devoted to a sectarian ideology, is incapable of inspiring the world's confidence. Communism is a non-wave of the future.

The only possible solution to the world's problems, the author suggests, lies in the liberal tradition as manifested in American political and social democracy. True, he admits, this tradition is ailing—shaken by racial strife, the generation gap, and violent protests against the establishment. But, despite the short-term negative impact of these developments on American society, they represent, according to Prof. Brzezinski, a courageous, frank, and often

[2] Brzezinski reminds his readers that the comparative ranking of the USSR (Russia) in composite social and economic indices per capita has not changed since 1900. Nineteen or twenty countries have higher ranking than Russia, just as was the case in 1900 and 1919 (p. 132).

[3] The author refers to the proposals of V. Grinevetsky, Rector of the Moscow Institute of Technology (pp. 129-30).

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painful experiment out of which the future will be born. American society suffers, he admits, from the fact that liberalism—originally a creative response to the inequities of the first industrial revolution—has been a success and has turned into an established doctrine, inflexible, over-sceptical, and self-satisfied. But the foundations are judged to be still sound: the nation experiments with solutions to the racial problem, with pluralism, and with participatory democracy; it is critical of itself; it is ready to adjust to changing circumstances and influences from outside. This, the author says, will keep American liberalism alive.

Prof. Brzezinski's book offers an elegant synthesis, fascinating insights, and challenging formulations. Some of the formulations, however, may be challenged by the reader. Take, for instance, the concept of "global ghettos." After all, a ghetto being a section of a city to which a particular minority is restricted, what remains of the restriction if the ghettos are global? Brzezinski has obviously selected a provocative label to describe different social groups sharing some characteristics. Are these ghettos more than a collection, more than a set of social groups? Do they actually constitute a unified, universal collective of the world's slum dwellers—a collective with enormous political potential? To be sure, a protesting American black leader may shout slogans on behalf of oppressed blacks in Portugese Angola, and Arab countries may grant asylum to American leftists, black and white. But how genuine is this solidarity? Can it survive such tests of fire as the threat to the livelihood of North Carolina blacks posed by a flood of textile imports woven by the poor laborers of India? Will the emotion-laden recognition of analogous grievances lead to the formulation of real common bonds of interest among the denizens of the world's diverse ghettos? There is little in this book to prove that this is so, and the author also fails to substantiate his estimate of the real political power of the "global ghetto."

One might also question Prof. Brzezinski's assurance that the revival of liberalism should be located on American soil. While there is no denying that a revival of liberalism in America is a possibility, one searches in vain in this book for sufficient proof that it *must* occur. Those who live in the open social laboratory which is the US and are tested for bounce in conditions of stress are passionately involved in the making of history. The question is: Can they be sufficiently detached to observe the experiment in which they themselves are subjects? How are they to manage to report on their observations without benefit of an independent frame of reference?

Perhaps someone else, an outsider, might be able to draw conclusions from the experiments going on in America? This possibility Brzezinski has excluded from the beginning by proposing that the answer for the future can only be found among the superpowers. History, however, tells us that this need not be so. For instance, at the beginning of the 18th century, Pierre Bayle composed his *Philosophical Dictionary*—regarded by many as the beginning of the Enlightenment—in the Netherlands, a secondary power wedged between the superpowers of the day, France and England. Maybe today it will be Europe, a secondary power wedged between Moscow and Washington, which will provide answers to our modern concerns. After all, Europe is also heir to the liberal tradition, is aware of the problems of the second industrial revolution, and, what is more important, is capable of a detached view. Should the revival of liberalism indeed occur in an American-European framework, the author's observations about the future would have to be accordingly modified, and enriched, by reference to the European liberal tradition.

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The Prague Spring and After

By Blanca Jicinski

TAD SZULC: *Czechoslovakia Since World War II:* New York, Viking Press, 1971.
IVAN SVITAK: *The Czechoslovak Experiment.* New York, Columbia University Press, 1971.
I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN, Ed.: *Czechoslovakia—Intervention and Impact.* New York, New York University Press, 1970.

WITH ITS MEAGER 14-million population and constricted territory, Czechoslovakia has often received a much greater share of attention from political thinkers, journalists, and historians than its size and power would seem to warrant. For decades, whatever developed there has been analyzed, reanalyzed, and gone over with a fine-tooth comb with an eye to its possible significance and consequences for the affairs of the world. Yet, the strange and sometimes morbid fascination that Czechoslovakia has held for political observers is not wholly unjustified. Historically a testing ground of new ideas as well as a breeding place of major wars, the country has displayed a capacity for troublemaking reaching far beyond its modest borders. Not only was it the birthplace of the Reformation that convulsed 15th-century Europe, but it also played a key role in the start of the Thirty Years' War and of World War II. It is with an awareness of this historical record that the authors of the books under review approach what may be called the latest tragedy of Czechoslovakia. Although their conclusions differ, they are all convinced that the events they treat are of significance not merely for Czechoslovakia but for Europe and the world.

Tad Szulc's approach is strictly factual. The first half of his book reviews the political history of Czechoslovakia since World War II by way of background, and the second half then proceeds to recount the events leading up to and during the short-lived Prague Spring of 1968. The author gives a month-by-month, plenum-by-plenum, resolution-by-resolution account of those events, reprinting some of the key documents, and also provides some interesting bits of party gossip and glimpses into the inner party councils (one would have wished for more of the latter, since the facts as such have already been abundantly reported). And yet, for all its detailed chronicling of the moves and countermoves of the liberals and conservatives, of Moscow and Prague, the book gives the reader something akin to the feeling of watching a space-walk—all these dangerous high-level political acrobatics seem to be taking place in a vacuum.

This is because the people of Czechoslovakia figure hardly at all in Mr. Szulc's account. He briefly refers to the populace on the eve of Dubcek's accession to power as "mainly preoccupied with its daily problems of earning a living and filling shopping baskets in the midst of an exceptionally cruel winter," and nowhere later does he adequately amend this picture of seeming public political apathy. The trouble is that Szulc's profession as a news correspondent led him to focus his attention almost exclusively on the principal newsmakers of the Prague Spring—the political leaders and the intellectuals. But if the masses rarely make news, it is they who make revolutions. Szulc believes that the Prague Spring *was* "a revolution in the deepest philosophical sense"; yet the people appear in his account only incidentally, when being addressed by a Smrkovsky or spoken for by the intellectuals. This does a serious injustice both to them and to history. For the most exhilarating and at the same time most revolutionary feature of the Prague Spring was the fact that the ordinary Czech and Slovak man-in-the-street became for the first time not only visible but also highly audible. Far from being content just to fill his shopping basket, he was filling the meeting halls, and his voice was filling the air waves with angry complaints about mismanaged plants and 19th-century working conditions, polluted rivers and cramped apartments, past persecution and present discrimination, and being treated as a second-class citizen.

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Significantly, this average non-Communist man-in-the-street (since over 80 percent of the Czechs and Slovaks are not party members) compared himself time after time to the Negro. Thus, one of a group of metal workers, in a discussion with the editors of *Literarni listy,* remarked: "We're just like the Negroes; we're never consulted about anything." It soon became a sort of democratic chic for the editors of journals—some of whom actually had rather illiberal political records—to invite these second-class citizens to speak out in their columns and to voice their opinions in polls. Though there was anger and pain in these voices, they were singularly free from hatred. No one called for guns, or for gallows and revenge. Encouraged by hearing others like themselves speak out, more and more citizens attended protest meetings, organized for political action, signed petitions, and morally pushed the intellectuals to increase their pressure on the government.

Such was the real dynamic of the Prague Spring. And it was the purposeful, politically intelligent, and civilized behavior of the people at large that gave this development its special glow. Unless one sees it, in part at least, as a bid of the second-class citizen and a second-class nationality (it was the disfavored Slovaks who were instrumental in engineering the fall of Novotny) for a fair shake and for more power, one is left with little more than hollow party maneuverings and intellectuals writing beautiful prose about lofty principles. Indeed, an intriguing speculation suggests itself as to whether the latter-day liberalization movements in Communist-ruled countries are not increasingly coalescing with a worldwide revolt of youth and of second-class citizens, races, and nationalities in multinational states, and whether their terms of reference are not being increasingly drawn from the US civil rights movement and New Left anti-Establishmentarianism rather than from the Marxist past. One might point to the Polish workers' recent slogan "Power to the Workers!," which seems akin to currently fashionable slogans in the US, and to the fact that East European students are now commonly referring to their countries' Communist parties as "the Establishment."

IVAN SVITAK, in *The Czechoslovak Experiment,* does give the common citizen the place he deserves. He considers the working class of Czechoslovakia, in alliance with the students, to have been "the most radical defenders of the national interests" and one of the three distinct components which, though having different goals, became "merged in one dynamic process of social change." The other two components were the "power elite" and the intellectuals. Svitak, who could perhaps be called the chief theoretician of the Prague Spring, himself belonged to the intellectual group, but he increasingly addressed himself to the workers and the students. His book, a collection of essays written both during the Prague Spring and after the occupation of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact armies, makes highly interesting reading for more than one reason. Not only does it afford an insight into the intellectual underpinnings of the developments of 1968, but since each essay is preceded by a brief chronology of events at the time it was written, the book actually enables the reader to watch the gradual radicalization of a movement and a thinker through a process of mutual feedback.

Svitak considers himself a Marxist, but it is clear that he is very much his own man and an incisive political thinker not subservient to any orthodoxy. He was one of the few who foresaw the possibility of Soviet armed intervention in Czechoslovakia, and the accuracy of his foresight renders his pessimistic conclusions about the long-range consequences of the suppression of the Prague Spring all the more disquieting. Among other things, he foresees the possibility of a Bonapartist solution to the increasing contradictions of a decaying Soviet Stalinism.

IT IS SPECIFICALLY to the consequences of the Warsaw Pact intervention that the symposium papers compiled by Mr. Zartman under the title *Czechoslovakia—Intervention and Impact* address themselves, and one leaves the book with the impression that the long-term effects of the intervention may constitute more of a threat to the West than to any future attempt at political liberalization in Communist East Europe. As Andrew Pierre argues in his essay on "NATO after Czechoslovakia," what the Russians achieved by their occupation of Czechoslovakia was a decisive alteration of the strategic balance in Europe in their favor. On the other hand, according to Jan Triska, what they failed to achieve was the political stabilization of Eastern Europe—and the December 1970 events in Poland would seem to bear out this thesis.

Szulc, Svitak, and the contributors to the Zartman symposium are far from unanimous, however,

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concerning the probable effect of the Czechoslovak experiment and its demise on further liberalization attempts in the Communist world. In one of his earlier essays, Svitak appears to see some hope of "socialism with a human face" becoming a model for Moscow, but in a later one he changes his mind and comes up with a flat no: it could never happen there. He even goes so far in his disillusionment with Communist party leadership as to say: "Democratization is possible with the Communists participating in a pluralistic political movement but impossible under the leadership of the Communist party apparatus." On the other hand, Szulc, takes the optimistic view that the Prague Spring was the beginning of a "fundamental metamorphosis of communism . . . if not of its ultimate collapse." He evidently believes that the Czechoslovak developments of early 1968 brought the emergence of a new breed of Communist party leaders, and that the same phenomenon may possibly repeat itself elsewhere. He also thinks that the Czechoslovak events must be viewed in the context of the stirrings of dissent in the Soviet Union and "the reawakening of protest among the national minorities."

Here again, one is brought back to the question of how much the Prague Spring was an expression of a *Zeitgeist*—of a worldwide yearning of the disenfranchised and the deprived for freedom and dignity. If it was, then it seems safe to say that such upheavals are not likely to cease in the Communist world. Nor need they necessarily depend on sponsorship by the local Communist party or on whether or not the particular country has a democratic tradition—which Czechoslovakia has but Soviet Russia does not. For such slogans as "power to the workers," "power to the people," or "an end to inequality and discrimination" express human aspirations that are universal. If, on the other hand, one chooses to believe that any further liberalization attempts in Eastern Europe will depend on the self-reforming instincts of the ruling Communist parties, one had better remember that such instincts have never been too strong —not even in Prague, as both Szulc and Svitak attest—and may well remain so as long as the Brezhnev Doctrine continues in force.

Reviewers in This Issue

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BORIS GOLDENBERG—Head of the Latin American Department of the Deutsche Welle broadcasting system, Cologne; author of *The Cuban Revolution and Latin America* (New York, Praeger, 1965) and *Zehn Jahre kubanische Revolution* (Ten Years of the Cuban Revolution) (Hannover, Verlag fuer Literatur und Zeitgeschehen, 1969).

JOHN W. BURTON—Director of the Centre for the Analysis of Conflict and Reader in International Relations at the University of London; permanent Head of the Australian Foreign Office between 1947 and 1951; author of *International Relations* (Cambridge, England, Cambridge University Press, 1966).

ELLEN MICKIEWICZ—Associate Professor of Political Science at Michigan State University; author of *Soviet Political Schools: The Communist Party Adult Instruction System* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1967); editor of the forthcoming *Handbook of Soviet Social Science Data* (New York, Free Press).

STANISLAW WASOWSKI—Senior Economist with the Strategic Studies Center, Stanford Research Institute, Washington, DC; contributing editor of *East-West Trade and Technology Transfer, an Economic and Political Appraisal* (New York, Praeger, 1970).

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HAROLD SHUKMAN—Research Fellow at St. Antony's College, Oxford University; author of *Lenin and the Russian Revolution* (New York, Putnam, 1967).

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VICTOR ALBA—author of *Nationalists without Nations: The Oligarchy Versus the People in Latin America* (New York, Praeger, 1968) and *Politics and the Labor Movement in Latin America* (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1968).

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Reviews in Brief

Kronstadt

PAUL AVRICH: *Kronstadt 1921*. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1970.

THE KRONSTADT UPRISING of March 1921, crushed ruthlessly by units of the Red Army, was the last and most intense manifestation of protest against the Bolshevik order termed "war communism." It also marked the first major instance that the Communist Revolution made victims of its own supporters. The Kronstadt insurgents rose against the Bolsheviks in the name of the Revolution itself, demanding democratic rule, Soviet power, relief of the peasants and workers, and democracy in the army—in short, the principles which had won them over to the Bolsheviks in 1917 but which had been sacrificed to the exigencies of the Civil War. By 1921 the need for "war communism" had been eliminated, thanks largely to the sacrifices of the Russian masses, who were now eager to enjoy the fruits of the Great October. Lenin's New Economic Policy, coincident with the rising, showed that the regime was prepared, indeed eager, to accommodate certain of the people's wishes; but "all power to the Soviets," as demanded by the Kronstadt rebels, was not among them.

Prior to the uprising, the forces in the island fortress of Kronstadt were widely—though in the author's view erroneously—considered to be model revolutionaries. He points out that they were fiercely uncompromising in spirit; they inhabited an isolated world of their own—a gaunt, formidable island from which their naval guns could threaten the despotic Bolsheviks in Petrograd as easily as they could keep guard against enemy ships. Mr. Avrich has written elsewhere of the anarchist tradition in Russia, and he feels Kronstadt fits into that tradition. His present book takes exception to the view that the Kronstadt fleet and garrison were the *crême de la crême* of the Bolshevik armed masses. True, they had served as the shock troops of the Revolution, but to see them as organized Bolsheviks is to miss the true nature of their militancy. Steeped in a passion for independence dating back to the rise of the bureaucratic state in the 17th and 18th centuries, they loathed privilege and authority, they were traditionally antagonistic towards central government, they hated regimentation and dreamed of local self-administration (we need not speculate on how they might have exercised these institutions had they been achieved), and they were prone to sudden paroxysms of violence. Moreover, in their almost xenophobic pattern of thinking, the Kronstadt men perceived the hidden hand of the wicked Jews at work within the Bolshevik regime. All of these attitudes were profoundly alien to Bolshevism, both as an ideology and as a system for the organization of political power.

In this book, one of the extraordinarily few studies of an important subject, Avrich gives a clear and confidently argued account of the factors leading to the dénouement in Kronstadt, as well as a fascinating analysis of the values, beliefs, background and traditions of the participants. It is to be hoped that the study will have a permanent impact on interpretations of the early period of Bolshevik rule.

Harold Shukman

Soviet Views of the World

WILLIAM ZIMMERMAN: *Soviet Perspectives on International Relations, 1957–1967*. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1969.

THE KHRUSHCHEV era witnessed a remarkable degree of political relaxation and flexibility in the Soviet Union by comparison with what preceded and what followed. There was considerable decentralization of economic decision-making; foreign contacts were promoted; and Solzhenitsyn was published. Scholarly literature on foreign policy also benefited from this moderating tendency, as the leadership apparently encouraged a less dogmatic examination of international relations theory in support of its more realistic and pragmatic foreign policy. It is this aspect of the Khrushchev liberalization which Professor Zimmerman attempts to document and analyze in the present volume, relying on extensive interviews with, as well as the writings of, numerous Soviet foreign policy commentators and scholars.

Reacting to the changes of Soviet policy orientation manifested in 1955—the signing of the Austrian peace treaty, the reconciliation with Tito, and the overtures to the Third World—these specialists began in 1956 to exhibit greater realism and less dogmatism, a trend which continued through the end of 1964. The writings of these commentators showed an increasing recognition of states as important and autonomous international actors in their own right rather than as mere class instruments. Nuclear realities were accepted, and war was consequently seen as not i
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the writings of the Khrushchev period "created the doctrinal legitimation for regarding Leninism as irrelevant in the atomic age" (p. 293).

While this development was both interesting and important, its fundamental significance appears to have been overstated by the author when he claims that "American and Soviet perspectives on the basic structure of the modern international system were basically similar" (p. 282). True, Khrushchev had a certain degree of faith in the ability of the Soviet system to triumph on its own merits in a peaceful contest with capitalism, and he therefore permitted somewhat greater freedom of discussion of international matters by Soviet specialists, to the end of developing a more realistic and effective foreign policy. However, by no means all of Khrushchev's policies—domestic or foreign—bore this open-minded, moderate imprint. At home he reemphasized the leading role of the party in society, made economic crimes punishable by death, introduced extrajudicial courts and antiparasite laws, and closed most of the churches reopened with Stalin's acquiescence during World War II. Internationally, the facade of peaceful coexistence was shattered time and again by the First Secretary's crisis-mongering and rocket-rattling. Thus, it is open to question what influence, if any, the writings of these experts have had on the conduct of Soviet policy. Indeed, as Professor Zimmerman himself makes clear, Soviet experts on international affairs have been much more propagandists than advisors and scholars an interpretation supported by the fact that they displayed a degree of tual flexibility that suggests cynicism.

If Soviet writings on international affairs cynically serve the purposes of the regime, what is one to make of the author's claim that these documents are indicative of a strong basic trend toward realism in Soviet international relations theory? He plays down the more obdurate and inflexible line apparent in foreign-policy writings since September 1965. While many see this development as an integral part of a general trend toward more dogmatic domestic and foreign policies on the part of the post-Khrushchev leadership once it had consolidated its power, Professor Zimmerman attributes the shift solely to Soviet reaction to the Vietnam War. This interpretation permits him to dismiss the current mood as an aberration, a temporary eddy in the underlying current of growing rationality and sophistication in Soviet foreign policy perceptions *and*—by implication, though never explicitly stated in this book—actual foreign policy. One may only hope that he is right, and that this unpleasant eddy does not reflect more profound currents in the making of Soviet foreign policy.

Robert G. Wesson

Stalin Defied

VLADIMIR DEDIJER: *The Battle Stalin Lost: Memoirs of Yugoslavia, 1948–1953.* New York, The Viking Press, 1971.

YUGOSLAVIA WAS evicted from the Soviet bloc over twenty years ago, but much of the story of why it happened and how this small and impoverished Balkan country escaped the fate which was later to befall Hungary and Czechoslovakia still remains untold. Dedijer's book is therefore particularly valuable even if it tells only one side of the story; Soviet historians have yet tc tell their side of it, the whole episode being ignored as virtually a "nonfact" in recent Soviet writings.

It seems clear that one of the major reasons why Tito was successful in resisting Soviet encroachments was that he had created an independent national power base of his own which the other East European Communist leaders, installed and kept in power by the Red Army, did not possess. As Dedijer shows, however, the decision to resist was not easily taken by Tito. He was still full of idealistic notions about Communist unity, and Stalin's accusation that he had betrayed the sacred cause hurt him deeply. For over a year after his excommunication, in spite of the flood of invectives and threats directed at him by the Soviet Union and its allies, in spite of the bloc economic blockade and the ominous tension on Yugoslavia's frontiers with the Communist states, Tito nevertheless refused to make peace with the West and continued to denounce imperialism and to side with the Soviets on every Cold War issue.

Yet Tito held firm against Soviet pressure. Alone among the East European Communist rulers, he was a genuine national leader who in World War II had fought his enemies—the Germans, the Ustase, the Cetniks—at constant risk to himself, while the others had been in exile, performing chores for Stalin, or had sat in the underground, waiting for better times. A firm believer in "proletarian internationalism" and a loyal supporter of the Soviet Union, he expected Stalin to treat him in comradely fashion as an equal, and he was deeply angered when the Cominform attack was launched against him at Stalin's bidding.

A major reason why Stalin did not order an immediate invasion of Yugoslavia was that he reckoned that those Yugoslav Communists who placed Communist unity under Soviet aegis above everything else—and there were many such—would quickly overthrow Tito's leadership. In fact, according to Dedijer, this might well have happened if Tito had not succeeded in retaining the allegiance of the key Partisan leaders and if his dreaded security police had not swiftly and ruthlessly exterminated thousands of suspect "Cominformists." Then by the time it had become clear that no internal coup against Tito was forthcoming, the changed international situation made a Soviet invasion too risky, in Stalin's mind.

Dedijer believes that Stalin was restrained in part by his agreement with Churchill (in October 1944) to share influence in Yugoslavia with the West on a 50–50 basis. It seems likely, however, that the Soviet dictator was deterred much more by the emergence of NATO and the West German Federal Republic, by the United States' seemingly permanent involvement in European affairs, and by the probability that the forcible subjugation of Yugoslavia would therefore prove a prolonged and costly affair. Even so, Soviet-bloc political and economic pressure on Belgrade continued to mount until 1953, and Dedijer maintains that if it had not been for Stalin's death an invasion of Yugoslavia by Cominform forces would eventually have come.

Dedijer wrote this book after the Warsaw Pact powers' invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Although by

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then this former Partisan fighter and member of Tito's inner circle had been repudiated as a heretic himself (for having gone to the defense of his friend Milovan Djilas), he received the full cooperation of Yugoslav officials in collecting data about the period from 1948 to 1953.

The book was published in Yugoslavia in 1969, apparently because the regime felt that it would help to rally popular support in the face of what appeared to be a new Soviet threat to the country (up until the fall of Alexander Dubcek in June 1969, the book was also being published in serialized form in Czechoslovakia). But even if publication of the study served the current needs of the Yugoslav regime in one way, it was also a measure of the relatively greater freedom of political expression permitted in Yugoslavia, since Dedijer repeatedly makes critical references in the book to certain aspects of Yugoslav life, particularly to the behavior of Tito's "security forces," whom he accuses of excessive zeal in liquidating many "honest fools" suspected of pro-Stalinist leanings.

Dedijer also makes an important point in observing that the partial democratization of Tito's regime came about mainly as a result of the break with Moscow. Confronted with the threat of invasion by Cominform forces and still isolated from the West by its strident Communist militancy, the regime could survive only by appealing to the nationalist instincts of the Yugoslav masses and allowing them a greater measure of participation in the nation's political affairs.

The decisive break with Moscow also forced Tito to make peace with the West—at first with the left-wing socialists in Western Europe and England, and later with the "ruling circles" of capitalist countries—with the result that the latter eventually accepted Yugoslavia as part of the non-Soviet world.

Although he has traveled a long way ideologically, Dedijer is still very much a patriot when it comes to defending Yugoslavia. The book is characteristically silent, for instance, on Tito's reaction to the coup in Prague in February 1948, and there is only one modest paragraph on Yugoslavia's role in the Greek civil war. But Dedijer is outspoken when it comes to the Soviet threat. "Stalin died in 1953," he writes, "but Stalinism [has] remained . . . . the summer of 1968 demonstrated just how tenacious and dangerous it could be."

Whether, as Dedijer implies, the Belgrade regime's need to continue its precarious balancing act between the worlds of communism and democracy will contribute toward the further improvement of internal conditions in Yugoslavia and to the further democratization and humanization of the regime remains to be seen.

Vladimir Petrov

The New Hombre

RICHARD R. FAGEN: *The Transformation of Political Culture in Cuba.* Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1969.

LITERATURE ON the present political system in Cuba tends to be polemical, lacking in objectivity, and therefore of little academic value. Happily, Professor Fagen's study is a welcome exception to this rule.

The book examines three particular features of the current Cuban political system—the literacy campaign, the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, and the Schools for Revolutionary Instruction. Prof. Fagen views these as interrelated elements in the regime's effort to socialize the masses and instill in them a sense of political awareness and commitment, whereby it hopes to mold each citizen into a model Castroite. The author fails, however, to delineate with sufficient clarity the contradiction inherent in a policy which seeks to win the support of the masses while failing to provide for genuine mass participation in government. The country continues to be ruled by a paternalistic, elitist oligarchy which confers the privileges of participation in its power monopoly solely on those who served in the rebel army or who are party members.

As instruments of mass mobilization, literacy campaigns, revolutionary committees, and programs of indoctrination are certainly not unique to Cuba—they can be found under different names in all revolutions, especially those led by Communists. But the author detects a characteristically Cuban flavor in the close intermingling in these institutions of two distinct functions: a) socialization of the masses and benevolent parternalism (*e.g.,* aid to the community), and b) control over the policing of the very masses which the government is trying to socialize. In other countries, these functions tend to be more clearly divided.

A central target of the regime's policies, as Professor Fagen notes, is Cuba's youth. The so-called "youth culture," which has swept through the non-Communist world, is rejected by Havana, as it is by other Communist regimes. Instead, the Cuban government seeks to promote the values of the ruling oligarchy, to fuse "work and social service into an idealized vision of a clean, hard, useful life" (p. 146). In doing so, the government is impelled, on the one hand, by its requirements for manpower, a need which has been aggravated by the exodus of hundreds of thousands of Cubans since the revolution, and on the other hand by "a fundamental belief that only the young come to the revolutionary experience uncorrupted and pure enough to be formed into true Communists" (p. 147). Havana sees this as the only way to create the "integral man"—*i.e.,* its own equivalent of the "new Soviet man" or the Chinese Communists' Lei Feng.

A policy of mobilization, rationing, sacrifice, and enthusiasm such as that attempted in Cuba cannot be continued indefinitely, as the experience of other countries has proved. Eventually, a substitute must be found. Castro apparently expects that even in a society of greater abundance, youth will neither become soft nor withdraw into itself—a utopian expectation which Prof. Fagen rejects. The measures described in the present book were obviously designed to create personalities capable of maintaining a heroic posture in a society where heroism is no longer the most important requisite. Only when the present siege psychology ends, however, will we learn whether youthful revolutionary fervor and dedication can in fact survive in a non-revolutionary, non-heroic climate. Prof. Fagen concludes that they cannot, but only time will tell whether his judgment is correct.

Victor Alba

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Correspondence

NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to the Editors, Problems of Communism, *US Information Agency, 1776 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, DC, 20547.*

Asian Issues

TO THE EDITORS: You have done a splendid job by raising the issue of China's expansionism in the January-April 1971 issue and presenting two contrasting views on it. However, I find that both the approaches suffer from similar limitations. Very briefly, the articles represent only slight variations on the *same* American myopia in perceiving China's policies. The search for wider perspectives has produced an unrealistic appraisal of China's proximate goals. Franz Michael's "design for aggression" concludes on the potentialities of psychological warfare and ignores that China's real success in international relations has *not* been the demonstration of moral righteousness. Peter Van Ness similarly assumes the constraints of Maoist morality and de-emphasizes the vast latitude within which it can operate.

It is difficult to be threatened by China's presumed expansionism on the psychological level, as Michael would have it, because the dominant threat does not exist on this plane. Michael's analysis is evidently influenced by the hangover of the Vietnam experience, which has badly bruised the American conscience. He appears now to be looking painfully for a sham corrective of psychological warfare.

An equally America-bound extreme is that of Van Ness, who mistakenly justifies so-called revolutionary self-reliance. Not having directly experienced it, he fails to mention the vast divergence between Chinese professions and practices. For example, China's material support to the Nagas—an act which constitutes a violent interference in India's internal affairs and which blatantly repudiates the virtuous "five principles of peaceful coexistence" that the Chinese leaders themselves continue to harp upon—is not even mentioned.

The broad generalizations of these authors hardly do justice to the underlying power concerns of the Chinese, who advance reasonable claims of ideological purity but at the same time continue to perpetuate their selfish national interests. Van Ness's reference to moral Confucian precedent constitutes only a half-truth. The morality of the sage has to be supplemented with the legacy of the legalists. China is not just one or the other. The debate should transcend the either-or approach because Chinese expansionism cannot be understood in terms of neat dichotomous categories. China is certainly not expansionist in the imperialist sense. However, the continuing syndrome of the Middle Kingdom has created situations where China has consistently failed to come to terms with any big nation on equal terms. It is the adolescent illusion of being a superpower without in fact possessing superpower status that defines the real Chinese stance. China's recent limited diplomatic flexibility is not a product of world policies but its own "opening up"—a process that can be strengthened only from within. Meanwhile, any talk of counter-psychological warfare or a retreat into an uncritical acceptance of Maoist morality would only endanger and halt this process. In fact, China has to do some real "growing up" before its nature can be understood.

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TO THE EDITORS: Gratitude and congratulations are due you for the perfectly splendid "Focus on Asia" issue. It has more than any journal's share of quality and original contributions to the many-faceted attention we need to maintain toward this crucial area. I particularly wanted to say as much to you so that the critical remark below could be placed in its proper context.

Peter Van Ness has very succinctly stated a major misconception which he and most people have concerning the military realities in Asia today. On page 73, at the top of the first column, he writes: "In fact, China today has no real offensive capability in the sense of being able to launch an effective attack on a major power." He cites a book on China's conventional forces as authority for his observation. . . .

The fact is, China could utterly destroy 20th-century Japan *this afternoon,* and Japan is correctly considered to be the third-ranking "major power" in the world. The Chinese have demonstrated this capability with highly-publicized nuclear-weapons tests, including—on October 27, 1966—a missile shot over the distance between China and Japan, with a nuclear explosion at the target entirely adequate to take out Japan's air defense bases. Given a handful of such weapons, the defenses of Japan could be paralyzed in from 10 to 15 minutes. China's home-produced bombers are, then, more than enough "real offensive capability" to reduce the centers of Japanese power to rubble in less than an hour using already demonstrated thermonuclear air-drop weapons.

None of these weapons has been either properly designed or deployed to serve in a defensive role. . . . These are weapons of intimidation, and their shadow is the one in which Asian and American leaders have labored to construct a secure peace in the area for the past seven years.

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